



ASSN Quarterly

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Welcome to the June 2015 Special Edition

ASSN Quarterly is published by the African Security Sector Network. It highlights the activities of the network, as well as other developments in the fields of Security and Justice Reform, both in Africa and beyond.

The views expressed in the articles published in this newsletter are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the African Security Sector Network.

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Dear Reader,

Let me begin by apologising for the prolonged absence of this newsletter. As with so many other organisations, staffing cutbacks have made it difficult to sustain some of our core services, including outreach to our membership. I am pleased to report that Philip Emase, who founded this newsletter and set the standard for its rich and colourful content, is once again riding to our rescue. I wish all our readers to join me in thanking Philip for his selfless support of the network.

We have not been lacking exciting developments to report. The ASSN was among the organisers of the inaugural 'Africa Forum on Security Sector Reform (SSR)', hosted over three days in November 2014 by the African Union at its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Forum was aimed at complementing and building on recent normative and policy developments in the field of SSR, most importantly the adoption of the AU Policy Framework on SSR (AU-SSRPF) in January 2013 and the

launch a few months later (in May 2013) of the multi-year, multi-donor programme entitled *"Building African Union Capacities in SSR"*, in which the ASSN features as a technical partner. The Forum was organised by the AU in collaboration with the Slovak Republic, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the ASSN, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and its International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT). It follows the earlier 'High Level Panel on the Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in East Africa' in Nairobi in November 2012, and is expected to be institutionalised as a biennial platform bringing together policy makers, analysts and practitioners from AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the Pan African Parliament, civil society, academia and international partners to review SSR developments and challenges on the continent.

For the ASSN, the success of the Forum was an especially a proud moment, in view of the fact that the AU Policy Framework on SSR was itself developed by the AU with technical support from the ASSN. Under the programme to build AU SSR capacities, the ASSN has the additional task of developing Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs) to facilitate the implementation of the AU-SSRPF. In the same month of November (and following on the heels of the Forum), the ASSN co-organised an AU consultation workshop (also in Addis) to validate the second batch of Operational Guidance Notes (the first batch of OGNs were validated at a previous workshop in Addis in November 2013). You will find details of both the SSR Forum and the OGN workshop in this special edition of the *ASSN Quarterly* newsletter. The SSR Forum was 'high-profile', but not highly optimistic, as it surveyed the conflicts in South Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic, the terrorist attacks in Kenya and Nigeria, and the increasing hubris that SSR confronts in these environments. The year 2015 has underscored these escalating security challenges, with the deepening crisis in Burundi (paradoxically one of the few bright spots in the case studies reviewed at the Forum), the xenophobic attacks in South Africa, and the distressing scenes of thousands of desperate migrants trying to flee violence, political oppression, and grinding poverty in harrowing conditions across the Mediterranean. These (and similar) events make it imperative that we advance the critical dialogue that began at the Forum in November, specifically around the key question: can SSR as presently configured respond to these multi-layered challenges? At a conference in Berlin convened by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 4 (appropriately to rethink Germany's contribution to SSR) I put forth my own initial thoughts on this question. I hope ASSN members and other readers will respond to widen and deepen the debate (and indeed I am happy to note that several ASSN colleagues have already taken on this task in the latest issue of the Strategic Review for Southern Africa, featured on Page 14 of this newsletter).

Still, there are other exciting developments to report. In addition to work on the continental level, the ASSN's member organisations have been equally busy. In Kenya, the Nairobi-based Security Research Information Centre (SRIC) supported the organisation of a forum to address security and community-centred issues relating to the nascent oil and gas industry in East Africa, which has over the past half-decade emerged as a new global energy frontier following the discovery of commercially viable oil and gas deposits in several countries within the region. In Ghana, the Women Peace and Security Network-Africa (WIPSEN-Africa) has spent the first quarter of 2015 charting the way forward for the post-programmatic sustenance of its now-ending project on gender mainstreaming in the country's security sector. In Nigeria, the NGO PRAWA (Prisoners Rehabilitation and Welfare Action) has launched a programme against human trafficking, working in collaboration with the federal government's National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), in addition to other relevant government institutions and Civil Society Organisations. The ASSN's growing role in promoting African security has been demonstrated by the recent recognition of individual ASSN members both in their countries and elsewhere across the world. Professor 'Funmi Olorisakin, a founding member of the ASSN, has been nominated by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as a Member of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, appointed alongside a panel of other eminent experts of global stature to review the UN Peacebuilding architecture. Another ASSN member, Abratha Doe, has been appointed Liberia's Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dennis Dlomo is South Africa's new Ambassador to Algeria while Jocelyn Habimana has been appointed AU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Consultant for the Republic of Madagascar. These individual achievements are briefly profiled in the 'ASSN People' section on Page 2 of this newsletter.

In this edition we also welcome two new institutional member organisations into the ASSN family. One is the African Policing and Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF), a network of African policing practitioners from state and non-state institutions that promotes police reform in Africa. The other is the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), an organisation that is playing a crucial role in the state building of the autonomous region of Somaliland in the Horn of Africa. And in our 'Member Profile' we feature Kellie Conteh of Sierra Leone, undoubtedly one of Africa's most experienced SSR practitioners, who was in 2014 awarded the country's Grand Commander of the Order of the Rokel (GCOR) by President Ernest Bai Koroma for his widely lauded contributions to the reform of the security sector in Sierra Leone. We hope you will have a happy time reading about these institutional and individual achievements that the ASSN members are making, as you also update yourself on recent developments both within the ASSN Network and broadly in the field of SSR, which you will find in the news and feature articles within the newsletter.

With warm greetings,

Eboe Hutchful
Executive Secretary,
African Security Sector Network (ASSN)

ASSN People



FUNMI OLONISAKIN has been nominated by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as a Member of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. Professor Olonisakin is a founder member of the ASSN. She joins a panel of seven experts from around the world tasked with undertaking country case studies in Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste towards conducting a policy and institutional review of the UN Peacebuilding architecture.



ABRATHA P. DOE has been appointed Assistant Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Liberia. Prior to her appointment by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and subsequent confirmation by the Senate, Ms Doe served as Coordinator of the Gender Section at the National Elections Commission, Republic of Liberia.



DENNIS DLOMO has been appointed Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa to Algeria. Mr Dlomo was previously Coordinator for Intelligence at South Africa's National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICC) and also served as Executive Secretary of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA).



LEYMAH GBOWEE participated in a live BBC World Debate on the topic of *'Ebola: What Next – Who runs a country when it's in crisis?'* Other panellists in the debate were Dr. Moustapha Koutoub Sano, Guinea's Minister for International Co-operation; Jan Egeland, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC); Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Director of UN Women; and Arnold Ekpe, former Chief Executive of Ecobank. The debate was filmed live at the University of Ghana in Accra.



ALI KAMAL-DEEN published an article titled *The Anatomy of Gulf of Guinea Piracy*, in the Winter 2014 Issue of the *Naval War College Review*. Commander Kamal-Deen is the Director of Research at the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, as well as Legal Director of the Ghana Navy.



ELISA ROCHA and **JOCELYNE NAHIMANA** have joined the African Union Commission (in separate capacities). Jocelyn (right) has been appointed the AU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Consultant for the Republic of Madagascar, while Elisa (left) has been appointed Programme Analyst at the Global Portfolio Services Office (GPSO) in the AU Peace and Security Department's SSR Unit. Both are new members of the ASSN.



African Union Hosts Inaugural Africa Forum on Security Sector Reform



The African Union (AU) hosted the Africa Forum on Security Sector Reform (SSR), from 24 - 26 November 2014, at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. The Forum was organised by the AU in collaboration with the Slovak Republic, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and its International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT).

The Africa Forum on SSR brought together over 250 participants, among them representatives of AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs), the Pan African Parliament and senior government officials and experts engaged in SSR across Africa, as well as partners.

The aim of the Forum was to complement and build on recent normative developments, in particular the adoption of the AU Policy Framework on SSR in 2013 which "URGES Member States to take advantage of the Policy, and ENCOURAGES the Commission to avail the required assistance to Member States in this respect". The Forum also discussed the UN Security Council Resolution 2151 of 2014, and highlighted the role of the UN and the AU in supporting SSR in conjunction with other sub-regional, regional, and multilateral organisations. The Forum additionally offered a platform of dialogue for stakeholders and experts to consider the unique challenges and opportunities in engaging and supporting sustainable SSR programmes in Africa. Participants further explored the application of the growing myriad of lessons and good practices identified across successful SSR programmes and processes in Africa.

Participants held in-depth discussions on a number of thematic issues, including the role of SSR across the cycle of development; the importance of governance; SSR as a political process; inclusiveness; the role of non-state and customary or traditional security and justice institutions; planning for sustainability, partnerships and effective coordination; the need for a holistic approach; coherence in support (underpinned by a commitment to national ownership); and the importance of monitoring and evaluation.

The following key issues emerged from the discussions:

- **National ownership cannot be imposed from outside:** SSR must be home grown, taking into account broader needs of all stakeholders in a particular context, with a view to transforming rather than strengthening already broken security institutions. Participants took particular note of the role of informal/traditional/customary security and justice institutions and stressed the need to better integrate them into reform processes.

- **The importance of political leadership in SSR processes:** The need for political leadership was highlighted in all SSR stages

including in the conception, resource mobilisation, implementation, and coordination of national SSR processes, taking into account the fact that SSR can have far reaching political implications.

- **Limited capacity was identified as a major challenge to building effective and accountable security and justice institutions in conflict and post-conflict contexts:** Participants emphasised the strengthening of linkages between SSR and DDR efforts as well as effectively integrating them into broader development and good governance priorities for reconstruction. They also stressed the need for incorporating gender as part of the process and expected outcomes of reforms.

- **African Union capacities in SSR need to be reinforced to better support the growing requests from its Member States:** Participants highlighted the potential for technical SSR support that could be delivered by the African Union in light of the growing number of requests currently being directed to the AU by Member States. This support to Member States can only be delivered if there is adequate SSR capacity at the African Union.

- **Coordination remains a key challenge to the effective implementation of SSR:** While coordination of SSR is a national responsibility, in practice, countries emerging from conflict often lack the capacity to coordinate international assistance. Participants identified some good practices in coordination, including joint situation and needs assessment by partners to support countries in formulating their own vision for reforming the security sector.

- **Implementation of SSR must place an equal emphasis on the effectiveness of core security providers as well as their oversight and proper management:** SSR involves not only building effective security institutions in a coherent manner, but it also involves laying down the foundations of good governance upon which they must stand. The latter remains a gap area for international support. However, the AU should not lose sight of the need to develop capacity to stop the violence and the atrocities in conflict areas before any SSR plans are put in place.

- **Good security sector governance, oversight and management - including in the area of public financial management - should be key priority areas for international support:** There is a need to re-balance processes and programmes from predominant focus on capacity building to equal prioritisation of effective, efficient and accountable use of existing and planned resources invested in reform initiatives.



AU Commission Deputy Chairperson Erastus Mwencha (centre) addresses a press briefing during the Forum, together with H.E. Miroslav Lajcak, Deputy Prime Minister of Slovakia (right) and Mr. El Ghassim Wane, Director for Peace and Security at the AU Commission

Participants agreed that SSR could be a significant expenditure burden to countries, which could crowd out other development priorities if left unchecked. Participants noted that reforms should therefore be supported by robust public financial management laws and policy frameworks in order for them to be accountable and sustainable. Participants also identified innovative approaches and tools for transparent human resource management and procurement.

• **SSR is an important peace-building tool:** SSR can enhance security for both the state and its people, bring peace and foster development and economic prosperity for all. Participants further identified important ingredients for success, among them inclusive structures for piloting reforms with the participation of civil society organisations and women. They further agreed on the need to build on quick wins that could lock-in momentum for long-term reforms.

• **SSR is also a critical stabilisation instrument:** The ability of SSR to address underlying causes of conflict comes from its commitment to dialogue. Parties to conflict can find power sharing solutions on national security issues through inclusive dialogue that does not necessitate the continuation of violent conflict and tragic pursuit of purely military solutions. In this regard, SSR may be used as a political tool to address violent security challenges, in particular in stabilisation contexts.

• **The crucial role of regional and sub-regional organisations in SSR:** Participants highlighted the important role that regional and sub-regional organisations can play in SSR processes in view of the cross-border nature of many peace and security challenges.

At the same time, they noted the central role of the United Nations in all global peace and security issues, and the responsibilities of AU Member States to provide security for their own states and citizens.

• **Focus on implementation of SSR activities on the ground:** It was pointed out that the AU has developed numerous policy frameworks, but a number of these policies are not being effectively implemented. The call was made to focus on the full implementation of the AU Policy Framework on SSR as the way forward.

Representatives of AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities, the Pan African Parliament and Civil Society Organisations held frank and open discussions on the added value of establishing an African Group of Friends of SSR. ASSN Chair Boubacar N'Diaye and Executive Secretary Eboe Hutchful chaired a number of sessions during the three-day forum. Various ASSN members also made presentations and crucial contributions, among them Professor Funmi Olonisakin, Ms Nicole Ball, Dr Awino Okech, Dr Niagalé Bagayoko, Mr Stephen Emasu and General (Rtd) Martin Luther Agwai.

On the way forward, the forum concluded that the amount of progress made so far called for the urgent need to expedite the complete operationalisation of the AU SSR Policy Framework, a call that the AU SSR team promised to work assiduously towards achieving.

East Africa Energy Infrastructure Security Forum Held in Nairobi



A number of countries in the East African have over the past half-decade emerged as new global energy frontiers, with the discovery of commercially viable oil and gas deposits in several countries within the region. These impressive finds and the accompanying development of energy infrastructure development projects have however been undermined by a string of recent security setbacks, particularly militant attacks, terror activities and ethnic conflicts in the region. These recent security incidents highlight the growing threats, broadly in the region's nascent oil and gas industries and the critical importance of community engagement in resource development for the optimal protection of oil and gas employees, infrastructure and assets.

In an attempt to address these concerns, the East Africa Energy Infrastructure Security Forum was held on 4 – 5 February 2015 in Nairobi, bringing together senior level security experts from oil and gas and construction to discuss pressing security concerns affecting the region. The two-day forum was sponsored by Warrior Security and Windward, with support from the Security Research Information Centre (SRIC).

SRIC is the ASSN's regional hub in East Africa and the Great Lakes Region.

The meeting was opened on day one by Charles Mbuvi, Head of Security at VIVO Energy Africa, with a keynote address that examined current and emerging security challenges facing the energy sector in this East Africa. There were also discussions on the importance of community engagement, with a panel discussion focused on best practices for cooperating with local communities. Experts from ASIS International, Maersk Kenya, and the Institute of Professional Security Studies (IPSS) participated in the discussion moderated by Rob Phayre, Security Manager of BG Group in Kenya. They analysed drivers of violence and insecurity in the region, the importance of coordination with the host countries and explored potential challenges associated with community engagement.

The second day of the forum featured a presentation by Leonardo Hoy-Carrasco, Maritime Crime Hostage Support and Government Mentor on Maritime Strategy at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), on the hostage situation in Somalia. Mr Hoy-Carrasco gave an update from the UN hostage support programme that looked at current threats, captivity, release, recovery, repatriation and post-capture care.

On the afternoon of the second day, Silvester Kasuku, Director General/CEO of the LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority, delivered a case study on security challenges for building and operating the LAPSSET transport corridor. LAPSSET is a monumental regional project that plans to develop a new seaport in Lamu, Kenya; an oil pipeline from the Lamu seaport to South Sudan; road and railway links to Ethiopia and South Sudan; as well as three new airports and tourist resorts along the LAPSSET Corridor. Mr Kasuku gave an update on the project development, potential security threats, and protection planning against terrorist activity. His presentation was followed by a lively discussion with the audience who called on the Heads of LAPSSET project and Regional Heads of Security to work more closely towards the success of the massive project.

Other participants included senior representatives from VIVO Energy Africa, the Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA), Maersk Kenya, ASIS International, CNOOC Uganda, BG Group, Kenya Ports Authority, ABB, Control Risks, SRIC, Windward, Warrior Security, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) and IPSS.

Second Workshop on Draft Operational Guidance Notes for AU SSR Policy Framework

In the final week of November 2014, the African Union Commission held a consultation workshop to validate a second batch of Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs) that will be used in the implementation of the AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (AUPFSSR).

The workshop, organised in collaboration with the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), took place at the Jupiter International Hotel in Addis Ababa. It follows another workshop held in November 2013 to validate the first three OGNs. The OGNs will form part of a consolidated body of technical tools and instruments that will be used to operationalise the AUPFSSR, a policy framework developed by the AU Commission with technical support from the ASSN.

The November 2014 OGN workshop brought together representatives of AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), security experts, and researchers to review and validate the following four draft OGNs in preparation for their eventual ratification:

1. The Operational Guidance Notes on SSR Training
2. The Manual on the Harmonisation of National Security Legislation
3. Operational Guidance Notes on SSR Monitoring and Evaluation
4. Handbook on SSR Good Practices and Lessons Learned

This engagement forms part of a broader multi-year programme to help operationalise the AUPFSSR, as well as to build the AU's SSR capacity by bolstering African ownership in the policy and practice of SSR, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Titled '*Building African Union Capacities in Security Sector Reform (SSR)*', the programme is being implemented in a partnership between the African



Union Commission (AUC), the European Union (EU), the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), the SSR Unit in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO SSR Unit), UNOPS and the ASSN.

The third and final day of the workshop was used to revisit the 2013 OGNs, which were presented for a review and final comment, with the aim of finalising the drafts. The OGNs are intended for use by AU Member States in guiding their own SSR initiatives, with support from the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the SSR Unit within the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD). In the same week, the ASSN also held its annual Executive Committee meeting in Addis Ababa, under the leadership of its Chair, Professor Boubacar N'Diaye.

WIPSEN-Africa Wraps up Project on Gender Mainstreaming in the Ghana Security Sector



As part of its activities to wrap up its project on *Mainstreaming Gender and Enhancing Gender Responsiveness in the Security Sector in Ghana*, the NGO WIPSEN-Africa (the Women Peace and Security Network-Africa) held an experience sharing workshop on 26 February 2015 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KA IPTC) in Accra.

The workshop brought together representatives from four security sector institutions in Ghana (the Ghana Armed Forces, the Ghana Police Service, the Ghana Prisons Service and the Ghana Immigration Service), as well as Civil Society Organisations and resource persons from the three countries of Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Senegal. These resource persons made presentations on the progress of gender mainstreaming in the security sectors of their respective countries. Their presentations were followed by an interactive session during which participants shared their experiences.

The workshop ended with a consensus that whilst significant strides are being made in the efforts at mainstreaming gender in the security sector institutions, there is still a long way to go if this campaign is to gain traction in a predominantly male dominated arena. The participants were consequently urged to take up the mantle and work with persistent purpose towards achieving the gender responsiveness and transformation that is envisioned in the security sector.

In follow-up to the experience sharing workshop, WIPSEN-Africa held a subsequent meeting on March 4 to strategise on the way forward regarding gender mainstreaming in the Ghana's Security Sector. While this meeting once again brought together the four security sector institutions and participating CSOs, this time it also had the participation of three key partners from the executive arm of the Government of Ghana - the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection; the Ministry of Interior; and the Ministry of Defence.

This strategy meeting was the last one for the Security Sector institutions, the Ministries and CSOs to devise their strategies for the way forward after the project ends in April 2015, as well as to elaborate on how the gender desks that will be established and supported by WIPSEN Africa will be sustained and strengthened. The key objectives of the strategy meeting were to:

- Re-emphasise the importance of gender desk officers to work with their ministries and also involve CSOs in their future activities and programmes.
- Make specific recommendations to the Security Sector institutions, the Ministries and CSOs on the effective collaboration in terms of technical expertise, knowledge and data gathering, networking and advocacy.
- To discuss ideas for future collaboration between WIPSEN-Africa, other security sector institutions, ministries and CSOs.
- Urge the gender desks of the security sector institutions to learn from each other.

Deliberations at the meeting culminated in the establishment of a roadmap for future collaboration between the security sector institutions, CSOs and the relevant ministries. WIPSEN Africa urged these important stakeholders to work collaboratively to make effective gender transformation in the security sector a reality in Ghana. At the end of the meeting, WIPSEN-Africa donated furniture, computers and printers to representatives of all four security sector institutions, as part of their support toward the establishment of gender desks within these institutions.

The African Security Sector Network (ASSN) was represented at both meetings by its Programmes Coordinator, Jane Abubakar. WIPSEN Africa is the ASSN's gender focal point.

Conference Explores New Thinking on Peacebuilding in Africa

The African Leadership Centre (ALC) in collaboration with the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) held a conference at Wilton Park in London from 23 - 25 February 2015. Bringing together over 40 academics and policy practitioners from around the world, the conference focussed on peacebuilding in Africa under the theme "Peacebuilding in Africa: Evolving Challenges, Responses, and New Thinking."

Among other things, the conference aimed to examine the evolving challenges in the field, responses and what new thinking is emanating from the terrain. There were participants from core institutions operating in the peacebuilding terrain in Africa, including academics from universities and research centres and policy practitioners from the African Union (AU), East African Community (EAC) and the UN. Experts from the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) also participated in the conference, led by ASSN Chair Boubacar N'Diaye and Executive Secretary Eboe Hutchful.

Discussions at the conference were rich, touching on conceptual questions around the definition of peacebuilding to empirical ones around the transformations in the current terrain and how they are challenging old approaches to peacebuilding. The conference also discussed innovations in African peacebuilding and alternative perspectives evident in peacebuilding interventions on the continent.

At issue from the first day of the conference was the central question of the nature of peacebuilding when perceived from an African perspective. More often than not, mainstream thinking defines peacebuilding work as a post-conflict issue. Yet in many cases, peacebuilding ought naturally to run the full gamut from pre-conflict to post-conflict environments. Participants argued that peacebuilding ought to occur as the set of interventions that aim to prevent the outbreak of conflict in situations where early warning mechanisms indicate cumulating danger of violent outbreak. The participants problematised the role of the state in the peacebuilding process in Africa. The question was posed - although not necessarily fully answered - whether it is possible to study peacebuilding in Africa without a proper understanding of the nature of the state, the character of the elite within and outside the state and the nature of the social contract between the state and society? This very question underscored the long term nature of the peacebuilding undertaking and process and provoked discussions about the role of key activities, like Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and elections, which mark the political process following a peace settlement.

The conference noted that short term engagement leads easily to relapse in conflict only a few years after peace settlement. At the conference, innovative engagements around peacebuilding processes were identified and discussed in parallel working groups.



The role of regional players in the peacebuilding terrain was also discussed. A conference participant from a regional organisation reminded participants that peacebuilding has persistently been treated as the responsibility and preserve of the executive arm of government, yet there are many other actors whose stake is critical and perhaps even more consequential. His comment brought home to the conference the tensions evident in peacebuilding initiatives between sovereignty-bound actors on the one hand and the local and transnational actors on the other hand.

This idea that peacebuilding initiatives go beyond the executive arm of government should of course be obvious as courts and national and regional legislatures have important roles. So too is the role of partnerships between communities of thought and practice, academics and policy practitioners. The partnership between the African Leadership Centre (ALC) and the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), which has seen the provision of evidence-based policy thinking for the Assembly, was cited as an initiative that needs upscaling. Conference participants also recommended that it should be possible, for instance, for the AU to partner with the range of existing academic institutions on the continent to provide solid research upon which the AU can base its policy engagements.

The conference, which was supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, marked an important moment. Coming only a few weeks after the UN Secretary General appointed an Advisory Group of Experts on the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, the findings of the conference will certainly feed into the work of the Group of Expert. It is also planned that the ALC will join its partners to host a second follow-up conference later in the year in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

PRAWA Embarks on Anti-Human Trafficking Project in Nigeria

Human Trafficking - especially among youth, women and children - has become a major challenge in Nigeria, making the West African nation a source, transit and destination country. The victims are either trafficked within the country or beyond its borders. Internally, prospective child labourers or house servants and sex workers are recruited and transported from the rural areas to urban centres. External trafficking involves the recruitment of victims for the same purposes - regardless of their state of origin or socio-economic status - and transported across the Nigerian border, where they are forced to live under slave-like conditions in foreign lands.

In an effort to tackle the menace of human trafficking in Nigeria, the country's federal government established the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and other Related Matters (NAPTIP) in 2003. Despite the agency's efforts, the menace of human trafficking has remained a serious social problem. NAPTIP's 2013 data analysis report shows an increasing trend in human trafficking in some states. For example in Kaduna state, the documented number of rescued victims of human trafficking increased from four in 2012 to 114 in 2013, while in Kano State the number of rescued victims increased from 59 in 2012 to 148 in 2013. Similar trends were noticed in Anambra, Edo, Ogun and several other states.

In line with its vision of facilitating the emergence of a humane and secure society that corrects and empowers to prevent crime, violence and torture,

the NGO Prisoners Rehabilitation and Welfare Action (PRAWA) is seeking to join the effort to put an end the human trafficking in Nigeria through the implementation of sustainable initiatives driven by an effective inter-organizational collaboration. This project will involve a partnership with NAPTIP, considering its mandate as the focal government agency on anti-human trafficking matters in Nigeria, as well as with other relevant government institutions and Civil Society Organisations in the implementation of its Anti Human Trafficking project in the identified endemic States of Anambra, Edo, Kaduna, Kano, Lagos and Ogun.

With support from the Embassy of Netherlands in Nigeria, the project is aimed at:

- Carrying out series of public sensitisation campaigns aimed at reducing human trafficking.
- Supporting the rehabilitation of victims of human trafficking.
- Implementing advocacy visits to the policy makers within the identified states in order to promote the birth and effective implementation of legislation on empowerment schemes for women and youths.

As an initial step towards the implementation of the project, PRAWA visited these six states November and December 2014, holding meetings with relevant stakeholders such as NAPTIP; the State Ministries of Education, Gender and Women Affairs; Youth and Sports Clubs; and Civil Society Organisations.

Features

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM TRENDS AND CHALLENGES IN AFRICA

A Partners' Summary of the first Africa Forum on SSR



INTRODUCTION

Two years ago a distinguished group of leaders, policy makers and practitioners came together to discuss Security Sector Reform (SSR) at the 2012 High Level Panel on SSR in East Africa in Nairobi, Kenya. In the period since, SSR has become even more central to the conflict prevention, stabilisation, peacebuilding and development agendas across the continent. In January 2013 the African Union (AU) adopted its Policy Framework on SSR after a long period of consultation. In the same year, the second United Nations (UN) Secretary General's report on SSR was released, reflective of the now 70 per cent of all Security Council mandates that contain references to the reform of security institutions. In April 2014, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2151 was unanimously adopted under Nigeria's Presidency of the UN Security Council. The European Union (EU) has also moved forward in its support to SSR, and more and more countries across Africa are engaged in some form of development of their security and justice institutions, as well as providing South-South assistance to others undergoing similar processes.

The Africa Forum on SSR, held over a three-day period from 26th – 28th November 2014, equally reflects the importance and depth of critical understanding of the topic today. Supported by the African Union (AU), UN, EU, the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), the Government of Slovakia, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and its International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), the Forum brought together over 250 policy makers, analysts and practitioners to exchange experiences and lessons, and explore practical ways to further successful SSR against the myriad of challenges faced by countries and regions in Africa. Participants included representatives of AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs), the Pan African Parliament, senior Government officials, and experts engaged in SSR across the continent, as well as other partners.

Through rich and wide-ranging discussions, the Forum teased out a number of thematic areas that cut across the case study examples provided by Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and South Sudan. Attention was also given to the role of the AU and the RECs in supporting Member States in their SSR processes.

THEMATIC AREAS

The Relevance of SSR

SSR has long been recognised as being fundamental to long-term peace and development, but it is important to underline the relevance of SSR in a number of other roles, such as stabilisation and the prevention of conflict.

SSR is an important contributor to stability and is being factored into multi-dimensional approaches to dealing with crisis. One such example of this is the focus given to SSR by the international contact groups established by the AU whenever dealing with a crisis. At a policy level, UNSCR 2151 highlights the importance of SSR in stabilisation and reconstruction. On the ground, operations or missions dealing with immediate stabilisation efforts are increasingly also being mandated to support governments in undertaking SSR to strengthen the long-term effectiveness and accountability of national security institutions. This dual role provides clear opportunities. Examples from CAR show that deploying force to resolve hard security challenges will only be successful in tandem with political engagement to resolve the underlying causes of conflict. These are often SSR related and therefore need to be factored into the support delivered.

Yet at the same time this produces significant challenges. Peacekeeping missions are a stop-gap, and the balance between short-term pressures to quell tension and longer-term considerations for the successful, sustainable development of security and justice provision is a difficult one to reach in such trying circumstances. SSR cannot take place in all contexts. The situation in Libya shows that SSR cannot happen before there is a minimum level of political stability, with certain legal frameworks in place. Moreover, there are risks to engaging even when that minimum level of stability has been reached. Rebuilding the technical capacity of existing security actors quickly in order to respond to immediate challenges can simply re-establish a system that serves the elite rather than reflects the more varied security and justice needs of the population. In doing so, the inequalities that contribute to the root causes of conflict may be reinstated. This is exacerbated by the fact that missions are often limited to working with whatever state structures already exist in whatever areas they are deployed, such as in Somalia or CAR, rather than having the capacity to support necessary systemic change. A further complication for missions in such situations is how to ensure that their decisions are based on accurate information that encompasses a wide range of views, including those from stakeholder groups such as women and youth, with whom they may not interact.

Nonetheless, the breakdown in systems seen in stabilisation environments can provide space to revisit views of what form SSR should take in a country. It should, however, be recognised that this will only be a first step. The experience of South Africa, where the country embarked on two years of consultations before drafting their policies, illustrates the timescales involved, and time is a rare commodity in a stabilisation environment.

SSR can also be identified as a key conflict prevention process and several of the case studies provide examples of what happens when this is not done. The recent outbreak of violence in Côte d'Ivoire was, in part, due to a failure to deal with reform efforts within the military two years previously – despite the general increase in well-being brought about by significant economic growth and development in the country. In CAR, failing to (re-)engage in SSR in 2012 was seen as a major factor in the re-descent into conflict. A further central theme to SSR's preventative role is the political and participatory dialogue that should accompany reform or transformation efforts, as this can identify and tackle potential causes of conflict before they arise.

The Importance of Governance

Good governance and accountability sit at the very heart of SSR. A strong message emerging from the debates is that programmes that only train and equip security forces are neither effective in improving the safety and security of the population, nor are they sustainable. For example in South Sudan, although there has been a rapid investment in the military, it has, at best, failed to improve peace and security.

Many of the case studies examined during the Forum still display weak institutional structures and a lack of democratic governance. This is often despite a concentration of support programmes over the years.

Features

So clearly the support that has been provided is not creating the systemic and behavioural change that is needed.

Results from a 2012 evaluation of UN Peacebuilding Fund support to SSR shows that 93 per cent of assistance has been in the form of training and equipment. This is by no means seen as unique to the UN, and there are a number of possible reasons behind the tendency of the international community to provide 'train and equip' assistance, despite the poor track record of results. There is often a strong pressure to do something quickly. Train and equip support is perceived as meeting an immediate need and is considered to have a quick impact, albeit limited in depth. There may also be clear threats that security forces need additional technical capacity to meet. One example is the Nigerian Army's need to enhance its effectiveness to fight Boko Haram, although support in this regard may not be classified as SSR. From an international perspective, technical support is easier to deliver and often provides easy to measure outputs that satisfy Headquarters' and Capitals' demands for tangible results.

Whilst there are examples of support to strengthen democratic governance, they are unfortunately not the norm. Results are still few and far between and it takes time to develop the sort of robust framework required for governance. Advances can also be quite fragile. As can be seen in the example of Kenya, external threats such as terrorist groups can sway the balance back towards increasing the power of security agencies at the expense of oversight and accountability.

Focusing on improving the democratic governance of the security sector is by no means the preserve of the international community. As is all aspects of SSR, the driving force behind efforts to reinforce the good governance of security and justice actors needs to be the state, its institutions and, most importantly, its citizens.

Citizens need to know about, and understand, matters related to security and justice sector development in order to have a voice on governance issues. This can be a major problem, as seen in Nigeria, where much of the population seem unaware of how to engage with the system. More positively, Mali provides an example of how parliamentarians are able to keep their electorate informed as a result of promoting regular exchanges between deputies and security sector heads in order to build understanding. This regular contact also allows potential issues to be discussed and actions taken to correct them. A similar commitment to communication can be seen in Kenya, where the judiciary produce and disseminate to the public an annual report on the state of the institution.

More work is needed to reconsider what is meant by democratic governance to take into account the realities of how security and justice is provided on the ground. Current models are, at their core, state-centric. Yet these may not reflect the choices that would be made by the population if their voices could be heard. Similarly, the different checks and balances rooted in traditional and informal forms of authority that can reinforce democratic oversight and accountability need to be identified and factored into the development of security and justice systems. Security governance mechanisms need to be developed that can work with informal institutions as well as the State, and are better suited to the African context, especially at grass roots level. Despite these challenges, the Forum provides many examples where progress is being made.

The Programme de Développement du Secteur de la Sécurité (DSS) programme in Burundi places equal importance – and therefore sufficient resources – on support to accountability as it does to support to building up the effectiveness of the security sector. Training for professionalism includes an element of integrity embedded to every aspect. Democratic governance mechanisms are being built into the design of the security institutions in Somalia and embedded into the Constitutional and legal framework. Kenya has developed specific institutions to reinforce accountability, such as the office of the judiciary ombudsperson, created in 2011 to receive and process complaints and grievances from the public with regard to the judiciary and its employees.

A further aspect of governance being strengthened is in relation to financial management and oversight of security actors. In this regard, public expenditure reviews (PERs) have become more common, informing responsible security policymaking and budgetary processes. Examples of recent PERs include Burundi, Liberia and Mali, with planning underway by the UN and the World Bank to support such a process in Somalia. This is backed up by the development of guidance.

Leadership

An element inherently linked to governance is leadership, which emerged as one of the most dominant themes of the Forum. The absence of strong leadership, or leadership that lacks credibility, is a major factor in the failure of SSR. Yet, as can be observed in examples from Libya, SSR is often seen as a panacea for the lack of enlightened leadership. Lessons are not yet being learned on the vital importance of this factor for successful SSR.

There is still an influx of technical assistance that does little to support the fundamental political changes needed to improve accountable security and justice service delivery. The problem is further compounded by efforts to circumvent a lack of strong direction. However, leadership cannot just be created where it does not exist, and the responsibility to choose the leadership remains very much with the nation. This adds time and a further layer of complexity to the way SSR is supported. So whilst stabilisation contexts might not provide an established environment to undertake comprehensive security reform, they can offer a window of opportunity to set the foundations for longer-term engagement, in particular shifting the discourse to one that is more reflective of society. The issue of leadership of security and justice institutions is growing in relevance. For example, the Kenyan judiciary has placed the reorientation of leadership style amongst its three basic objectives for SSR. In Côte d'Ivoire, efforts are being made to build collaborative leadership through capacity building at the operational level. Yet work still needs to be done on the relationship between the leadership and the population, so leadership becomes truly representative, not just something that reinforces the elite.



Kenya's Deputy Chief Justice Kalpana Rawal speaks on Justice Sector Reforms

SSR as a political process

SSR is a fundamentally political process. It should be a process that seeks to alter the relationship between governing elites and the people so that they can forge a common sense of purpose and craft a shared vision of security. But there are still too many examples of support being approached as a purely technical undertaking, not least because it is often the easiest way to be seen to take action. For example, SSR in CAR is still largely perceived as a technical process revolving around the defence forces. Yet the politicisation of the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) in CAR has been identified as a key reason for the failure of SSR efforts over the past decade. Even if awareness of the political nature of SSR is present, it is no guarantee that a political process will be pursued, as other challenges often arise. In Libya, for example, everyone has retreated to offering technical responses because the framework to build more politically-minded transformation is missing. Hence, despite the understanding of the importance of the political dimension, putting this into practice is a much more challenging endeavour. SSR in South Sudan provides an example where there has been very little political support for SSR beyond issues that feed into the personal agendas of those in power. This situation is exacerbated further by weak oversight. One of the biggest lessons emerging from Libya is the need to create and encourage political will and achieve some degree of organisation in the Government and Parliament.

There are, nonetheless, many suggestions on how the politics of SSR can be placed more centrally. Undertaking a political analysis of the context and root causes of conflict allows for better focus and sequencing for SSR.

Features

For example, in Mali such a process identified that they needed to address the balance of ethnicity and factions within the security and defence forces before increasing their technical skills. The AU's policy on the illegal change of government (most recently invoked with regard to Burkina Faso) has been seen as an important step forward in helping to remove security actors from active involvement in politics.

The Burundi DSS example demonstrates that confidence of the public only comes with their seeing SSR as a process that has not been captured by politics. This means putting politics centre stage and factoring it into all the planning. Understanding the highly political nature of SSR means understanding the inherent risks, and developing systems and structures to monitor and manage them. Whilst the difficult political issues that block true change are rarely tackled effectively in programmes, the DSS covers this on a daily basis at both policy and operational level. The structure of the programme has even promoted necessary political dialogue, not least through the establishment of a multi-actor advisory group that facilitates exchanges and provides a testing ground for ideas before they are shared with wider stakeholders. Another benefit from taking such an approach is that it promotes a problem-solving approach to relationships.

The importance of putting politics at the core can again be seen in CAR, where power sharing in the security apparatus between the different belligerent groups will be at the heart of the political negotiation during the Forum of Bangui planned for January 2015.

Inclusiveness

Engaging in a truly inclusive SSR process is extremely challenging and time consuming. However, the authenticity, and therefore the sustainability, of any SSR effort lies on its ability to capture the range of views held within a country. For example, the lack of inclusion of families and communities has been cited as a key factor in the failure of SSR efforts over the last decade in CAR.

Exclusion can breed additional security problems. The strong link between economic power and political power in Nigeria has resulted in the elite excluding many sectors of the population from making politically-related decisions, including those affecting the security sector. This has potentially far-reaching consequences. A failure to engage with the most vulnerable groups of society runs the risk of their disenfranchisement, which can make them more susceptible to being co-opted into terrorist activities.

National visions for security and justice need to reflect all sectors of society, particularly the most vulnerable groups whose voices are still not always heard. If plans to transform the security sector architecture do not reflect the broad range of interests, efforts to reform or rebuild will be reduced to recreating the same broken systems, built on narrow security interests and agendas. Moreover, the design of a security and justice architecture that meets the population's needs can only be done through genuinely understanding the root causes of insecurity and fragility. This can only be achieved by learning from all sections of the population.

Reaching an inclusive vision is extremely challenging, as has been seen in CAR, where efforts have been hampered by diverging and often competing interests of actors vying for power and influence. Similarly, in Libya all efforts so far to bring multiple people to the table have collapsed.

Nonetheless, there are ways in which greater inclusiveness in SSR can be encouraged. Greater sensitisation efforts are required to ensure that people are aware of any SSR process and understand the issues at stake. This impacts on the time and resources needed. As underlined in the AU's policy framework for SSR, civil society and grassroots movements have an important role to play in this regard.

Lessons can be gathered from post-apartheid South Africa, where it took two years of consultations before establishing the idea of a White Paper. The Council of Ministers in South Sudan has used expert support from NGOs, as well as a six-month consultation process that went down to grassroots, to draft its new national security strategy for reform. Civil society in Mali is providing inputs into government policies to develop national strategies, and has seen some success fostering dialogue between the security sector and civilians. Furthermore, in Côte d'Ivoire efforts are being made to decentralise security processes and involve local authorities, thus taking the decision-making down to lower levels.

Security structures also need to be transformed to represent the societies they serve. Examples from francophone Africa show that ethnicity has often been used as factor for exclusion, with elite security forces coming from single ethnic groups. There are models that take a different approach, such as in

Cameroon where the different provinces have ring-fenced posts within the public institutions (such as the armed forces), but this can create challenges with regard to recruitment, promotion and training. Moreover, given that much of security and justice provision in Africa is delivered through informal mechanisms, efforts to encourage inclusiveness and representation must also be extended to these systems.

The inclusion of women in decision-making in security policies, and the development of security and justice provision to include safety concerns most relevant to them, is also an important aspect. In this regard, Mali is promoting gender throughout its defence and security forces. Female representation is now at 11 per cent. This covers all ranks, and three women have been recently promoted to the rank of General. In Kenya, efforts have been made to ensure that all judicial staff are trained and informed on issues relating to the security of women in order to make the institutions better equipped to deal with cases.

Non-state and customary or traditional security and justice actors

SSR is often seen as a state-centric preserve. However, a significant percentage of security and justice services is provided by customary, traditional or non-state providers. Moreover the AU Policy Framework highlights the importance of customary and informal security and justice actors.

This area is incredibly complex and engagement with non-state actors can be high risk. Nonetheless such engagement is crucial for success given their prevalence and capacity to provide services where no state structures exist. This can, in part, be mitigated by ensuring an in-depth understanding of the nature of non-state actors: their roles, constituencies and relationships. This is vital, as many SSR processes are unfortunately based on misunderstandings of how this sector functions, and of the complex relationship between these informal actors and the state structures. The situation in Libya provides a clear example where such analysis needs to take place. This can also be seen in examples from CAR over the role of religious groups, and the nature of the civilian Joint Task Forces set up in Nigeria. Even within state structures there are many aspects characterised by informal practice that affect the functioning of the system. One such example is the criteria for recruitment and promotion within the security forces.

In addition to the provision of security and justice services, the non-state sector has an important role to play in oversight. Lessons from the Burundi DSS underline that civil society is critical for comprehensive and viable accountability with adequate external oversight.

Planning for sustainability

SSR needs are often pressing and there is pressure to get support seen on the ground quickly. However, this can have dramatic effects in terms of undermining the sustainability of efforts. Addressing issues of governance requires long-term commitment and patience. Addressing issues of governance requires long-term commitment and patience. Even when the primary focus is on short-term stabilisation, it is nonetheless vital to start developing the vision of security and identity, and recognise the impact of decisions taken in the early stages on the long-term success of SSR. One such example of this is the propensity of the International Community to focus solely on the elite, often under the guise of national ownership, thus perpetuating the narrow involvement of the population in the decision-making process.

Examples from CAR show that the hope and expectations of the local population for quick results are difficult to manage, particularly after protracted conflict and instability. It can be difficult to incorporate a longer-term perspective. There are also short-term pressures to deal with immediate security concerns, such as links to elections, DDR and providing immediate steps to address root causes. However, decisions made quickly can have far-reaching, negative consequences, as has been seen in the case of Libya where the national authorities took a decision to start paying the revolutionary brigades at two to three times the rate for personnel in the Police or the Army, resulting in inequalities and a dramatic increase in numbers that went far beyond a sustainable level.

Incorporating a long-term vision to SSR needs to be matched by commitment and political will of partners to engage over a protracted period of time. This needs to be far longer than the current two to four years seen in most programmes or peacekeeping mandates. The International Community also needs to deliver its assistance in such a way that it builds and encourages national ownership and avoids the pitfalls, seen in countries such as CAR, of creating dependency on donor interventions.

Features

Support that is developed, managed and/or implemented by external actors will only further stifle opportunities to build up the capacities for creativity, initiative and delegation that are often lacking after decades of dictatorial rule. The Burundi DSS programme provides some insight into how to incorporate the necessary timescale to change mindsets and public confidence in institutions.

The issue of ownership is central for sustainability and efforts by the international community to drive through frameworks are doomed to failure. Efforts in South Sudan have been met by multiple obstacles and donor behaviour may have been a contributing factor. For example, civil society felt that the process of drafting the South Sudan White Paper on Defence was driven by donors, rushed and not fully consultative. Moreover, they were not involved in the development of national security policy, nor were they brought into awareness raising, monitoring or dialogue.

In terms of planning support, it is important to identify the progressive building blocks needed to achieve a national vision for the provision of security and justice services. Tools and systems need to be developed to encourage and demand national political will, enticing a culture and attitude more suited to SSR and good governance.

Plans should also include analysis and programmed support regarding public financial management aspects of the security sector as part of a sustainable approach. Moreover, external supporters of SSR in a country have a responsibility to ensure that their support is passed through the official state financial management systems to ensure accountability and embed it into the national systems.

Sustainable support often means a progressive approach, whereby increased responsibilities within a programme are taken on by national counterparts as their capacities develop through being intimately involved in implementation. This was very much the case in Burundi, where flexibility has been built in to allow the focus of support to shift in order to build up the level of ownership as the programme develops.

The need for a holistic approach

Experiences from across the countries presented at the Forum underline that isolated support to single units does not lead to sustainable solutions. For example, whilst in South Sudan each security actor has planned for reform, the work has been uncoordinated. There is no national framework to allow for a holistic approach and there is a great difference in understanding across the different actors of what SSR means.

Nigeria provides a germane example of the repercussions of failing to take a holistic approach. Only the military seems to have been engaged in fighting terrorism in Nigeria, missing out the vital roles of diplomacy, economic development, humanitarian interventions and aid. This misses the vital point that fighting terrorism is as much about capturing the goodwill of the population as it is about deploying hardware. Furthermore, the judiciary needs to be enabled and empowered to prosecute offenders in relation to terrorism, and given the length of its borders, reform of the Customs and Immigration Agencies should also be considered.

Similar challenges with regard to fighting terrorism apply to Mali and the wider Sahel. A holistic approach to find solutions is required, bringing together all the different actors implicated in the root causes. The need for such a multi-dimensional focus can also be seen in CAR, where SSR will need to be synchronised with future DDR plans, and both will need to flow from the broader political dialogue to address the underlying causes of the conflict. This is being supported by the AU, UN and EU.

The holistic approach can also be seen as capturing a number of the themes of the Forum: the need to link up political dialogue and technical cooperation; linking up short-term measures to stabilise with long-term support to institutionalise change; addressing security issues at national, regional and local levels; and promoting a governance element to all train and equip support.

Kenya has taken steps towards a more holistic approach to development of the security sector with the setting up of an inter-ministerial reform team looking at prison reform. The use of Community Service Orders also illustrates how the probation service, the police, the prison service, the judiciary and local communities can work together towards the rehabilitation of non-serious offenders.



Left to right: ASSN Member Stephen Emasu, ASSN Executive Secretary Eboe Hutchful, World Bank Conflict & Security Expert Paul Bisca and Niagalé Bagayoko of the ASSN / OIF at the conference.

But dealing with such a multitude of actors becomes very complex and therefore mechanisms are required to provide the space for transformation to occur. This is particularly important in light of the findings from the Forum that the international community should try and deliver more simple programmes. Mali provides one example, where they have developed a multi-dimensional organisational structure to guide, coordinate and monitor cross-sectoral SSR efforts. This has the added advantage of ensuring that the voices of a wide range of state and non-state actors are taken on board.

Partnerships

The partnerships built around support to SSR processes over the recent years are central to developing an in-depth understanding of the issues, and enhancing the capacity to respond to those needs. Sharing experience and expertise is vital and pooling resources maximises the comparative advantages of different organisations to provide assistance. Moreover, the legitimacy of international support is based upon strong partnerships with host nations and regional organisations.

The joint AU-EU-UN programme 'Building African Union Capacities in Security Sector Reform', aimed at operationalising the AU Policy Framework on SSR, is a positive example of what can be achieved when multiple actors are brought together. The recent joint SSR assessment missions to CAR and Madagascar carried out by the AU, EU, UN and the ASSN in partnership with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the case of the CAR, and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Organisation Internationale la Francophonie (OIF) for the case of Madagascar demonstrate the way in which joint support can be provided to AU Member States.

The UN's Group of Friends of SSR provides another such illustration, in particular with its role helping to assess which capacities, policy development, mechanisms and structures are needed by the UN system. Finally, the UN and the World Bank are launching a "Partnership on Security Sector Expenditures", which will organise peer exchanges between SSR practitioners, experts and government officials, as well as undertake a number of PERs.

But partnerships are not always easy, especially when looking at those that cut across different stakeholder groups. For example, there is still some way to go to bring together military and civilian ways of thinking within the UN/AMISOM partnership. In Burundi it took a long time to develop sufficient understanding of respective roles between the security forces and civil society. However, solutions can be found. The challenge in Burundi was surmounted through, inter alia, introducing the basics of SSR to all workshops, open days and visits by the media to military barracks.

Coherence of support

Whilst there is an overarching commitment to coordination, it is clear that there is still a long way to go in this area. Ensuring a common understanding of the issues is the first step in developing a joint approach to providing support, and there is evidence of progress being made in this direction with the joint AU/UN/EU assessments undertaken.

Features

A strong framework to guide engagement is key, and the African Union Policy Framework for SSR provides clear thematic guidance and acts as a very useful reference document that can be used to explore the division of roles of support. However, responsibility for coordination must rest with the national authorities and there is still a need in many countries for a stronger, coherent international SSR support strategy that has been developed with, and endorsed by, local partners. This is not always easy. If national capacities are weak, international actors should refrain from actions that are more likely to promote their own visibility than boost locally-led coordination. The suggestion of the AU and the RECs supporting national governments in setting up coordination mechanisms was first aired at the 2012 HLP, and with the AU Policy Framework on SSR now endorsed, there could be an opportunity to explore this idea further.

Coherence of support can also be improved through better internal coordination within missions, and the approach developed by UNSMIL with its SSR Division provides a good example of how this could be done. This underlines how SSR can play an integrating function within UN and international missions, rather than being a separate discipline, undertaken in parallel to police, justice, prisons and governance reforms.

The importance of monitoring and evaluation

Finally, the need for strong monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has been emphasised in all of the recent policy frameworks. UNSCR 2151 also calls for mechanisms to alert on underperforming SSR processes, including consideration of political or economic obstacles. There is a need to focus on building national inclusive and transparent monitoring and evaluation capacities, as well as developing mechanisms to share the lessons and experiences that would come out from such M&E processes.

There is often a lack of expertise and resources, as can be seen in the attempts in South Sudan to form an executive secretariat to follow up implementation. The lack of indicators to track progress, or real capacity to develop them, raises another problem. Even being able to identify what constitutes a result is often a challenge, especially in the area of democratic governance, where progress is often very incremental. Nonetheless, there have been examples of progress in establishing M&E systems. At a continental level, the AU is required to assist in the monitoring and evaluation of SSR processes in Member States. At a country level, the National Security Council in Côte d'Ivoire and UNOCI use a joint action plan that is jointly monitored. Civil society in Mali is carrying out monitoring of government processes. The DSS programme in Burundi recognises the need for results to be built progressively and incorporates an understanding of the time to achieve systemic change in its programme monitoring approach. A further lesson to emerge from Burundi is the need to develop a culture whereby mistakes are accepted as an opportunity to learn and develop, thus encouraging a willingness to take considered risks and try innovative approaches.

National ownership remains a fundamental dimension of security and justice sector reform in Africa. It is also a central principle for the AU, highlighted in the AU SSR Policy Framework. However, the myriad of cross-border dimensions and opportunities, for example across the Sahel, the Great Lakes region, or the Horn of Africa, illustrate the vital role Africa's regional and sub-regional organisations in assisting countries tackling emerging security threats. A range of structures and tools have been created to facilitate this, such as the African Standby Force (ASF) and counter terrorism mechanisms, and the establishment of an SSR unit within the Department of Peace and Security that will be sustained from 2016.

However, more is still needed to support Member States, for example supporting the mobilisation of resources and enhancing cooperation with partners. As such, the AU has established a solidarity initiative to help to support Member States. Moreover, there is a MoU between the AU and RECs on peace and security, as well as assistance provided by the EU to integrate a regional perspective into potential solutions.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has built experience assisting its Member States in their reform processes, including support to the police, judiciary and community policing in

Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan, as well as addressing transnational security threats, DDR and issues of decentralisation. This expertise could be taken further and used to further complement the work of the AU Commission.

ECOWAS has also evolved the assistance it is providing to its Member States, developing its approach and resources to sustain SSR support beyond donor-funded engagement, and ensuring that its tools and mechanisms can be adapted to address the dynamic nature of insecurity. Concrete examples of the political and strategic role that ECOWAS has played, as well as the direct capacity building support provided, include the ECOWAS Mission for stabilisation and support to SSR in Guinea Bissau, with 65 million USD committed to support DDR and SSR related activities. In Mali, ECOWAS played a political and diplomatic role to contribute to the stability of the country. Looking forward, ECOWAS is finalising its own guidance notes for SSR, although work is still required to move away from being overly focussed on defence at the expense of security more generally.

The Way forward

The understanding of good practice for SSR in Africa has clearly come a long way in the past two years. And as the Forum demonstrates, its importance as a way of preventing conflict, contributing to stability and building the foundations of long-term peace and development is as relevant as ever. There is now an AU SSR Policy Framework, and as seen from the case studies presented, a number of examples of good practice and innovative approaches to addressing security and justice challenges. The overarching conclusion is that more still needs to be done: a greater focus on governance, a better synergy of actions, more effective ways of working together with greater awareness of the impact on, and by, other processes, increased consideration of the informal or non-state sector, greater inclusiveness, and better delivery of support that reflects the political nature of SSR and the need for sustainable results.

With the aim to continue and deepen the debate within the AU and between the organisation and partners, a number of steps are proposed:

- The frank and open discussions held between representatives of AU Member States, RECs, the Pan-African Parliament and civil society organisations on the added value of an African Group of Friends of SSR highlighted a potential interest in the concept. However, more information is required before any decisions can be taken, including with regard to its constitution, mandate, and how it would complement other existing structures. In order to take this forward and in conformity with the recommendation made during SSR briefing to the Peace and Security Council on its 467th Meeting on 13 November, the AU SSR team will organise an AU member States consultation on SSR by October-November 2015.

- While the AU starts moving towards a greater presence and assistance to member States on SSR, it is important that the policy framework is better known and that all actors intervening on SSR within the continent are in line with its principles. The AU SSR team intends to include the issue in its Communication Strategy that will be implemented from early 2015.

- The 2014 Africa Forum on SSR has built on the 2012 High Level Panel on SSR in East Africa and generated even more debate, bringing in additional regions and layers of complexity. The next Forum should take place in 2016, to track progress and look at more innovative ways to improve the delivery of security and justice. One possibility is to include such an event into the new AU roadmap on SSR within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture. It is likely suggested that a similar forum is organised every two years.

- A specific Africa Forum on SSR website will be developed, providing an opportunity to harness the richness of the 2014 event through additional analysis on the main thematic areas explored, further development of lessons and guidance, and video interviews with some of its key speakers and contributors. The website will also provide the platform to bring together leaders, policy makers and practitioners again in 2016 for the second Africa Forum on SSR.

Security Sector Reform at the Crossroads?

By Eboe Hutchful

(This is the text of a presentation delivered by Professor Eboe Hutchful at a conference on 'Security Sector Reform and Governance: Assessing Germany's Contribution', convened by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, on May 4, 2015).

Building on the statement by the German Secretary of State that 'crisis' is the 'new normal', and taking advantage of my position as the first speaker on the first panel, allow me to inject some contrarian thoughts into today's discussion.

Recent developments have clearly signalled that we cannot continue to approach or discuss Security Sector Reform (SSR) with the same mantras, or endlessly interrogate the same familiar issues from SSR conference to SSR conference – 'same-old, same-old' as we say in West Africa.

The three principal developments that I have in mind are the following:

1. Recent acts of terrorism have exposed African states as having feet of clay, simply unable (or unwilling) to confront blatant new security threats. All the more worrisome that what we have in mind are not the usual suspects, but some of Africa's most militarily capable states, Nigeria and Kenya. The fact that these new threats are engulfing some of the strongest states in the region leads one to question the very concept of 'fragility';

2. Current events in Burundi (as in South Sudan earlier) have once again underscored how easily painfully executed SSR programmes can be derailed by broader political dynamics, or unravel in the face of ruthless contests for political power. The case of Burundi is particularly poignant, as it was only recently showcased at the 'Africa Forum on SSR' as a rare example of African SSR success, and – more to the point – hailed as an equally unique example of the positive difference made by placing governance at the heart of SSR. Less dramatic—but no less significant—is how longer-lived SSR initiatives in countries such as South Africa and Sierra Leone (also deemed in their day as largely successful) are slowly being shredded under the weight of shifting ruling regime interests;

3. The horrendous humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean: in two weeks in April 1200 people ('illegal migrants') drowned, and this morning alone (May 4) an additional 600 were rescued. What could possibly motivate large – apparently endless – streams of people to contemplate such desperate acts, particularly in view of the demonstrable dangers? On the other side of the continent, we have been witnessing another round of so-called 'xenophobic attacks' against African migrants in South Africa. What appears to link these two sets of events are the same dynamics of poverty and marginalisation.

These developments demand that we rethink SSR itself, the environment within which SSR unfolds, and (most importantly) the way(s) in which we conceive the linkage between SSR, governance, and development.

Let us consider each of these in turn:

Security

'Emperors without Clothes': African states are demonstrating extraordinary ineptitude at confronting serious emerging security challenges. The worrisome new element is that this is no longer your 'broken states', but now involves African states with vaunted military capabilities.



Professor Eboe Hutchful (second right) at the conference in Berlin

It is clear that addressing these new threats requires a different skill-set than what African security institutions are currently deploying. Core to this skill set is heightened intelligence capabilities. Yet 'Intelligence' is an element that is rarely addressed – indeed often studiously ignored – in SSR.

Or at least in the PUBLIC rhetoric of SSR. What is in reality is emerging is what some have called 'two-track SSR': on the one hand, the norm-driven, public 'SSR', on the other, the more covert and much more muscular Counter-Terrorism (CT) operations and capabilities (such as the regional operations in the Sahel, the Horn and in Nigeria) that are also closely tied to European and American security concerns and interests. It is already apparent (from both Kenya and Nigeria) that these CT operations are directly undermining governance and human rights, and will continue to do so as long as the focus is on military and police responses not informed (as my colleagues 'Funmi Olonisakin and Awino Okech argued eloquently at the Africa Forum on SSR) by a wider political and social strategy.

An increasingly urgent question is: To what can SSR be expected to equip African states to counter these new threats? This is not an easy question to answer, as it has never been clear what level of capability SSR is intended, expected or required to deliver. What one can conclude on the basis of available evidence, however, is that SSR has never been intended to deliver serious capability, offensive or defensive.

This provides an opportunity to address (however parenthetically) the misleading opposition that some have drawn between 'building operational capability' and 'building accountable and democratic security governance'.

Many critics of SSR have complained that SSR focuses too much on one at the expense of the other. In fact, operationally capable armed forces and security services are also much more likely to have both the discipline and institutional capacity to be responsive to civil oversight. For oversight is a technically complex and demanding exercise, both for those exercising oversight, and for those complying with its requirements. Conversely, there is little doubt that strong oversight contributes to institutional strengthening, as much in the security as the wider public sector. Studies (such as our own earlier survey of military budgeting processes in African countries) suggest that weak armed forces often go together with weak oversight, and vice versa (though there is no suggestion that strong military institutions necessarily or automatically sprout effective oversight or governance mechanisms – vide the fascinating example of apartheid South Africa).

Features

Governance

Evidence is emerging again (in Burundi as in South Sudan earlier) of how SSR may be destabilised by wider political dynamics. The reality is that SSR will remain inherently vulnerable to destabilisation in contested political environments where there is at best only tenuous respect for the rules of the game.

In spite of constant reiteration that SSR is 'highly political', the reality is that we have continued to approach it as a series of technical fixes. There has thus been a huge gap between rhetoric and action in the realm of governance in SSR programming. One has only to 'follow the money' to realise how little real priority has been placed on strengthening security governance even in contexts such as Sierra Leone. At best, 'governance' has been approached as an extraneous layer, to be executed by 'NGOs' or delivered through informal action (pretty much the experience for instance of ASSN and partners with parliamentary capacity-building as well as our work in Liberia from 2005-2009).

Similarly, our ideas of 'democratic security governance' have been both exaggerated and simplistic: the SSR policy literature is replete with elevated norms of 'security governance' that would seem ambitious even in a mature democracy (and certainly well beyond what is realistically possible in 'fragile' states, often coming out of conflict and/or with little or no tradition of *security governance*).

For that matter, the nostrums on 'governance' tend to reflect little understanding of the protracted, contested, and always contingent and uneven processes by which the metropolitan democracies themselves arrived at democratic security governance as we know it today; and little hint as well of the crisis in SSG that is roiling these societies as new and 'unconventional' threats bring these arrangements (both fact and myth) under renewed pressure. It would be much more realistic and helpful to see SSG as a *global problem* – and organise candid dialogue around that issue – rather than present it as yet another Northern solution to a distinctively 'Southern' problem.

The prevailing naivety is also partly linked to the tendency in the SSR lexicon to view security institutions in terms of 'service delivery' (which is indeed part of their *raison d'être*) rather than as *pre-eminently* apparatuses of power at the heart of the state – underscoring, once again, the deficits in the analysis of both the state and power that permeates much of the SSR discourse.

At the core of politics and SSR (or the politics of SSR) is the question rarely raised: which social, political or class factions are going to control those apparatuses. Probably the most insightful – and at the same time neglected – observation in Samuel Huntington's 1957 book *The Soldier and the State* is the argument that the state of 'civil-military relations' depends less on the relationship between the military and civilians than on the relationship between contending civilian groups or interests interested in acquiring control over the military as an instrument of political supremacy. Opposing political interests are tempted to use the military against each other, entailing attempts to monopolise control. (Of course we have learned in Africa that the contest for power between *military and civil power* is also very much an issue).

An associated danger – as we are again seeing in Burundi today – is that political gridlock and contestation between civilian parties over fundamental rules of the game place the military in a position to make political decisions (or execute political interventions) for which it is ill-equipped.

The core problem is precisely that we have failed to commit African leaders and elites (security elites included) to respect for the wider rules of the game. In essence, we have created "democracies" without democrats, and in the process exposed security institutions to their own political calculus.

We have also (surprisingly) neglected entirely to address *political parties* or to view them as key SSR actors – as the principal instruments for organising democratic power, gestating norms and programmes, and shaping political policies and practices. Few indeed are the political parties in Africa that have any firm orientation on the specific issue of *security governance*; attitudes on this question (all too often reflected as well among parliamentarians) can often be described as ad-hoc, opportunistic, or abstentionist ('leave it to the President or the executive'). Our preoccupation with 'civil society organisations' – while entirely legitimate – appears however to have cascaded directly down from the (neoliberal) suspicion of the state and politics (and all things connected therewith) that characterised much of the 1980s. The disregard – even marginalisation – of political parties that went along with this ideology is overdue for reconsideration.

This links up with the wider question of elite incentives that my copanellist Erwin van Veen and colleagues have been exploring: as with the previous generation of structural adjustment or public sector reform, what incentives are there for political elites to do things any differently than they have done in the past, particularly given the high political risks – and unpredictable outcomes – of SSR?

It is no longer just an issue of revitalising the governance agenda (i.e. acknowledging that the element of governance is more at risk – as well as gestator of risk – than ever before), but also rethinking and *expanding* the remit of that agenda, to include political engagement and dialogue with extremists and 'rejectionists' of all stripes as a means to counter radicalisation.

Development

It is by now clear that whatever our model of development is, it is not working for the poor, the vulnerable and the youth.

This is the message that links the dramatic media clips of recent days: the ease (and frequency) with which youth are being radicalised, the desperate waves of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean, and the xenophobic attacks in South Africa. It is a message of deep marginalisation and political and *social* alienation.

It is equally alarming to realise that, given the right context, these same actors might be interchangeable: gravitating as easily in the direction of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram as braving the Mediterranean, – or in earlier days, toward revolutionary Marxism rather than religious extremism.

In other words, what we are witnessing is the comprehensive failure of the vision of Human Security driving SSR, in turn generating threats out of all proportion to anything that SSR is designed to address or prevent.

Professor Eboe Hutchful is Executive Secretary of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN). This is the text of a presentation he gave at a conference on 'Security Sector Reform and Governance: Reviewing Germany's Contribution,' organised on May 4, 2015, by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin.

PUBLICATION

Strategic Review for Southern Africa



The *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* is an accredited journal of the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs (ISPA) in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria. It is included in the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) list.

Since its establishment in 1978, the *Strategic Review* has witnessed major social and political changes in Southern Africa, the wider African continent and the rest of the world. The *Strategic Review* engages in strategic and political analysis of socio-political developments that

impact on or provide lessons for Southern Africa. As a multi-disciplinary platform, it facilitates vigorous and enlightened debate among scholars, policy makers, practitioners, students and activists, in order to contribute to the wider global discourse on the strengthening of

democracy, human rights, security, good governance and the rule of law.

In addition to thorough scholarly analyses, the *Strategic Review* offers topical reports and assessments, debates, briefings and reviews to reach as wide a readership as possible, thereby promoting plural and open-minded interaction between various stakeholders.

The journal is published in May/June and November/December. In addition, one guest edited special issue per year could complement the regular issues of the periodical. Issues are available in print and in future also open access.

This year's special issue, released in May, is on the theme '**Human security, peace and conflict: African perspectives**'. Its guest editor is Professor 'Funmi Olonisakin, Director of the African Leadership Centre (ALC), Distinguished Andrew Mellon Foundation Scholar at the University of Pretoria and a founding member of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN). ASSN Vice-Chair Sandy Africa is the journal's senior editor.

MEMBER SPOTLIGHT

Securing a Nation: The Transformation of a Soldier and his Country

In 1995, shortly after assuming control of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) Mr. Kellie Conteh, the then Chief of Defence Staff of the RSLMF, wrote an unusual letter to his Government. In this letter, Mr. Conteh expressed concern over the state of affairs of the armed forces – not with regard to arms and equipment, but to governance and management.

"I needed clarity," Mr. Conteh says. In his view, Sierra Leone lacked proper systems for command and control of the uniformed personnel, and suffered from insufficient management structures and inadequate civilian oversight of the Armed Forces. In response to these deficits, Mr. Conteh called for the establishment of a National Security Council to provide stronger civilian leadership of the security sector. At the time, Sierra Leone was engulfed in a civil war that lasted from 1991 to 2002. "It was a very unfortunate time in our country's history," Mr. Conteh notes. As the Chief of Defence Staff, he found that military operations were uncoordinated resulting in the Government and Armed Forces working at cross purposes. Orders from military headquarters were often countermanded at the political level. "There was much confusion and people fought and fended for themselves," Mr. Conteh explains. "The motivation to send the letter was based on my realization that while the Armed Forces had a significant role to play in security provision, the Government ultimately had to be responsible for security management."

The war made any reform efforts impossible. But Mr. Conteh continued to stress the importance of an effective and accountable security sector to ensure peace and prosperity. He repeatedly advocated to his colleagues in the Armed Forces and the Government that "without security there couldn't be development, and without development, security would be temporary."

As the war drew to an end, attitudes also started changing. "By 2002 we were ready to initiate the reforms and we went ahead with our programmes," Mr. Conteh explains. "These efforts were spearheaded by a democratically elected government who sought to restore its authority and legitimacy by putting in place a more responsive security sector."

Mr. Conteh was put in a unique position to push for the reforms when he was appointed the National Security Coordinator in charge of



overseeing activities across the security sector. He now found himself in a civilian position through which many of his previous recommendations as a military commander could be implemented.

"While the reforms were necessary, we met some resistance at first", Mr. Conteh notes. "However, as people started understanding the benefits of a clear national security vision and strategy, supported by an effective National Security Council responsible for coordination of the security institutions, things went better."

In the end, there was a growing understanding both in the Government and the Armed Forces that "military leaders and other security sector stakeholders could benefit from a focused civilian leadership and vice versa," Mr. Conteh says.

For more than ten years, Mr. Conteh served as the National Security Coordinator and saw his country emerge from the ashes of the war to re-establish functional security institutions accountable to civilian authorities while undertaking two democratic elections. "Senior commanders have come to me and expressed gratitude that Sierra Leone has managed to build a strong foundation for the Armed Forces, which are now responsible to the population and the Government and enjoy more collaboration and cooperation across the security sector," Mr. Conteh notes.

Reflecting over his service to Sierra Leone, Mr. Conteh notes: "Making the security sector more effective and accountable was a challenging journey for my country and me. And I'm proud to have been a part of this transformation, because it opened up my eyes".

In early 2012, Mr. Conteh left Sierra Leone to assist the authorities in South Sudan reform their security sector, as part of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

In April 2014, Brigadier (Rtd) Kellie Conteh was awarded Sierra Leone's Grand Commander of the Order of the Rokel (GCOR) by the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone in recognition of his 'outstanding contribution towards the reform of the security sector and the establishment of the Office of National Security.' This article was first published in the UN's *SSR Perspectives* magazine.

New Member Organisations

The Academy for Peace and Development: Contributing to State-building in Somaliland



Academy for Peace and Development Akaademiga Nabadda iyo Horumarka



Since Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in May of 1991, it has achieved a degree of peace and stability that has largely escaped the attention of most of Africa and the rest of the world. Some analysts have however described Somaliland as one of the most stable areas within the territory of the former Somali Republic, others even considering it perhaps one of the most peaceful places within the Horn of Africa.

Although Somaliland has not been formally recognised by any country or international organisation, its existence thus far tells the story of relative political and economic stability, democratic gains and government willingness to involve the civil society in its state building.

One of the civil society organisations helping with the state building process is the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), which recently joined the ASSN network.

APD was established in 1998 as a research institute in collaboration with the United Nation's War-torn Societies Project (WSP), which later became an independent UN affiliate currently known as the International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace).

APD is committed to promote democracy and consensus decision-making at the policy level by encouraging and supporting participation of citizens in the affairs of their lives. In this regard, the goal of the Academy is to empower Somaliland communities to adopt peaceful changes by providing a neutral venue to identify their issues and set priorities for response.

To achieve this, APD has set the following objectives for itself:

1. To provide a neutral forum for dialogue and to create the opportunities to discuss and address development and reconstruction issues of common concern to Somaliland society.

2. To facilitate the process to collectively identify, set priorities and formulate policy options for the challenges of development and rehabilitation of the country.

3. To assist key stakeholders including the Somaliland government, international community, donor agencies and local actors—to better respond to the challenges of re-building the nation by providing them with relevant information on critical issues, seeking consensus on their interventions and facilitating their responses and effects.

4. To stimulate action-driven change and achieve actionable change.

APD's keystone initiative is the Pillars of Peace Programme, which it implements in partnership with Interpeace.

The vision of the Pillars of Peace programme is to build upon more than a decade's experience of peace building and support for institutions in order to continue to advance and strengthen the consolidation of peace throughout Somaliland through consensus-oriented, integrated approaches to state building and peace building.

Pillars of Peace II has three pillars and they were selected based on previous experience and sustained efforts of APD through the Dialogue for Peace programmes. The three pillars (or thematic areas of focus) are as follows:

- The Decentralisation Pillar;
- The Social Reconciliation Pillar;
- The Democratisation Pillar.

Research and publication is a key area of the Academy's activities. Some of its recent publications include *Confronting the challenges: The 2012 Municipal elections and Somaliland's first decade of multipartism* and the *Perception survey on voter registration and civil registration*.

Based in Hargeisa, Somaliland, APD's Executive Director is Mohamed Farah Hersi. The 32 year old with a Master of Law degree from the University of Pretoria first joined APD as a researcher before rising through six years of hard work to assume leadership of the Academy.


Hersi was born and raised in Somaliland. His passion is to contribute to the achievement of permanent peace in his country and to play a part in the state-building processes that have gone on since Somaliland declared its independence in 1991 while the rest of Somalia descended into civil war following the fall of strongman Siad Barre's regime.

"I grew up in this country, which is recovering from civil war," Hersi says. "I believe that I should contribute towards its state-building processes to the extent that I can."

New Member Organisations

The African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF)

According to Bahame Nyanduga, a past Commissioner of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), the last 50 years of Africa's independence and statehood, have experienced massive numbers of violations of basic human and peoples' rights associated with police enforcement of order.



This, in Nyanduga's view, is attributable to a number of factors, such as the breakdown of law and order during civil unrest, civil conflict and military coups in many states. This being said, the past two decades have seen considerable effort invested in the governance and accountability of the police. A number of African countries have seen significant reforms with improved police/community relations and enforcement. In some countries key government officials, including police leaders, have recognised the need for broad community-based interventions to address the causes of criminal violence and support oversight of law enforcement, as an essential measure to help build community trust, necessary for effective policing.

Despite these advances many challenges remain. These include the ambivalence of political powers in implementing a democratic policing agenda. Alongside this, the continued paramilitary character of policing which is resistant to scrutiny and oversight persists across much of Africa, largely as a result of the unreformed legacy of colonial policing methods. Capacity and institution building also remain weak. This challenge applies both to the police and oversight agencies.

Building police oversight institutions is no easy task. Just as policing is multi-faceted and challenging sector, so is police oversight. This makes simple translation of practice from one country to the next both impractical and undesirable. Countries on the continent have had few points of reference except for examples emanating from countries in the wealthy, developed and industrialised north. The implication of this, together with the inherent political sensitivities, is that generating greater and more effective policing oversight requires sustained expert support. This technical assistance must be sensitive to local dynamics, and to continental and international political agendas. Proposed inputs need to be relevant and appropriate to the capacity and constraints of local situations. It is here that a network such as the APCOF Board and the regional networks it supports are invaluable.

Networks, including those of 'reform-minded' police officials, and a networking approach on police reform are recognised as important facilities in promoting ethical and accountable policing. Networks provide opportunities and potential to move beyond institutional reform to reach wider constituencies and to translate concepts of national security for local level consumption. The extent to which local communities can operationalise the tenets of accountable policing will determine the role they play in ensuring police accountability and secure their input into future policy interventions in safety, and guarantee the democratic process.

APCOF is a Not-for-Profit Trust working on issues of police accountability and governance in Africa. APCOF promotes the values which the establishment of civilian oversight seeks to achieve namely: to assist in restoring public confidence; developing a culture of human rights, promoting integrity and transparency within the police; and good working relationships between the police and the community. While APCOF is active in the field of policing, its work is located in the broader paradigm of promoting democratic governance and the rule of law.

The objectives of APCOF are to:

- Promote police accountability.
- Advocate for and support the development of institutions and mechanisms for oversight of the police.
- Create and sustain public confidence in police.
- Develop a culture of good governance, human rights, integrity,

transparency and accountability within the police.

- Promote good working relationships between the police, civil society and citizens.

The debate on police reform has evolved in the last decade and recognises that:

- Attention needs to be paid to the fundamental importance of the oversight component in the overall reform process and that support must be directed at strengthening the oversight mechanisms in society.
- There is a need to enshrine governance at the centre of the reform process which should include the oversight component, normative frameworks, institutional management and operational efficiency
- Police reform needs to be built on local ownership
- The use of African expertise to assist peers is desirable.

The APCOF strategy takes cognisance of the above points. The focus of APCOF's work are in the areas of increasing political support for police accountability; improving capacity for oversight; and developing a community of practitioners promoting accountability.

Work is divided into four distinct but inter-related work streams namely:

- Promoting regional and continental standard setting on police oversight and police accountability,
- Developing tools as a means of assessing and encouraging ethical policing,
- Building and supporting local networks of ownership: and
- Supporting the knowledge and skills development of oversight practitioners.

APCOF's recent achievements include:

2014: The adoption of Guidelines on arrest, police custody and pre-trial detention by the African Commission for Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR).

2013: Establishing a Police and Human Rights Focal point at the ACHPR and co publishing a biannual newsletter on police and human rights.

2013: Development and presentation of an advanced human rights course for the Centre of Human Rights at the University of Pretoria.

2012: Development of training material on investigative skills for independent police oversight and provision of training support to various entities including the Kenyan Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA).

2010: Development of monitoring indicators for the Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation Code of Conduct for Police Officials and an assessment of the application of the Code.

2009: Approval by EAC Ministers of Security, and East African Police Chiefs Cooperation (EAPCCO) of Common Standards for Policing in East African Community.

2008: A continental audit of police oversight in Africa.

2006: The adoption of a resolution at the ACHPR on police oversight.

APCOF's operational model is also centred on networking. APCOF operates with a small staff of six at its core, and seeks to undertake its operations utilising a range of relationships and partnerships across the continent. This approach allows APCOF to benefit from local knowledge and expertise, as well as, to contribute to local capacity building, where this is relevant. This model allows for organisational overheads to remain low at the centre, and for greater investment in resources in the development of activities.

Support our Work



**AFRICAN
SECURITY
SECTOR
NETWORK**



The African Security Sector Network (ASSN) was founded in 2003 to help harmonise the various African organisations carrying out activities in the broad areas of Security Sector Reform (SSR), Security Sector Transformation (SST) and Security Sector Governance (SSG).

Our fundamental objective is to facilitate progress towards the achievement of Effective and Democratically-Governed Security Sectors across the African continent. We pursue this mission by spearheading and implementing programmes aimed at strengthening the capacities of African governments, National Security institutions, Parliaments, Intergovernmental Organisations and Civil Society groups to undertake and own SSR programmes. The ASSN also strives to expand the concept of African SSR through sustained research, publication and training.

The driving vision of the ASSN is that of an African Security Sector that is Democratically Governed, People-Centred, Well Managed, Accountable and Effective in supporting and sustaining Human Security.

OUR PRIMARY TOOLS ARE:

- Advocacy and facilitation of emerging SSR and SSG networks;
- Promotion of inclusive dialogue and informed debate around issues of Security and Justice, designed to influence decision-makers and policy processes;
- Enhancement of Security literacy among the continent's policy- and decision-makers and the general public, through training, education, and dissemination of resource materials;
- Support for policy and institutional development, via applied research and provision of advisory and consultancy services;
- Building of capacity within the Security Sector, as well as relevant policy and oversight organs;
- Promotion of an African-centred focus through dissemination of African 'best practices' in the areas of SSR/SSG; and
- Functioning as a continental information repository on SSR/SSG.

ASSN STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

In the short to medium term, the bulk of the ASSN's efforts will be channelled towards the following strategic priorities:

1. Assisting the African Union (AU) and various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to develop and deliver on their SSR/SSG agenda, in accordance with the ASSN's MOU with the AU, and a related tripartite agreement between the AU Commission, the UN and the ASSN;

2. Assisting African countries (particularly those undertaking SSR as intrinsic part of their transition from situations of conflict to peace) to plan and implement SSR programmes, and to better comply with AU/REC SSR frameworks and standards;

2b. Addressing current gaps in SSR and integrating excluded programmatic elements, particularly those that strengthen Governance and improve Security and Justice for the poor and vulnerable such as the following:

- (i) *Strengthening the Gender dimensions of SSR/SSG;*
- (ii) *Forging closer links between SSR, Justice and the Rule of Law;*
- (iii) *Integrating private, informal and customary Security and Justice institutions into SSR, in recognition of the often crucial roles they play in providing Security for the poor and ensuring social peace and stability;*
- (iv) *Engaging Intelligence organs and facilitating Intelligence reforms.*

3. Building the capacity of National Legislatures and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to engage with SSR/SSG and to better conduct their Security Oversight responsibilities;

4. Running a 'Next Generation of Security Analysts' Programme, which entails building the capacities of young professionals in policy, research and advocacy around SSR/G.

If you are interested in supporting our work in any of these areas, or generally in collaborating with the ASSN on related projects, please contact us on info@africansecuritynetwork.org.

The African Security Sector Network

Striving for Democratically Governed and Effective Security for the Peoples Of Africa.



Our Regional Hubs

In West Africa



African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)
Accra, Ghana
Website: www.africansecurity.org
Regional Coordinator: Dr. Uju Agomoh

In East Africa and the Great Lakes Region



Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC)
Nairobi, Kenya
Website: www.srickenya.org
Regional Coordinator: Lt Col (Rtd) Jerry Kitiku

In the Horn of Africa



Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue (CPRD)
Juba, South Sudan
Website: www.cprdssr.org
Regional Coordinator: Professor Medhane Tadesse

In Southern Africa



Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM)
Mzuzu, Malawi
Website: www.sadsem.org
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