



Welcome to the April 2012 Issue

ASSN Quarterly is published by the African Security Sector Network. It highlights the activities of the network, as well as other developments in the fields of Security and Justice Reform, both in Africa and beyond.

The views expressed in the articles published in this newsletter are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the African Security Sector Network.



Dear Reader,

Welcome to yet another edition of our newsletter, which features topical issues and opinion pieces on security and justice in Africa and provides insights on specific activities of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), its members and affiliate organisations.

This quarter, even as Africa grapples with events arising in Mali and Guinea Bissau following military coups in the two countries, we bring you the latest developments regarding the African Union's Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR). The emerging continental SSR Policy Framework, which is an outcome of collaborative work between the Africa Union (AU) and other critical stakeholders with the technical facilitation of the ASSN, avows the commitment of African Heads of State and Government to the democratic governance of an African security sector that is effective and respectful of the rule of law.

The policy development process, launched in 2009 following a decision by the AU Assembly, is near complete with rising expectations for its adoption at the June Summit of AU Heads of State and Government. In preparation for this, the AU Commission collaborated with the ASSN to facilitate a language harmonisation workshop on the draft policy framework. The harmonisation workshop took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from February 27 to March 1. It brought together a team of SSR experts - including three from the ASSN - to review the draft policy framework in the four working languages of the AU (English, French, Portuguese and Arabic) so as to ensure coherence and consistency of meaning.

Across the border, despite rising tensions with its northern neighbour, South Sudan continues to prioritise its SSR agenda and is eager to strengthen cooperation with the AU and other regional actors in this process. The AU has pledged to support the SSR aspirations of the government and people of South Sudan, yet again designating the ASSN as its technical partner. Furthermore, we are happy to report that the ASSN has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with South Sudan's Ministry of National Security, committing the ASSN to support Security and Justice Reform in the new state. This evolving partnership between the Government of South Sudan (GOSS), the AU and the ASSN will hopefully go a long way in mobilising and streamlining support for security and justice reforms in South Sudan in ways that promote national ownership, leadership and effective coordination among diverse actors and stakeholders.

We also update you on our ongoing project in Kenya, which we are implementing in collaboration with the Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC). Themed "*Leveraging Political Space in the New Kenyan Constitutionalism: Enhancing Civil Society and Community Engagement with the 'Agenda Four Reforms'*," the project focuses on constitutional reforms aimed at ensuring long-term stability in the East African country. Kenya is set to go to the polls in a matter of months. The last election in 2007 ended in post-election violence, and the national unity government formed to resolve the dispute over presidential results identified key long-term reforms, christened the 'Agenda Four Reforms', that would preclude the future reoccurrence of such political-related violence. In this issue, the ASSN and SRIC report on the progress of the project, the latest activity being the conduct two nationwide surveys to measure the popular perception on the pace of implementation of the 'Agenda Four Reforms' within the context of the new, people driven constitution adopted in 2010.

In other pieces, Professor Medhane Tadesse analyses the London Conference on Somalia, hosted by the UK Government on February 23; Professor Anthoni van Nieuwkerk gives a critical analysis of the reviewed Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and Dr. Paul Jackson reviews a new book titled "*Well-Kept Secrets: The Right of Access to Information and the South African Intelligence Services*." This book was authored by Dr. Sandy Africa, an ASSN member and former Deputy Director-General in the South African Secret Service.

This quarter we also welcome the membership of a number of experts and practitioners working on various security and justice issues in Africa to the ASSN network, even as we bid farewell to two members of staff, including myself.

On a personal note, I wish to thank the Executive Committee, staff and members of the ASSN network for the opportunity afforded me to learn, serve and contribute to our collective vision of an African security sector that is democratically governed, people-centred, well managed, accountable and effective in supporting and sustaining human security. My experience at the ASSN is invaluable and highly pertinent for my new role at the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), where I will continue to work on issues pertaining to peace and security in Africa. Besides, given the ASSN's role as a key player on continental peace and security issues and a critical partner of the AU on SSR issues, I am really not saying 'goodbye' as such; our paths remain crossed and my continued collaboration with the ASSN is inevitable.

We hope you will find the news, features and analyses interesting, and will generally enjoy your time reading through the newsletter.


Warm greetings,

Ecoma Alaga,
Outgoing Senior Programme Manager, ASSN.

THREE ASSN MEMBERS were engaged in the language harmonisation of the African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The three are Professor Boubacar N'Diaye (for the French version), Professor Medhane Tadesse (for the English Version) and Ms Anicia Lalà (for the Portuguese version). The Arabic language version was reviewed by Ambassador Hussein Mubarak and Mr. Moaaz Elzougby.

Left to right:
Boubacar N'Diaye,
Anicia Lalà and
Medhane Tadesse.



The African Union has been developing its SSR Policy Framework since 2008 with the ASSN as its technical partner.

ECOMA ALAGA has taken up a new position with the United Nations. Ecoma was until her appointment the ASSN's Senior Programme Manager.

The ASSN Chair, Professor Eboe Hutchful, leads the network's membership and staff in congratulating Ecoma on her new appointment and thanking her for her sterling work during the time she served at the ASSN secretariat. The entire ASSN family wishes her success in her new position at the UN headquarters in New York.




JANINE RAUCH has been contracted by the Stabilisation Unit of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to lead on the review and revitalisation of the African SSR Experts Roster.

Janine is an active ASSN member from South Africa. She is on the spotlight in this edition of the *ASSN Quarterly* (read her full profile on page 11).

DAUDA GARUBA co-edited a new book with Thomas Jaye and Stella Amadi.

The book, *ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peacebuilding*, was published by the Council for the Development Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). It includes chapters contributed by other ASSN members, including Professor Boubacar N'Diaye and Dr 'Funmi Olonisakin.



ASSN facilitates Language Harmonisation of the Draft African Union SSR Policy Framework

The Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the African Union Commission, in collaboration with the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), held a four-day exercise to harmonise the draft African Union (AU) Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform in the four official AU languages - Arabic, English, French and Portuguese.

The exercise took place at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa from 27 February to 1 March 2012, with the objective of finalising the draft Policy Framework and conforming it to the AU language policy.

It will be recalled that the development of the AU Policy Framework on SSR started in 2009, following a January 2008 AU Assembly decision mandating the AU Commission "to develop a comprehensive AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR), within the context of the Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development adopted by the Executive Council in Banjul in June 2006."

The ASSN's facilitation was in line with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the ASSN and the AU Commission in 2010, in which the ASSN committed to provide technical support to the PSD in the development of a policy framework on SSR for the AU member states. The ASSN has since worked very closely with the AU Peace and Security Department, providing support at every stage of the development of the policy framework. In particular, the ASSN, together with the SSR Unit of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Training (DPKO), assisted the AU in organising an African Regional Conference on SSR in March 2009.

After this workshop, the AU Commission contracted the ASSN to write nine policy briefs on various aspects of SSR as background papers to inform the writing of the Zero Draft of the AU Policy Framework on SSR. In October 2010 the ASSN further hosted a second SSR experts meeting in Accra, Ghana, to review the draft Policy Framework. The ASSN is additionally sponsoring one Senior SSR Advisor and two assistants who have been working in the AU SSR Office.

It was on the basis of this long and mutually beneficial relationship that the Head of the AU Defence and Security Division of the PSD,



Left to right: Ambassador Hussein Mubarak, Professor Boubacar N'Diaye, Dr Norman Mlambo, Professor Medhane Tadesse and Ms Anicia Lalà at the language harmonisation exercise in Addis Ababa.

Dr. Tarek A. Sharif, requested the ASSN to assist in the language harmonisation of the draft Policy Framework.

Following this request, the ASSN sponsored a team of experts to conduct the exercise. These were Professor Boubacar N'Diaye for the French version, Ms. Anicia Lalà for Portuguese version, as well as Ambassador Hussein Mubarak and Mr. Moaaz Elzougby for the Arabic version. The harmonisation of the English version was facilitated by Dr. Norman Mlambo (the AU Focal Point on SSR) and Professor Medhane Tadesse (the Senior SSR Advisor based at the AU on secondment from the ASSN). Professor N'Diaye, Ms. Lalà and Professor Tadesse are all members of the ASSN.

During the exercise, the logistical arrangements were facilitated by the ASSN Chair, Professor Eboe Hutchful, with assistance from the two ASSN staff members attached to the African Union, Eleni Tafesse and Lina Imran. The draft AU Policy is now ready for deliberation and probable adoption at the next AU Summit, scheduled for June 2012 in Lilongwe, Malawi.

ASSN Signs MOU with the Government of South Sudan



The African Security Sector Network (ASSN) and the Ministry of National Security in the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) have signed a memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for ASSN support for Security and Justice Reform in the newly independent state.

The MOU follows a scoping mission conducted in South Sudan by the ASSN in November 2011.

Under the MOU, the ASSN commits to provide support in the following fields, among others:

- Provision of high-level African expertise, contextual knowledge, and SSR experience-sharing;
- Establishment and operationalisation of a Nation Security Council structure and a National Security Secretariat;
- Development, promulgation and implementation of a National Security Policy framework;
- Enhancement of strategic awareness and security literacy among GOSS security and political officials. This will be conducted through

executive seminars, thematic training workshops and South-South Dialogues designed to expose the GOSS to African and Southern experiences, as well as lessons learned on a range of issues topical to Security and Justice Reform in South Sudan;

- Strategies for mainstreaming gender in South Sudanese security institutions;
- Linking up the South Sudan Security and Justice Reforms - wherever possible - with the AU SSR Policy framework; and
- Any other areas where the ministry and ASSN may mutually agree to co-operate.

The African Union (AU) has meanwhile responded positively to an appeal from the South Sudan Ministry of National Security to support SSR in the new nation, and has designated the ASSN as its implementing partner.

The ASSN's Senior Security Sector Reform (SSR) Advisor to the AU, Professor Medhane Tadesse, is currently working to mould the tripartite partnership between the AU, the GOSS and the ASSN, as well as leading on plans for a stakeholders' meeting to be held in Juba later this year.

Stakeholders Discuss Nationwide Survey on 'Agenda Four Reforms' in Kenya



On January 31, the Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) held a breakfast meeting in Nairobi to share the findings of a nationwide survey it conducted in Kenya to establish the popular perception of the ongoing implementation of key elements relating to Security and Justice in the country's new constitution.

Conducted in December 2011, the survey forms part of a project themed "*Leveraging Political Space in the New Kenyan Constitutionalism: Enhancing Civil Society and Community Engagement with the 'Agenda Four Reforms'*," jointly implemented in Kenya by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) and SRIC.

The project aims to sustain the momentum of the 'Agenda Four Reforms', which were identified by Kenya's unity government as indispensable in the effort to liberate the country from historical grievances that precipitated deadly post-election clashes following a disputed presidential poll in 2007. The unprecedented clashes - touched off when incumbent President Mwai Kibaki and his main opposition challenger, Raila Odinga, both claimed victory in the closely contested election - were largely vented on ethnic and class lines. The result was the loss of an estimated 1,300 lives, the internal displacement of 350,000 people and charges at the International Criminal Court (ICC) against four prominent Kenyans suspected to have masterminded the violence that spilled over into the early months of 2008.

SRIC is specifically focussing on aspects of the 'Agenda Four Reforms' that relate to Security and Justice. The overarching objective of the survey was to contribute to ongoing efforts by governmental and non-governmental actors and stakeholders,

research institutions and the Kenyan people in tracking the pace and direction of the 'Agenda Four Reforms', with the ultimate goal of facilitating their complete implementation within the deadlines set by Kenya's new constitution, promulgated in August 2010.

The breakfast meeting was attended by various governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, including representatives from relevant government departments and agencies, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the private sector and the donor community. It began with a keynote address by Col (Rtd.) Jerry Kitiku, the Director of SRIC and ASSN Regional Coordinator for East Africa and the Great Lakes Region.

Col Kitiku stated that the survey had identified major public and grassroots concerns regarding the pace and implementation process of the 'Agenda Four Reforms,' adding that the findings were expected to stimulate informed debate among the stakeholders and the general public. SRIC Senior Researcher Johnstone Kibor then presented the actual findings of the baseline survey, before proceedings moved to a plenary session moderated by Mr. David Kimaiyo, Director of the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP).

Among other things, participants observed that while the country's unity government had made considerable progress towards the implementation of the 'Agenda Four Reforms', the findings of the survey indicated that there were concerns about the effectiveness of some of the governmental institutions created to help advance the reform agenda. They also identified gaps in the popular understanding of the 'Agenda Four Reforms' and the implications of their incomplete implementation at both the national and grassroots level. In the end they concurred that there was need for a greater awareness campaign to ensure wider popular understanding and oversight over the pace and direction of the 'Agenda Four Reform' process.

In his closing remarks, Mr. Kimaiyo hailed the ASSN and SRIC for facilitating the newfound cordial working relationship between the government and the CSO community in the constitutional implementation process.

A subsequent quarterly survey has since been held in March 2012, with the findings set for release sometime in May.

Feature photo: ASSN member Missak Kassongo, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (third from left), makes his submissions at a Security and Justice Reform workshop in Bujumbura.

The one-day workshop, held on February 1, 2012, was part of an OECD/INCAF project on a 'process approach' to Security and Justice Reform.



The London Gathering and the Future of Somalia

By Medhane Tadesse

The stories of most conferences on Somalia, however different their sponsors and colloquium, are basically the same. They start with great hype and optimism and finish precariously. In the last two months, much international policy has focused on the idea of supporting Somalia. This is of concern to the international community for numerous reasons, including the humanitarian crises that it generates, and the propensity to export problems to its neighbours and globally, including piracy, refugees, armed conflict and terrorism.

Until recently, many would have considered Somalia as a manageable crisis. But this is now changing. The UK-led London Conference on Somalia that took place on 23 February 2012 has persuaded many that the international community, particularly the Western powers, has finally realised that it cannot afford to ignore the crisis in Somalia. What is certain is the persistent but parochial nature and narrow focus of external actors. International responses have been half-hearted at best, with serious efforts directed only at the economic interests of the international community in stopping piracy. This is quite depressing, considering that the original impetus for the conference was thought to be the rising costs of piracy. Equally important is (Somali) Diaspora radicalisation and the upcoming London Olympics.

Despite this grave shortcoming, the London conference has been extremely useful in providing a high profile status for the crisis in Somalia, creating a consensus on the political transition, and strengthening the African Union (peacekeeping) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Most importantly, the conference brought Somali, African, Middle Eastern and Western players together. The conference moved the Somali crisis out of the hostile corners of the Horn of Africa onto the centre stage of world politics. Hopefully, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) will no longer decide the fate of Somalia alone. Everyone concerned with Somalia from the international community was present in London – a success of sorts.

International approaches to Somalia have had mixed success. The value of the London Conference should be measured against three major principles that could help to facilitate the transition in Somalia. These principles are widely known and widely supported, and it should not be difficult to bring about an international consensus in their support. They include a consensus on the transition itself, support for AMISOM and the post-transition political reconstruction of Somalia. The conference agreed that the mandates of the Transitional Federation Institutions (TFIs) must end in August 2012. Instead, a new authority will be established with the sole role of facilitating the creation and development of local administrations all over the country. This is understandable since TFIs have been ineffective and

dysfunctional since their formation. The conference welcomed the UN resolution expanding AMISOM's mandate and raising its troop ceiling.

However most of the decision points are ambiguous, to say the least. In some cases the outcome of the Conference threatens to destroy the gains made to date. The main insurgent group, Al Shabaab is marginalised from the whole process while Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has been relegated to a sideshow. In actual fact the London Conference ended up de-legitimising the two major players in the Somali political and armed conflict. And yet the road map requires the TFG executive to make good-faith efforts to facilitate the transition. This will not happen soon. To be sure, it is highly unlikely that the main insurgent group would agree to any peace plan. Neither the TFG nor Al Shabaab will seriously consider the provisions that emerged from such an international conference. International actors have not gained leverage with either the Government or the opposition, and the conflict will continue to be ugly and costly.

Obviously, such an internationally endorsed framework of principles is not self-implementing, and will be rejected by Al Shabaab, ignored by the top leaders of the TFG and compromised by the unrelenting rivalry among local administrations, as is evident by the proliferation of local entities with minimal relevance to the realities on the ground. The Somali people, too, may object to the continued presence of foreign forces, particularly the provisions allowing troops from neighbouring countries to be integrated into AMISOM and act with impunity. The London Conference, it should be clear, no longer holds any hope of ending the conflict in Somalia. It was not a peace conference. Piracy and counter-terrorism concerns are still dominant in many governments, including that of the UK. Despite the optimism expressed by many in relation to the London Conference, the political and military conditions for a ceasefire, durable peace and the beginning of a robust process of state building do not exist and do not appear imminent. Somalia is unlikely to see the establishment of a functional national unity government in the months, if not years, following the August deadline. State collapse, a complex insurgency and violent conflict are likely to continue to define Somali affairs.

Professor Medhane Tadesse is a Senior SSR Advisor to the African Union, as well as the ASSN's Regional Coordinator for the Horn of Africa.



Critical Analysis of the Latest SADC Peace and Security Policy Guideline

By Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk

In January 2012 a member of the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) network, Prof Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, published an analysis of the reviewed Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) as part of the FES Peace and Security Series. Entitled "Towards peace and security in Southern Africa," the study offers a critical analysis of the revised and updated SIPO.

Informally known as SIPO II, the policy guide supersedes the original Strategic Indicative Plan, or SIPO I, adopted in 2004 for a five-year period. Following a lengthy review process, SIPO II was approved by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit of Heads of State and Government in late 2010. SIPO II is structured around five sectors: Politics and Diplomacy; Defence; State security (intelligence); Public security; and Police. The policy guide provides

an analysis of each sector, followed by a number of objectives to be achieved by member states and/or the Community as a whole. All the objectives are accompanied by detailed strategies, activities and expected outcomes.

The analysis of SIPO II locates its approach in the 'new regionalism' literature, particularly the concept of 'security regionalism'. It then examines the continental and Southern African peace and security terrain before turning to the evolution of security cooperation among SADC members. Next, it unpacks SADC's structures and processes for coordinating its political, defence and security objectives. It then offers a detailed analysis of the revised SIPO.



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The study argues that, given the region's overwhelming poverty challenges and democracy deficits, SADC has not yet been able to fully transform its conflict-generating interstate and intra-state relations, or behave like a regional security actor. There is also little evidence of SADC having a track record as a security actor beyond its own region. Moreover, its relationship with the African Union (AU) is underdeveloped. The study notes that the South African government has played a prominent role in re-energising the SADC Organ, but asks whether it is advisable for SADC's peace and security agenda to be shaped by one regional player. Regarding the content of the revised SIPO, the report highlights an awkward sectoral approach, the lack of involvement of key regional stakeholders in developing the plan, and the need to revitalise the relationship between the SADC Organ and the International Cooperating Partners (ICPs).

By early 2012 SIPO II was yet to be released for public consumption; presumably, its implementation is also lagging, hence the recommendation by the study for the speedy and formal launch of the policy guide. The study concludes with a number of policy recommendations to SADC member states, the SADC Secretariat, and ICPs. These include a call for a renewed focus on policy harmonisation, whereby the Community's two business plans (SIPO II and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan or RISDP)

are brought together, as well as the need for SIPO II to be clearer on the distinction between the public security and police sectors, the need to engage the region's civil society formations more directly and regularly in implementing SIPO II, the need to re-engage the ICP community (through activating the SADC-ICP working group on peace and security), and the need to address some of SADC's shortcomings (human and financial resource constraints) in implementing SIPO II. The analysis points out that despite the policy guide's best efforts, the issue of monitoring and evaluating the implementation of its objectives remain a challenge.

The analysis concludes with the recommendation that the international community should respect the sovereignty of SADC and its member states, avoid imposing 'Western solutions' to regional problems, and rather support SADC, its members and people in developing indigenous, credible African approaches to peace, security and democratic governance.

Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk is a professor at the Centre for Defence and Security Management, Graduate School of Public and Development Management (P&DM) at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.

POLICY NOTE:

From Quick Wins to Long-Term Profits? The Story Continues...

Developing Better Approaches to Support Security and Justice Engagements in Fragile States



By Erwin van Veen

A brief recap and new developments

In the October 2011 issue of this newsletter I had the pleasure of writing about how the members of the OECD's International Network on Conflict and Fragility were embarking on a new project in the area of security and justice. This project seeks to develop operational and innovative options to respond more effectively to four key

challenges¹ to effective security and justice programming. It does so by analysing 8-10 programmes in 4-5 case studies. It particularly investigates how more attention to time and process can be reconciled with and improve existing programme cycle approaches and the use of logframes. The project assumes that the examination of current programming can generate lessons, good practice and innovation, which, under certain conditions, will be usable elsewhere. Since October last year, the project has made quite some progress that I have outlined below to give you a broad idea of where this work is heading. Overall, my sense is that the first case study confirms the thinking driving the project and has gathered some interesting evidence and ideas that we can pursue further.

It's the process stupid! Five basic process elements to respond to programming challenges

On the basis of quite some discussions, a workshop in Stockholm and the first case study, we have identified five process elements that are not typically included in much current programming, but are essential in responding to programming challenges around ownership, results, monitoring and programme management.

¹ These were identified in phase 1 of the project as: i) the difficulty of defining meaningful results in a fragile environment), ii) the challenge of monitoring engagements in real-time and acting upon the findings, iii) the difficulty of ensuring ownership for change efforts over time and iv) the challenge of setting up flexible and accountable programme management structures.

These are:

- The ability to engage politically at all levels and on a daily basis;
- Establishing results progressively;
- Working iteratively at every stage of the programme cycle with an increasingly central role for local stakeholders;
- Being flexible in using resources; and
- Having a time horizon commensurate to ambition and environment.

Most of you could probably have come up with this on the back of a pack of cigarettes. However, if we can make it plausible that introducing these elements in current programming approaches is likely to generate better results, identify options and ideas on how this can be done practically and clarify how accompanying risks can be mitigated, we will have an innovative and reasonably evidence-based case for change. We also need to bear in mind that most programmes today remain coherent sets of time-bound projects in pursuit of clear and detailed objectives with a defined financial and capacity envelope. Such rigorous programme design, planning and implementation against detailed results, however, assume a level of predictability and 'plan-ability' of the environment that belies the dynamics and characteristics of fragile and conflict-affected situations. Yet, this traditional approach to programming is a reality and the challenge is how process elements such as those stylised above can become bigger parts of existing approaches. This is why we look at specific programmes and cases for evidence and ideas...

Selected highlights from the first case study in Burundi

Nicole Ball, Jean-Marie Gasana and Willy Nindorera conducted the project's first case study in Burundi in January/February 2012. They mainly examined the Dutch-financed Security Sector Development (SSD) programme and the Justice Programme, financed in part by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and implemented by Belgian Technical Cooperation (CTB). In all, they interviewed some 30 in-country programme staff and other stakeholders. They also managed to discuss some of the key issues raised by the field research at a meeting in Bujumbura with representatives of the programmes, donor funders, representatives of the Government of Burundi and civil society.

Features

They have come up with some interesting findings that include:

· *There are distinct benefits to incorporating these five process elements into programming.* For example, the relatively long commitment of the SSD programme for eight years, combined with four two-year programming phases, enables results to be established progressively and on the basis of an increasingly deeper understanding of the needs, priorities and possibilities of the key Burundian security actors involved. The fact that the programme began with a series of concrete activities helped to enhance political access, build trust and enabled governance related aspects to be progressively introduced. It is now possible to openly discuss previously taboo subjects in meetings that bring together government officials, members of the defence and security forces, parliamentarians and civil society. This is a huge change for Burundi.

· *Introducing these five process elements is particularly promising for enabling and deepening ownership.* For example, because the SSD programme constructs projects bottom-up, gives a key role to Burundians (who are also trained and gradually put in charge of the programme) and has several layers of joint Burundian-Dutch management, there is, as one Burundian military official put it, “a lot of ownership between the definition of a need and its implementation”.

· *The ability to proactively address the political aspects of a process of change at all levels and on a daily basis is at the heart of effective security and justice programming.* Without the ability to tackle sensitive political issues, programming will be far less effective and sustainable. Yet, the Burundi case work highlighted that many donors and programmes still think that project execution can be depoliticised – which is generally a recipe for failure. However, it also suggests that even one politically active programme or donor can, if others agree to coordinate, help overcome this problem. What is required is a continuous assessment of the political situation and of political aspects of seemingly technical issues so that relevant (and often difficult) conversations with national stakeholders can take place and influence attitudes, behaviours and the programmes themselves. One interesting innovation has been the use of questions posed in the Dutch parliament to show Burundian stakeholders what concerns

existed in the domestic Dutch context and to solicit their views. This served the dual purpose of consultation and of making messages, in this case on extrajudicial killings, much more political.

· *The five elements are often closely linked.* For example, iterative programming is difficult without flexible resources and a long timeframe. Hence, these elements probably need to be seen and marketed as a “programme quality enhancement package”.

· *Using these process elements can also help overcome some resource, legislative, procedural and political constraints that can make or break the best-conceived programme.* For example, the gradual and Burundian-owned approach to governance as part of the SSD programme has enabled Burundian parliamentarians, who have engaged with the SSD governance pillar, to begin questioning the lack of transparency of the security and defence budgets. Over time, this may influence the attitudes and behaviours of ministers in charge, often a key impediment to change.

Obviously, many challenges to both programmes remain. Moreover, all these findings need further validation and exploration in future case studies. It is difficult to do the case work justice in this short contribution. If you are interested in the report, please write to me at erwin.vanveen@oecd.org.

Next steps

Building on the Burundi case work we will conduct more case studies, starting in Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. This will allow us to gather more evidence and generate more practical options on how programming can be improved, before taking stock of the findings and progress once more. These case studies will take place in April-June of this year.

Erwin van Veen works as policy analyst on peace and security for the OECD's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), which stimulates more effective international policies and practices to help reduce conflict and fragility worldwide.

OPINION PIECE:

The Failure of Guyana's Security Sector Reform Action Plan

In 2006 - 2008, the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) mounted three technical missions to Guyana in October-November 2006, October-November 2007, and April 2008 under (under contract to DFID and the UK Government). The purpose of the first two missions was advise the Government of Guyana on an Security Sector Reform (SSR) Implementation Strategy, while the third was to advise the Guyana Defence Force on its Strategic Defence Review. This article, originally published in the **Guyana Review** on 1 December 2009, analyses the outcome of Guyana's broader SSR agenda. It is reproduced here, with permission from the author, as a purely informational piece for SSR 'Lesson Learning'. ([Click here for related news article.](#))

By David A. Granger



The Guyanese public learnt from the BBC in late October of the British Government's decision to abandon the negotiations with the Guyana Government of Guyana on the £ 4.9M *Security Sector Reform Action Plan*. The administration responded with resignation but without a full explanation of the implications of the British action for day-to-day law enforcement in Guyana.

The need for security sector reform became evident in attempts to suppress the troubles which erupted and escalated on the East Coast in the aftermath of the breakout of the gang of five desperadoes from the Georgetown Prison on 23rd February 2002. The Guyana Police Force was unprepared for the intensity and severity of criminal violence and gang warfare. It was clear that extraordinary solutions had to be found both to the short-term situations created by the crisis and to the long-term maintenance of public safety.

Official responses to the crisis were hardly surprising given the standard of training, the shortage of manpower and the state of resources and equipment in the Police Force at that time. These deficiencies, in the public mind, were aggravated by the reported misconduct of rogue policemen in the Target Special Squad who were blamed for the shooting to death of several suspected criminals. The attitudes of other members of the Tactical Service Unit have also been criticised.

Features

Many villagers alleged that young men were detained without warrant; that suspects had been shot down without investigations being held; that their homes had been repeatedly searched and that their property was damaged without compensation. Security operations, as a result, received scant cooperation from the public.

Criminal elements filled the void created by the absence of effective law enforcement. Death squads sprang up and dubious shoot-to-kill tactics were employed against suspects. Although many known criminals were executed in the counter-crime campaign, many policemen – the largest number in the history of the Police Force – were also killed by bandits. Worse still, the surge in criminal violence was augmented most visibly by the growth in narcotics trafficking and the influx of a large quantity of assault rifles and ammunition into the country.

Cooperation

In light of the grave crisis in public safety, President Bharrat Jagdeo promulgated a \$100 M, counter-crime plan on 7th June 2002. The menu of measures included a complete review of the existing legislation on crime; comprehensive reform of intelligence-gathering, analysis and dissemination; improving the Criminal Investigation Department's investigative and forensic capability; establishing a specialised training school where policemen would be exposed to modern methods of anti-crime tactics and creating a 'crack squad' along the lines of a special weapons and tactics team.

This plan had little immediate effect on the raging violence although it did much to explain the President's concept of security reform at that time. The administration also initiated various consultative measures – including establishing the Steering Committee of the National Consultation on Crime, the Border and National Security Committee and the Disciplined Forces Commission – to seek solutions to the unfolding national security crisis.

The administration then approached the British government for security assistance. President Jagdeo visited London in May 2002 and personally met with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to seek support for his counter-crime campaign. The following year, 2003, a UK Defence Advisory Team visited the country and produced a report on ways in which the capability of the Police Force could be enhanced. The next year, in October 2004, another Defence Advisory Team visited, as did a group of instructors to train members of the Police Force's Tactical Service Unit to become the core of a Special Weapons and Tactics strike force. The next year, an eight-member team of officials from the Scottish Police Service and the English Police Service came to study the functioning of the Police Force. A Security Sector Defence Advisory Team visited and issued another report in November.

The president personally met Baroness Valerie Amos in Georgetown in April 2006 soon after the assassination of a government minister Satyadeow Sawh. Baroness Amos had previously served as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and as International Development Secretary and the two were able to agree on a Statement of Principles which became the basis for what was to be the final round in the saga of security sector reform. The same year, a team from the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) came to conduct a study of the Police Force that led to the Security Sector Reform in Guyana report in 2007. A task force from the National Policing Improvement Agency International Academy then visited.

The cumulative effect of all of these initiatives was to show that enough evidence and experience existed to draft, finally, a comprehensive Security Sector Reform in Guyana plan. That proposal included specific support to the reform process in the Police Force over a two year period, 2006-2008.

Implementation

Security cooperation between Guyana and Britain never ceased during this period. The International Policing Adviser for Latin America and the Caribbean spearheaded a task force from the National Policing Improvement Agency International Academy at Bramshill and the Scottish Police College to begin to implement the *Security Sector Reform Action Plan*. The international department of the Scottish Police College, which provides learning and development opportunities in operational policing, police leadership and performance management and Centrex – the trading name of the Central Police Training and Development Authority which was subsumed within the new National Policing Improvement Agency – have been involved with local police problems and programmes for a long time.

The Scottish Police College, in particular, has executed several projects since 2004. Starting with a scoping exercise to assess the Police Force's training requirements in December 2004, it then conducted a series of management training programmes in February-June 2005; an assessment of the impact of the previously delivered training programmes in December 2005; and another scoping exercise in May 2006. Those were followed in June 2006 by the presentation of the Guyana Police Force Strategic Plan in partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank as part of the Guyana Citizens Security Programme. It also executed a project to assess the police force's operational capability in October 2007.

British consultants from the Police Service of Northern Ireland also continued to work with the Police Force to help develop crime intelligence, advise on structures, provide training and conduct a needs analysis for the setting-up of the new, expanded Criminal Intelligence Unit, in March 2008 under the Interim Memorandum of Understanding.

It seemed evident that the type of organisation and level of administration required to support the reform process might have been underestimated. In fact, even before the troubles on the East Coast had erupted, and in response to the Guyana Government's specific request in 2000, the United Kingdom Department for International Development had commissioned a strategic review of the Guyana Police Force which produced the comprehensive Guyana Police Reform Programme, conducted by the Symonds Group Limited.

Known locally as the Symonds' Report, it was aimed at helping the force's senior management to determine the functions of an accountable, professional force; developing a community-based policing style; and helping the government to identify the areas to strengthen performance, accountability and community orientation of the Force. The establishment of a witness protection programme and better management of information, particularly with regard to fighting narco-trafficking, were also recommended.

For most of the past seven years, the Guyana Government has been receiving British Government assistance to reform the security sector and to support the improvement of the Police Force's capability. The efficiency of the British public safety establishments which have been so frequently involved in advising and training the Police Force has not been disputed. But it was always up to the Guyana Government to implement the policy recommendations which have been made.

No one should pretend that the administration and the Police Force itself were not affected by capability constraints and little was achieved in implementing these weighty recommendations in a holistic manner. The Police Force itself did establish a 'Task Force on Organisation Change' but this collapsed because of inadequate funding and full-time staffing.

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It was not until January 2009 that the Security Sector Reform Secretariat was established within the Office of the President as a permanent institution to continuously manage change in the security sector.

Concept

It became clear, as time went by, that the practice of sending groups of experts to study Guyana's security sector problems and to make recommendations was not contributing sufficiently to improving public safety. But then there was a change in both the concept and content of proposed security sector reform. Assistance from donor countries was required to conform to current international practice as prescribed by guidelines promulgated by the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development to which the United Kingdom subscribes.

The OECD's Development Assistance Committee defined security sector reform as seeking to increase a country's ability to meet the range of security needs within society "in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law [that] includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing."

Britain's agreement with Guyana, therefore, should be seen in the context of this concept. It is not the result of a stand-alone bilateral agreement but, rather, a prescription based on established guiding principles, tailored to national needs but in accord with international security norms. The *Security Sector Reform Action Plan* has been determined by the key policy and operational commitments derived from the *Implementation Framework for Security Sector Reform* that was agreed on 4th April 2007.

Adherence to the Implementation Framework ensures that the UK's support for security sector reform programmes is effective and sustainable. It should be quite obvious that, in order to achieve both effectiveness and sustainability, "local ownership" by the Government of Guyana is essential. Accordingly, the Framework states, "The bottom line is that reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained." This, indeed, might have been the problem with earlier efforts prior to 2007 which petered out once the experts departed. Hence, the recent concern has been to improve Guyana Government capability, develop a national security policy and build accountability and oversight.

Under this new OECD-driven *Framework*, there had been a deliberate moving away from ad hoc, short-term projects to longer-term, strategic engagements; an appreciation of the need to support partner countries in leading the reform process and the adoption of a multi-layered, multi-stakeholder approach which can target assistance to state and non-state actors. The *Framework* requires donors to aim at the improvement of basic security and justice delivery, the establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability system and the development of local leadership and ownership of a reform process to review the capacity and technical needs of the security system.

Coordination

It has been apparent, at least for the past couple of years, that security sector reform assistance would be available only in accordance with this overarching strategic concept. The Guyana Government understands the paradigmatic change and this explains why it established an oversight committee for the security sector in the National Assembly; appointed Major General (Ret) Michael Atherly as Project Coordinator for Security Sector Reform and established the Security Sector Reform Secretariat.

The parliamentary committee established to review the implementation of the Plan was required to receive and examine official annual reports from the administration on the status of the implementation of the activities in eleven priority areas on an annual basis and also to provide a final report of its examination of the reports on the implementation of the entire Plan to the National Assembly. These measures were components of the Plan and did emphasise the importance of Guyanese "ownership" of the reform process.

The four-year, £3M, bilateral Interim Memorandum of Understanding for a Security Sector Reform Action Plan that was signed by British High Commissioner to Guyana Fraser Wheeler and Head of the Presidential Secretariat Dr. Roger Luncheon on 10th August 2007 was intended to integrate the initiatives of several years worth of reports, recommendations training courses and visits.

The Plan, in the main, provided for building the operational capacity of the Police Force, from the provision of a uniformed response to serious crime, forensics, crime intelligence and traffic policing; strengthening policy-making across the security sector to make it more transparent, effective and better co-ordinated; mainstreaming financial management in the security sector into public sector financial management reform; creating substantial parliamentary and other oversight of the security sector and building greater public participation and inclusiveness in security sector issues.

The Plan was designed also to complement the ongoing Citizen Security and Justice Reform programmes, in an effort to tackle crime and security in a holistic manner and in accord with the OECD's Framework.

Despite the substantial body of Guyana-Britain security sector reform cooperation over the years, controversy arose in late May over the modalities for advancement of the Plan. An extreme interpretation of the event appeared in an article in the Weekend Mirror newspaper, published on 3rd June, which stated "After 43 years of independence, the British are still trying their best to have their way in the management of the Guyanese affairs" and cited the controversy between the Office of the President and the British High Commission over the security sector reform project as an example.

Controversy

The controversy, in fact, arose out of the negotiations to upgrade the interim memorandum to a permanent agreement as the Framework for the Formulation and Implementation of a National Security Policy and Strategy." According to Dr. Roger Luncheon – Head of the Presidential Secretariat and Secretary to the Guyana Defence Board and who had governmental responsibility for the project – the framework for the "Formulation and Implementation of a National Security Policy and Strategy" was concluded last year. But in his view, the version of the Security Sector Reform in Guyana Plan which was approved by the British government in April contained a proposal for a four-tiered British management structure which handed the British side "complete control" of the management of the programme.

Luncheon said that such a proposal was "offensive" and would not be tolerated by the Government of Guyana. The British, he thought, were attempting to convince Guyana that it was suffering from a "capacity constraint" in project implementation, a notion with which the government disagreed totally. He asserted that "Guyanese ownership" of the Plan will be maintained and that the government "will not relent one bit on this." He added that the implementation of the reforms would indeed be facilitated by the British involvement, but that he is "not going to give up one our dignity [and] our sovereignty for the contribution that could come from this engagement".

British High Commissioner Fraser Wheeler, on the other hand, reiterated that the British government was committed to Guyanese

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“ownership” of the process which was designed to be in accord with the OECD paradigm for security assistance. Expectedly, though, local discussions in Guyana between the High Commission and the Office of the President were subject to approval by the UK government which was committed to financing the Plan and this might have been the source of some misunderstanding. He stated plainly that he was dissatisfied with the delay in implementing the reform plan, accusing “some persons” in the administration of “quibbling about administrative details.”

The comments of both the Head of the Presidential Secretariat and the High Commissioner immediately made headline news in late May. Despite the media frenzy, however, moderate counsel seemed to prevail by mid-June. Writing in the *Weekend Mirror* newspaper, Speaker of the National Assembly Ralph Ramkarran referred to the controversy and complained that it was “painful to see relations between the British and Guyana Governments, underlined by unusually strong language, take a negative turn.” Ramkarran’s optimism, however, seems to have been misplaced and the *Plan* is now dead in the water.

Any objective evaluation of the efforts to reform the security sector over the past seven years would indicate that much ground had been covered; Guyana has been the beneficiary without its sovereignty being compromised. Equally, any review of the public safety situation in the country at present would show how much more still needs to be done.

After the collapse of the British-funded *Plan*, Dr Luncheon promised that “Security Sector Reform will continue in Guyana, maybe at a different pace and the scope and the design will be different, but the implementation of that will be from public funds from the Government of Guyana.” We shall wait and see what happens.

David A. Granger is a Guyanese politician and former military official. He has in the past served as Commander of the Guyana Defence Force and later as the country’s National Security Advisor. He is currently leader of the opposition in the National Assembly of Guyana.

PUBLICATION REVIEW:

***'Well-Kept Secrets: The Right of Access to Information and the South African Intelligence Services'* by Sandy Africa**

Published by the Institute for Global Dialogue, South Africa, and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Mozambique; May 2009.

Reviewed By Professor Paul Jackson


This book, as pointed out in the introduction, is based on Dr. Sandy Africa's doctoral thesis. As an academic this phrase on book proposals usually makes me squirm, since doctoral theses frequently do not make good books, unless they have been comprehensively rewritten. However, in this case I am happy to make an exception to my usual rule and say that this book is definitely worth reading. Written by someone who knows this sector very well, having been an intelligence officer in the struggle-era African National Congress (ANC) and then in post-Apartheid South Africa, Sandy Africa is in a powerful position to outline the wide-ranging changes and demands on the intelligence services in her country. She does so in an accessible and clear way that outlines several core dilemmas faced by intelligence services more generally, as well as the tensions between secrecy and democracy as seen through access to information.

As Manfred Öhm and Garth Le Pere state in the preface:

'Civilian intelligence services are often perceived as occupying a recondite world, characterised by secrecy, ambiguity, and concealment. But not always understood is that they are subject to stringent oversight and accountability imperatives, which are often legally enshrined. Access to information is thus an important normative aspiration for any society that seeks to promote the virtues of democracy. One of these is the right of the public to know about the nature of intelligence work with regard to its policy, operational and regulatory dimensions. This takes on added meaning and relevance in defining the parameters of how political power is exercised and managed.'

Clearly, this has a specific resonance in the case of South Africa's move from an explicitly oppressive regime to an open, democratic society. Within this overall context, the intelligence services of the former regime had a long way to go in the process of developing more accountable ways of working that remained within the law. The previous regime had authorised a wide range of secret activities as part of its battery of measures against the ANC and other opposition groups within South Africa and internationally, and now the ANC had become the Government, leaving the former intelligence services in possession of numerous secret files on informers, activities and policies that the new Government could now act upon. Its response was predictable: many files were destroyed, leaving very little trace of many of these clandestine activities.

Any destruction of history in this way is a tragedy, but in the case of South Africa this has left a missing element in the construction of



individual and collective narratives of the apartheid era, including the difficult realisation that in many cases the truth may never be disclosed. All in all, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) destroyed more than 44 tons of documents and microfilm, creating a hole in the corporate memory of the South African NIS and the subsequent service. This is potentially not only important for the service itself and the individuals who may not now get to know about specific operations, but also for the collective memory of South Africa following those years.

The author follows the developments of intelligence within South Africa by splitting the book into three distinct sections. The first deals with the Apartheid era and the role of the NIS within the regime. It then goes on to look - briefly - at the Department of Intelligence and Security (DIS), the organisation established by the ANC to counter the NIS. Indeed, if I have any criticism of the book, it is that the text rather skips over the nature of the DIS and the clash of cultures between the DIS and the NIS during a difficult period of transition.

The first section charts the role of intelligence under apartheid and then details the negotiations and various legal frameworks governing the amount of secrecy established around them. This section particularly has a fascinating amount of detail relating to the transitional arrangements during the negotiations and transition to the post-apartheid, ANC Government. The author was clearly involved in these discussions and it shows in the book. The outline of the new legal framework is excellent, and the initial discussions of the institutional framework for intelligence in South Africa are the clearest I have seen. She even manages to make Chapter 11 of the constitution, the White Paper on Intelligence - which also provides a broad policy framework and a basis for the legislation that sets up and regulates the intelligence services: the Intelligence Services Act of 2002, the National Strategic Intelligence Act of 1994, and the Intelligence Services Oversight Act of 1994 - interesting.

The second section looks at the operation of this new framework and particularly the accountability mechanisms both outside and inside the organisation. Consequently, an interesting section on the nature

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of the DIS and the clash of cultures between the DIS and the NIS during a difficult period of transition.

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The second section looks at the operation of this new framework and particularly the accountability mechanisms both outside and inside the organisation. Consequently, an interesting section on the nature and difficulties of parliamentary oversight is followed by an insightful section on the role of internal accountability and reviews and accounts within the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South African Security Service (SASS). In particular, the analysis of information gleaned from published accounts of the NIA is revealing and wide-ranging, including a discussion of changing security priorities for South Africa over each year. Nevertheless, the conclusion is necessarily sanguine with regard to transparency in saying that the record of the SASS in particular has been 'inconsistent'.

Where the book really comes to life is in the sections dealing with the South African Bill of Rights, and particularly the right of access to information held by the state for each citizen and the 2000 Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA). The Act makes it possible, even easy, to access information held by the state with only some specific exceptions. As a result, the book gets into some real detail about how the security services have balanced the competing demands of transparency and

secrecy. As such it goes to the heart of the essence of what security services actually are. As the author herself states, her work;

'...deals with the attempts of the intelligence services to balance the competing requirements of secrecy and transparency, while taking PAIA into account. It also assesses whether these actions have contributed to effective and accountable governance of the services, and analyses the policy choices resulting from the Act, as expressed in institutional arrangements and statements by policy-makers.'

As one may imagine, this opens up several different avenues for analysis and the book uses a case study technique to trace through the decisions taken on individual attempts to access information from the security services. This certainly brings the whole piece to life and brings a relevance that is occasionally lacking within academic work on intelligence services, which has a tendency to be bone dry.

The third section looks at lessons and conclusions, but starts with a section on international practice in relation to intelligence services and access to information. I however did wonder whether this was the right place to put this chapter. Perhaps it may have sat more comfortably in the first section, where the overall context of the reforms was set. Nevertheless, this is a useful exercise in placing South Africa into the wider international context.

Finally, the section finishes on what amounts to a call to arms for parliamentary oversight of the security services and an end to the 'paternalistic' history of the services in deciding what the people should know about. However, this conclusion perhaps falls slightly short of what is included in the rest of the book. There are very strong policy implications and some very clear writing in the sections on specific cases and yet the debates and challenges of balancing transparency and accountability with secrecy are not really revisited systematically in the conclusion. Perhaps this reticence is the result of the author's previous profession within intelligence circles, but she has a lot to say as evidenced within the rest of the work. This is, however, nitpicking, and overall this volume sits very comfortably within the growing literature on secret security services. It is well written, clear and has some interesting food for thought. It should particularly be read by those same parliamentarians responsible for the oversight of these institutions, as well as those serving within secret organisations themselves.

MEMBER SPOTLIGHT: Janine Rauch

In this edition, we turn our spotlight on Janine Rauch, a South African criminologist and a member of both the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) and the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM).

Janine has many years of experience in the strategy and management of large security and justice programmes, including design, evaluation and



programme management - mainly in Africa - for a variety of governments and donors. She also has extensive experience in policy research and civil society activism on the subjects of policing, accountability, crime and transition in South Africa, as well as issues of governance, civil society and community safety elsewhere in Africa. She began her career with a focus on police accountability and police reform at the time of transition to democracy in South Africa.

When South Africa attained democratic rule in 1994, Janine was appointed an advisor to the Minister of Police, coincidentally becoming the youngest advisor to the youngest cabinet minister in the new government. Her role involved advising on various aspects of police reform in the post-Apartheid era, such as basic police training, the amalgamation of 11 Apartheid-era police forces into one new police service, responsibility for donor liaison, coordination of donor support for the police reform effort, and ministerial speechwriting. She later worked for some years on crime prevention, particularly on multi-agency prevention processes and on non-criminal-justice types of prevention.

Upon leaving the South African public service, Janine worked as an independent consultant for a variety of International NGOs and donors on programme design and evaluation. She has most notably consulted for the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the European Commission, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), the Clingendael Institute and the Open Society Foundation.

Through the ASSN and SADSEM networks she has been able to expand her focus beyond the police and the criminal justice system, to work more widely on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and accountability issues. In 2006, Janine helped SADSEM design a new postgraduate programme in Security Sector Management. This resulted in the creation of a Masters Degree programme and a Postgraduate Diploma in Security Sector Management, both conducted at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa. These courses are being followed by security sector personnel and researchers from across the Southern African region.

Much of her work since 2007 has mainly focussed on citizen participation and community-level accountability. In 2010 she led two large evaluations in the Great Lakes region (the Democratic Republic of the Congo/DRC and Burundi) for international donors. One of them was a joint ASSN and Development Associates International (DAI) team assembled to design the 'External Accountability' component of the DFID Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme in the DRC. The team, which also included fellow ASSN members Niagalé Bagayoko and Dylan Hendrickson, designed a three-year programme valued at £10 million, still being implemented today in the DRC.

Janine spent the summer of 2011 working for the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) in Geneva as a senior SSR consultant on projects in Serbia, Mali, South Sudan and Switzerland, while consulting part-time on police accountability for the Justice for All (J4A) programme in Nigeria. While at ISSAT she facilitated a renewal of the relationship between ISSAT and the ASSN, resulting in a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two networks and agreements to share trainers and consultants.

A holder of an MA in Criminology from Cambridge University and a bachelor's degree in the same discipline from the University of Cape Town, Janine speaks English and French. As of the year 2012, she is assisting with the establishment of Corruption Watch, a new trade-union inspired civil society organisation in her native South Africa. She is also working to strengthen the ASSN Roster of African SSR Experts.

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