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THE ROAD AHEAD: CHALLENGES AND  
OPPORTUNITIES OF SSR  
2013



THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SECTOR  
ADVISORY TEAM (ISSAT)

# High Level Panel on the Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform

Between October 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> 2012, DCAF's ISSAT organised a High Level Panel (HLP) on the Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform<sup>1</sup> (SSR) in East Africa, in partnership with the United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON), the Governments of Burundi, Kenya, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Somalia and South Sudan, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Union (AU), East African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Security Sector Network (ASSN). It was attended by over two hundred SSR policy makers and practitioners.

Informal Conclusions of the Chair<sup>2</sup> were distributed the week following the event, and provided a brief overview of the main messages emerging from the HLP. This report seeks to take those discussions further, including more of the points raised by participants during the HLP, and adding in lessons from experience gathered from individual missions and related trainings. Three case studies featured in the HLP (Burundi, Somalia and South Sudan) and as such provide many of the examples, although the report also draws from examples beyond East Africa. An introductory section on SSR in each of these countries is provided in section one and full case studies are included in the annex.

It is hoped that this report, which keeps to the same thematic areas as those covered in the HLP, will offer information on contemporary thinking in security and justice reform, as well as provide some recommendations and examples of good practice to those interested in or engaged in SSR. As many of the ideas contained in the report have come from verbal contributions, references have only been added where text is replicated from other sources. There is, however, a bibliography of useful material included in the annex and additional resources are highlighted in the text where possible through hyperlinks.

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<sup>1</sup> The term security sector reform is understood as including security and justice providers, as well as those providing governance functions. It also covers both state and non-state actors.

<sup>2</sup> For the 2012 Informal Conclusions of the Chair, see <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Community-of-Practice/Resource-Library/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Informal-Conclusions-of-the-Chair-High-Level-Panel-on-the-Challenges-and-Opportunities-for-Security-Sector-Reform-SSR-in-East-Africa>.

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## Introduction

The concept of Security Sector Reform is often used to refer to the process through which a country seeks to review and enhance the effectiveness and the accountability of its security and justice providers. While the concept itself continues to evolve and some variations of this definition exist, it is broadly acknowledged that SSR is:

“A nationally-owned process aimed at ensuring that security and justice providers deliver effective and efficient security and justice services that meet the people’s needs, and that security and justice providers are accountable to the state and its people, operating within a framework of good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights.<sup>3</sup>”

Some of the issues around national ownership are explored further in section two.

SSR enhances the security and protection of individuals and their property. Where the security sector is a source of conflict, SSR helps to transform the sector into an instrument of conflict prevention and management, which contributes to development and paves the way for other development activities<sup>4</sup>. SSR is now widely recognised as playing a vital role beyond improving the delivery of security and justice services to the population. The transformation of security and justice institutions to be more accountable and more effective is a critical element for post-conflict peace building and development, contributing to both short-term stabilisation and long-term stability. SSR promotes greater participation of marginalised and disenfranchised people in decision-making related to the security sector and its reform, enhances their involvement in the oversight of the security sector, and increases access to security and justice. SSR may also lead to a more effective allocation of resources, and better budgetary management, which could in turn make more resources available for broader development activities. Moreover, SSR should not only be a reactive process, dealing with past imbalances, but also focused on identifying and addressing future security challenges. These include youth and unemployment, regional security challenges or conflict over resources. The synergies that exist between SSR and other areas are explored further in section four.

The type of support provided to national governments undertaking security sector reform or transformation has also developed over recent years, as the International Community has started to review and learn from its approaches. Many of the multi-lateral or regional organisations now have normative frameworks to guide their engagement. These are covered in section five. There is a greater understanding of the benefit of partnerships to help host nations to develop their security and justice systems, as shown in section six. However, challenges to providing effective support remain. The challenges to support raised at the HLP have for the most part been included in the relevant sections; however, those not already covered are included in section seven.

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<sup>3</sup> Information taken from ISSAT’s SSR in a Nutshell training manual, p. 6. See: <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Community-of-Practice/Resource-Library/Tools/SSR-Level-1-Training-Manual>

<sup>4</sup> Idem.

# 1. Country case studies - summaries

## BURUNDI

Within the defence and police sector, the government faced the significant challenge of incorporating different armed movements into the respective forces, harmonising diverse ranks and levels of training, while at the same time providing security services. For example, the strength of the police force went from 2,000 to approximately 20,000 almost overnight with the integration for former combatants whilst preparing for elections. Oversight and governance in general remain a challenge, and greater internal and external controls of the security and defence forces are required to address human rights violations by some security institution personnel. The resources that are required to fully integrate these reforms are beyond the current financial capacity of the Burundi authorities.



## THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA

In Somalia, the SSR process has only just begun and is taking place in parallel to stabilisation efforts. There is very little in the way of democratic oversight and whilst ministers have been appointed dealing with security and justice, they lack functioning ministries to support them in their work. A framework for SSR now exists in the form of the National Security and Stabilisation Plan, but there are significant challenges for implementation. Somalia requires integration of the militias and a comprehensive DDR process. The police face similar reform needs, especially to extend its reach across the country to the newly recovered areas. There is hardly any justice sector. Current levels of support from donors are insufficient to cover all requirements. Moreover, SSR and DDR efforts in Somalia are set against a backdrop of prolonged instability, although the recent gains over Al-Shabaab suggest that the end is now in sight. Additional challenges will arise when AMISOM eventually leaves, when extensive efforts will be required to prevent a security vacuum from arising.



## The Republic of South Sudan

In South Sudan the SPLA transformation aims to provide, transforming into a professional army whilst simultaneously undertaking its role. There has been an absence of an overarching SSR guidance framework, with sectors moving forward at different speeds. This is now on the way to being rectified with an established National Development Plan and the current drafting of a National Security Policy. Challenges of implementation remain however, for example how to incorporate civil society more and take into account community concerns and needs. This human security perspective requires a greater attention and investment in developing the rule of law and justice elements within the country.

Transformation within the security sector is taking place in an increasingly complex security environment, with on-going external threats to South Sudan, as well as internal challenges. These include reviewing the size and composition of the SPLA, managing internal violent conflict, supporting and integrating returnees and finding solutions to small arms and light weapons proliferation.




## 2. National ownership

The principle of national ownership is recognised as a fundamental pillar in many SSR policy frameworks, academic discourse and programme documents. It provides legitimacy and ensures that national priorities and local contexts frame the SSR process. It is central to whether SSR is accepted, or whether it will be successful.

Despite agreement over its importance, there are still many different interpretations of what it actually means, what exactly is owned, and how to achieve it across the myriad of contexts in which SSR takes place. The issue of national ownership can be divided into three interlinked areas, each with specific roles, as shown in the diagram on page seven.

Discourse on national ownership is often focused on the role of donors or other external actors, partly because this principle is all too often not respected. However, national ownership is primarily about the vision, responsibility and commitment on the side of the national authorities. It also involves national governments ensuring that the voices of the population are taken into account, and their needs and concerns are incorporated into SSR efforts. Finally, national ownership implies that any external support provided is done in a manner that facilitates, rather than replaces, national efforts.

The principle of national ownership transcends all aspects of SSR. This includes the development of a national SSR vision that incorporates the cultural and historic context of the country, identifying priority areas, developing the process for implementation and carrying forward reform. It also involves investing national resources, including financing, human resources, infrastructure and other logistical aspects. National governments may struggle to meet resource needs. However, whilst external support is often crucial for SSR to go ahead, it remains imperative that these needs are factored as much as possible into national budgets. When donor support is provided, plans should be developed for the gradual increase of national resources to cover the different activities.





Overarching coordination for SSR should be managed by the national authorities, and national actors should take the lead in monitoring and evaluating progress in SSR.

## Challenges

In practice, there are several challenges to achieving this level of national ownership:

- There may be a lack of commitment by the political leadership to reform;
- There may be a lack of commitment by the political leadership to ensuring wide participation;
- There may be low levels of capacity (resources, expertise, spare time to focus on SSR in addition to other tasks, etc.);
- It is likely that there are several different views on how SSR should be undertaken while some stakeholders may disagree on the need the need to reform.
- Local communities may not have the knowledge or ability to contribute to policy debates;
- It may be viewed as difficult to support widening ownership of the SSR process to include the likes of civil society or opposition groups without undermining state authority;
- Although civil society may be represented in a process through a nominated individual, they may still be part of the elite and their voice not be representative of the most vulnerable groups;
- External actors may not understand what national ownership entails, believing for example that they have a 'nationally owned' process because they have secured a government stamp at different stages;
- External actors may be pushing their own agenda, models, processes or timelines;
- External actors may not want to be coordinated, especially by national authorities;
- External actors may not want to open up their programmes to national oversight;

The extent of the challenge to establishing a nationally owned SSR process will depend on the context, as well as the degree to which national actors are willing to assume responsibility and external actors are willing to relinquish control. The remainder of this section covers a number of suggestions on how to improve national ownership.

## Improving national ownership

The partnership between donor and host country should be established from the outset, rather than the host country being presented a finalised plan. This means working together to develop the initial Memorandum of Understanding and subsequent Terms of Reference for engagement. This approach was used successfully by the Burundi national authorities and the Government of the Netherlands at the outset of the current assistance programme.

There is often pressure for partner countries to accept whatever is offered by donors, even if the assistance is based on what the donor can provide, as opposed to what is needed



SRSR Augustine Mahiga and former prime minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali at a handover ceremony of police equipment. Source: Gihan Eltahir (UN)

or desired (supply-driven assistance). This situation may be particularly prevalent immediately after a conflict when donors often have significant budgets to spend in a limited time period and there is limited capacity in the host country to actively manage donor assistance. Moreover, there may be an absence of overarching strategy or policy documents at this stage. In such situations the African Union (AU) or Regional Economic Committees (RECs) could play a role in facilitating discussions between the donor and host nation to ensure that national ownership principles are adhered to. This is in line with the principle of African Solidarity incorporated in the AU Policy Framework on SSR, and the AU already engages international partners to encourage support, as well as providing a continental forum for lesson sharing, training and assessment, programme design and M&E, which further reinforces its credentials. A final step is for national governments to carry out an assessment of which partners to engage with. Whilst this may take additional time, it is a worthwhile endeavour to ensure that the assistance offered fits with the national vision and local context.

When planning support, multilaterals and donors should use the likes of national development strategies, poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), national security strategies and national SSR strategies as the first point of analysis. This helps to ensure that initial thinking is based on national priorities. It is important, however, to also understand the level of consultation used in the development of the national documents in order to determine the extent to which security and justice concerns of groups outside of the elite are taken into account.

The partnership between national and external actors can be further enhanced through donors using national coordination mechanisms. In addition to taking charge of coordinating partners, national authorities should ensure they understand how each offer of help supports national interests and what the level of commitment is, taking into account the likely timeframe of donor engagement. If the national government lacks the capacity to carry out donor coordination, international partners may take on the role to ensure that coordination is carried out, but in such a way that the national government will be able to take the reins once they have built up the required skills.

#### **National Ownership – Experiences from Burundi**

Lines of communication were opened between the army, the police and the community. This was brought about by the conduct of some citizen perception surveys and community policing efforts, and has led to a significant improvement in the level of trust in the performance of the police and the army. Inclusive analysis also led to a shared view on the causes of conflict, which in turn provided common ground across different stakeholder groups.

International staff members should have specific training in what national ownership really means, understand the importance of process and know how to be an effective advisor before deployment, ensuring that they support the national authorities to lead the process, rather than stepping in to carry out the work themselves. In order to counter the capacity deficits that may exist, a local assessment should be undertaken to map out the skills required on the national side to plan, implement and oversee relevant aspects of any assistance programme. Support programmes can then incorporate skills training to meet any gaps.

Ensuring the population has the capacity to input into policy development is a key part of national ownership. National authorities should develop robust communication strategies from the outset to ensure that information is delivered to the people in a timely way, in a medium that they can understand and accompanied by a means to feed back their views. The concept of SSR is often alien to many citizens, so it needs to be translated into a way that people can see how it applies to their own lives. Suitable mediums for communications could include radio, cartoons, social media, text messages to phones, leaflets in local languages, town hall meetings in rural areas, role playing, women-only meetings, school visits, anonymous drop-boxes for placing ideas, briefings to other ministries and parliament, etc. They should recognise that the security situation may preclude citizens travelling to central locations, as is the case in many areas of Somalia, and, as much as possible, arrange alternative ways of capturing rural views.

### **National Ownership - Experiences from Somalia**

The concept of national ownership features strongly in Somalia's National Security and Stabilisation Plan (NSSP), which "defines the process by which the Federal Government of Somalia will lead in re-orienting the policies, structures and operational capacities of security and justice institutions and groups in Somalia" and is "designed to serve as the main conduit for institutions will have the capacity to absorb the assistance offered and to what extent donngment of both national and international assistances for the implementation of prioritized, coherent, harmonized and sustained interventions in Somalia". Moreover, the Somali government has stressed that all external assistance should be processed through their central institutions. However, it is too early to say to what extent this will translate through to implementation, whether national inors will adhere to their promises to uphold national ownership. Observations were made during the HLP that coordination and support to the security sector have been fragmented so far and lack transparency. The NSSP aims to reverse this trend and ensure effective coordination. The NSSP was developed by Somalis – with a strong input by members of the diaspora – and subsequently circulated for comment to ministers, civil society and regionally to Puntland. However, there are some concerns over the extent to which the views of the general population have been captured and taken into account in the guiding policy documents because of the lack of freedom of movement due to the security situation in the country.

National authorities need to commit financial resources to underscore their ownership and commitment to the reform process. The extent to which national funds meets the requirement for SSR in a country will obviously depend on the individual circumstances of the country. However, irrespective of the amount, a strategy should be developed covering how the national authorities will take on a greater financial burden for reform over time, including indicators for when this shift will happen.

There has been an increase in recent years in the amount of South-South partnerships. In addition to sharing knowledge and lessons on technical aspects of SSR, regional countries should also share

experiences of managing donor assistance and lessons on how to ensure support is truly based on the principles of national ownership.

Specific indicators on national ownership should be developed for support programmes, especially when there are significant capacity gaps that mean that external actors carry out a greater role at the outset. These could take into account the extent to which different constituencies have been genuinely consulted, the extent to which national priorities are reflected in the programme, the rate at which control of the programme is taken on by national actors and the rate of increase in national resources deployed for reform, as opposed to international funds.

### **3. Politics of SSR**

Given its very nature, Security Sector Reform touches the heart of power and sovereignty, an area fiercely guarded by the State and accepting little, if any, interference from the outside, and even more so from foreign actors. However, the politics of SSR are not limited to countries with ongoing reforms. Given the amount of resources set aside for various SSR activities by the donor community, SSR has also become a burning political debate within their administrations.

This section of the report will first examine the reasons behind the political dimension of SSR in partner countries before analysing the politics of SSR within the donor community. Finally, this section will seek to identify possible solutions for mitigating the political complexities of SSR.

#### **Winning and losing with SSR**

In the immediate aftermath of conflict or in fragile societies, the State and governance structures are often weak, and concentrated among a small group of actors. These actors may have been in power for a long time, or may have recently come to power after waging a long battle. In both instances, giving up some of their power, albeit for the greater good of the State and its people, does not augur well with the leadership. For power brings with it certain financial and personal privileges that a country's leadership would be unwilling to sacrifice, and even more so in a context where resources are scarce and access to them is difficult. Additionally, having control over the security forces is often perceived as the ultimate representation of power and authority. Controlling the security forces will not only help protect the leadership from its enemies, but most importantly, it will protect the leadership from its greatest threat- the security forces themselves.

Reluctance to concede some of one's authority is also characteristic of the security forces. In many post-conflict or fragile societies, being part of the armed forces implies a certain status, privilege and/ or income for those concerned, either through respect (where the armed forces are considered as heroes), or abuse of status (where certain laws are bypassed or citizens are threatened). Similarly, downsizing certain components of the security sector, in favour of the upsizing of other components implies that there will be winners and losers in a reform process.

Finally, reforming a country's security sector entails significant consequences to the broader socio-political architecture of a country. In some societies, for instance, there may be no formal governance structures and no culture of accountability. Creating such mechanisms is not only a technical task, but also requires a shift in approach and political perception. In other instances, citizens may have recourse to informal governance structures that, if formalised, may lose their

effectiveness or legitimacy. Initiating a reform process should therefore not be perceived as a purely technical issue, but also needs to be considered for its political dimension.

In Somalia, for instance, SSR is not a standalone process. It needs to be anchored in the broader public sector reform process and constitutional reform. More generally, SSR could face resistance because of a lack of communication and/ or fear of the unknown. SSR is often perceived as being imposed by outsiders, leading to strong resistance from partner countries. Similarly, difficulties to estimate the real extent of reform, or its consequences, also make partner countries reluctant to commit to an SSR process. In other instances, partner countries may demonstrate initial eagerness to engage in SSR, only to back down once they realise the real implications of such reform.

In sum, SSR produces winners and losers, when reforms may go at great expense of affected institutions and actors, potentially generating resistance and competition with those benefiting from these reforms. Presenting SSR as a process that is generally beneficial to all, despite certain immediate drawbacks is key to overcoming the political complexity of SSR.

### **Donor politics**

Engagement in SSR processes abroad has become a highly political debate in donor countries, especially in recent years. The considerable amount of resources that are put into SSR processes, limited visible results in the short-term, and the deepening economic crisis have meant that citizens in donor countries are beginning to increasingly question the reasoning behind allocating large amounts of funding to partner countries that could be used for their own country's benefit. Government expenditure is subject to stricter parliamentary control, with stronger requests for proof of concrete results. As a result of the increasing need to account for public money spent on SSR programmes, donor countries tend to focus on the technical aspects of SSR, where concrete results can be achieved, to the detriment of the political dimension of SSR. For instance, donors may focus primarily on training and equipping security forces, rather than engaging in substantial institutional or legal reforms. Similarly, administrative and financial constraints mean that donors often tend to limit their SSR activities to short or medium-term funding cycles, whereas SSR is a long-term process that requires long-term commitment.

Another reason for donor engagement in SSR processes in partner countries could be traced back to historical and/ or political ties with the country or region in question. The European Union, on the other hand, has been highly involved in the SSR process in Guinea Bissau, in part to end the flow of drugs from Latin America to Europe, through Guinea Bissau.

Finally, international, regional and sub-regional organisations are also engaged in SSR processes. Although exposed to lesser levels of public criticism, these organisations are also caught up in administrative and financial constraints, with the added challenge of being dependent on member states and/ or donor contributions to carry out activities. The complexity of some of these institutions also means that internal politics and rivalries could surface at various stages of an activity, thereby rendering a complex reform process even more challenging.

### **Overcoming the political complexities of a reform process**

Overcoming the political complexities of reform, both from a partner and donor country perspective requires first acknowledging the political realities of such a process. Ignoring these realities or only dealing with them partially will only allow them to reappear at a later stage of the reform process.

Acknowledging such realities, on the other hand, could push partner and donor countries to work together to seek viable solutions, and in doing so, also learn to work together more effectively. Some possible solutions to overcome the political complexities of SSR at a local level include:

1. *Identify a champion*: In order to be effective and sustainable, reform processes require political ownership at the highest level. However, this may not always be possible from the onset. Identifying a political champion who can rally others for the cause and push for political buy-in is essential for all reform processes.
2. *Engaging with those who may disagree with the reform agenda*: SSR will always create winners and losers and the loser will often become spoilers. Excluding spoilers, although it could simplify matters in the short-term, can significantly complicate matters by encouraging them to further disrupt reform processes. Every effort should therefore be made to effectively engage spoilers to the extent possible.
3. *Transparency and communication*: Fear of change often creates resistance and scepticism that can be overcome by transparency and communication. Effectively communicating the reasons for change, what it entails and the expected outcomes can make the key stakeholders feel less threatened and encourage them to constructively engage in the reform process.
4. *Incentives*: Offering substantial incentives could significantly enhance support for reform. The absence, or lack of visibility of such incentives could lead to reluctance in engaging in the high-risk process of security sector reform.
5. *Inclusiveness*: A key challenge faced in post-conflict and fragile societies is the exclusion of certain groups of the population from political decision-making process. SSR advocates for an inclusive and holistic approach to reform processes. Such an approach will not only enhance the effectiveness of a reform process, but also reduce the likelihood for opposition.



Police Workshop in Somalia. Source: Gihan Eltahir (UN)

Possible solutions that could be undertaken by donor countries include:

1. *Moving beyond the technical dimension*: Given the strict reporting and budgeting requirements of donor countries, the key focus of the large majority of activities carried out by these countries target quantitative results over qualitative measurements of progress. Although more challenging, donor efforts need to increasingly focus on longer-term qualitative results.
2. *Positive reform*: Indeed, SSR is a challenging and complex undertaking. However, focusing on the achievements, however small they be, could offer incentive to carry on the reform process and could help increase momentum. Excessive focus on the challenges and

complexities of SSR could, on the other hand, discourage the drivers for reform and encourage spoilers.

3. *Coordination*: With an increasing number of international actors engaging in SSR programmes, there is a pressing need for enhanced coordination in order to ensure the effective use of resources by avoiding the duplication of work and limiting the risk of manipulation by other actors.

## 4. Synergies

As lessons are gathered from the recent proliferation of actors engaging in SSR, it is becoming more evident that SSR processes typically benefit from, if not require, a more multidisciplinary and dynamic approach. This is particularly noticeable with the growing traction of SSR in post-conflict peace building and state building processes and attempts at formulating whole of government approaches to SSR. However, there is growing evidence that policymakers and SSR practitioners need to think beyond the complementary reforms that have an explicit or pronounced security component, such as small arms, DDR, and transitional justice, to look at other key processes that may ultimately influence success.

Synergies are important in two ways. Firstly, linking together complimentary processes can ensure that they benefit from mutual reinforcement. Such an approach can also have several tangible dividends in regards to enhancing efficiency, allowing access to additional resources, improving sustainability and reinforcing complementarity. Secondly, failing to link together processes can result in gaps that undermine the long-term success of SSR.

The challenge, however, remains that SSR is often deliberately designed and implemented as a standalone process, for example due to a lack of culture of working across different departments or mandate restrictions. SSR processes have also struggled to better engage or even actively promote the integration of actors who have shied away from SSR in fear of 'securitising' their more development-oriented agendas.

Developing or utilising synergies can only be done through a proactive, collaborative approach whereby SSR is designed, implemented and reviewed with potential synergies in mind. The following section aims to provide indicative, rather than exhaustive, examples of possible processes and mechanisms that SSR processes should consider or aim to build synergies with.

### Stabilisation

The first priority in a stabilisation phase is to prevent a recurrence of conflict and to progressively, or incrementally, develop enabling conditions for longer-term peace building and state building processes to take root. In such an environment, the security sector and its development is often a key focus of both the Government and donor support, as it plays a critical role in the stabilisation process. However, the conditions are not yet present to engage in any robust SSR activities. In this phase, donors are typically more engaged in providing training, mentoring and material support to the security sector institutions, as opposed to addressing capacity and governance aspects. Such activities are often mislabelled as SSR and it would be more appropriate to title such activities security sector stabilisation or transformation to create the necessary distinction.

Nonetheless, it is critical already in this early stage to start planning and setting the groundwork for future SSR activities that will follow once the stabilisation phase begins to transition towards peace building. Synergies between stabilisation and SSR should be developed from the onset, particularly as there is no linear path of sequencing where stabilisation ends and SSR begins.

Insuring effective coordination and collaboration with actors engaged in stabilisation activities can be difficult especially because of institutional cultural differences. Such actors are mostly focused on short-term engagement and looking for 'quick wins' for either minimising conflict or addressing the humanitarian crisis. In extreme cases, such as East Timor in the years after gaining independence, international actors may be providing security roles in the place of government institutions. This is of course in stark contrast to SSR, which takes a more long-term developmental approach and emphasises empowering local actors to lead the SSR process. Despite these challenges, it is key at this stage to identify suitable entry-points and developing the necessary dialogue and networks for a future SSR process. SSR teams can help by advising and assisting in formulating the SSR component of peace agreements, or by helping ensure that activities supported by stabilisation teams, namely training and provision of security equipment, are carried out in such a way as to pave the way for a future SSR programme. In this respect, it is important that stabilisation teams keep in mind the potential sustainability and suitability of any support going forward.

Ideally, SSR and stabilisation experts should have a shared understanding of internal and external threats and work collectively on a cohesive strategy to provide support to the government to address such threats in the short and long-term.

## Peacekeeping

In the past decade the United Nations Security Council has increasingly included SSR provisions in peacekeeping mandates and the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations has also developed its own SSR capacity both at the field level and headquarters. This is a shift that has come about as a result of the increased appreciation of the importance of SSR in such contexts, but also



Somali and UN Police women parading at a police handover ceremony. Source: Gihan Eltahir (UN)

that training and mentoring, which is often provided by peacekeepers to their local counterparts, has been insufficient as a standalone activity to improve local capacity.

One of the key methods of ensuring greater understanding of SSR by peacekeepers is by more consistently including SSR specific modules in pre-deployment peacekeeping training and to similarly consider peacekeeping modules in SSR training. This can raise awareness as well as ensure effective transfer of skills and knowhow from one field to another, and courses of this type have now been run at peacekeeping training centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Mali and Ghana. This helps to ensure continuity from one phase to the next and also facilitates the redeployment of personnel to new phases. This can be complemented by recruiting a more diverse cadre of peacekeepers, with broader range of capacities, including advisors, trainers and specific technical experts. The new UNPOL Standard Operating Procedure, Assessment of Individual Police Officers for Service in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, emphasises recruiting UNPOL



officers that have such specific skill sets and have shaped the recruitment process to favour individuals with various in-demand specialisations.

Secondly, peacekeeping missions can potentially benefit from better integrating their diverse SSR related activities under a single umbrella framework. This helps to ensure that the various units and advisors working in SSR related activities are coordinated and applying appropriate SSR principles. Advisors would therefore work across the entire mission and ensure that, when appropriate, SSR is integrated into on-going activities, and technical experts could work to help establish the enabling environment to begin SSR activities. Optimally, such SSR advisors would report directly to the respective SRSG to ensure that s/he has the appropriate tools and authority to effectively lead the coordination efforts. Alternatively, there are good examples of dedicated SSR Units, also embedded within the SRSG Unit, which can be tasked with such a coordinated function but also dispose of the capacity to technically assist the national government on issues related to SSR. The preferred set up is of course is contingent on context and the mandate of the mission.

### **Service Delivery Agenda**

Improved service delivery, especially of basic goods and services, is a normal key priority of governments in post-conflict states. Its importance is almost universally acknowledged in poverty reduction strategies or national development plans. In regards to security, there are often causal links between effective service delivery and improvements in community safety and improved human security situation and social cohesion.

This may lead to governments formulating a dedicated Service Delivery Agenda that is embedded within a wider Public Sector Reform process. Within such a framework the government sets certain benchmarks and objectives, outlined with dedicated indicators, that it aims to achieve in the short to medium term. The challenge, however, is that security sector reform is oftentimes overlooked in these processes and the focus is often more on service objectives tied to health, education and welfare, yet the aims of SSR to improve accountability, efficiency and effectiveness closely mirror the overall objectives of Service Delivery Agenda.

Integrating SSR into the service delivery agenda would both ensure a more coherent government approach to reform, as well as potentially providing access to additional resources. Furthermore, it can provide access to political capital as the service delivery agenda often has significant political commitment. The process is commonly anchored directly in the office of the Prime Minister or President, which can help to move forward important reform processes if they prove to otherwise have political resistance or lack prioritisation.

In practical terms, the service delivery agenda can also enhance and strengthen SSR. The need to improve human resource capacity of state institutions to deliver essential services is at the heart of the process, done through effective and de-politicised recruitment of civil servants coupled with requisite training. In the case of countries where recruitment of public or civil servants is done centrally through a Public Service Commission, priority in allocating or approving new functions into institutional organograms is given to institutions found to be most in need with respect to government priorities. In addition, this centralised process helps to ensure that recruitment is based solely on qualifications rather than ethnic, personal, or political ties. The ability to recruit qualified

and competent individuals to staff security sector institutions is one of the key determinants in the success of capacity building efforts in the security sector institutions.

A further area to be considered is the shift in organisational culture of security sector institutions. This is heavily rooted in the overall service delivery agenda principle of improving the quality of public services. Such transition are especially prominent in post-conflict states moving from authoritarian regimes to more democratic systems whereby the role of the police moves from being a police force concerned primarily with protecting the state to becoming a police service that principally caters to the needs of the people. Examples of such transitions include Zambia and Kenya.

### Public Finance Management

Ensuring efficiency and long-term sustainability of SSR processes is contingent on sound public management principles being in place in the security sector; yet, in post-conflict and fragile environments, debate on fiduciary matters in the security sector is often absent altogether. Not only does the sensitive political context of the security sector make such dialogue challenging but the right skill sets to undertake such technical and complex dialogue have been missing in the sector and not prioritised. The institutions with the requisite mandates and know how on such fiduciary issues have avoided the SSR agenda, in part through fear of securitising their mandates, and national security actors have often been resistant to opening up their respective fields to financial scrutiny. Nonetheless, an increasing trend in the willingness of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to reconsider their engagement in the security sector, evidenced by the recent increased proliferation of IFIs in SSR related activities.

Public finance management (PFM) reform is closely linked to the governance aspect of SSR, as both share similar reform goals and objectives: enhancing efficiency, sustainability, improved civil oversight, improved service delivery and accountability. PFM also introduces a new element to the SSR agenda, and that is to encourage and gradually instil predictability to the planning, policy and budgeting process.

A PER basically aims to assess whether current and planned expenditure in a sector is sustainable and balanced. This includes analysing expenditure trends and previewing potential future funding gaps in budgets. A PER process can also highlight hidden costs, off-budget items and provide a cumulative spending estimate that includes donor funds, recurrent budget, and capital expenditure.<sup>5</sup> Commonly, SSR practitioners only have rudimentary estimates of expenditure in the sector because many of these headings remain unknown, with national actors often unable or unwilling to provide details. The practical value of such analytical information is that it enables SSR practitioners and policy makers to anticipate whether ongoing or proposed reform activities, which will have recurrent cost implications, are affordable and ultimately viable without continued donor support.

Lastly, a PER can guide SSR programming by giving an indication of the sector's absorption capacity and potential project backlog due to insufficient public finance management systems. The PER can highlight if the donors as well as government have been able to disburse available funds in line with

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<sup>5</sup> Hidden costs are costs that in the accounting system that are deliberately masked under other budget headings: for example including the costs for procuring weapons under a budgetary heading of 'travel'. Off budget costs are simply unspecified costs that are not detailed in the budget. The purpose of such accounting practices is to hide 'real' spending on contentious or politically sensitive issues.

projected financing forecasts or if chronic delays have been experienced. In this regard, absorption capacity is a key indicator that shows the ability of the government to proceed with the pace of reforms and to ultimately assume ownership of the programmes. The collected data can also show if the procurement and accounting systems in place are capable to handle the allocated funds. In this regard, a public expenditure review can be an important analytical tool that would provide a thorough diagnostic analysis of the PFM system, fiscal governance, and expenditure management in the security sector.

A PER and SSR process should by design be complementary. Since a holistic approach to SSR is commonly accepted as good practice, fiduciary and public finance management issues would need to be taken into account from the outset of SSR processes rather than considered as an afterthought. Optimally, any SSR process should include a component or elements of PFM in its strategy.

## 5. Strategic Frameworks for SSR

Over the past five years much has been done on developing normative frameworks to guide SSR processes. At an international level these have looked specifically at security sector reform. Regionally they may have developed as a subset requirement of an economic or defence grouping. Nationally, there are also a greater number of security sector frameworks emerging, linked to longer-term development. In anticipation of the African Union's Security Sector Reform Policy Framework, this section looks at the utility of normative frameworks in reforming the security sector, and how their development is shaping Africa.

Normative frameworks have all arisen for reasons of unity of vision and coordination, and may serve a number of additional purposes. Firstly, normative frameworks pertaining to security sector reform provide **a common vision of values and goals**. The formulation of the vision helps bring all the stakeholders to a mutual understanding and primes them to work in the same direction for the common good. Articulating a common concept is also a useful starting point for matching security aspirations with security provision. Framework values might be drawn, for example, from the UN Charter, or from the mission of regional groupings. For each framework, the vision is explicitly defined early on in the framework, and the process of formulating this definition is the first step in building the framework.

Secondly, normative frameworks attempt, over time, to create **a holistic process**, i.e., one that covers all the necessary elements to achieve its vision and purpose. Such a framework is an invaluable prerequisite to a clearly conceptualised, systematic, well coordinated, locally owned and inclusive SSR process. Without these frameworks, well-intended SSR processes can risk reinforcing sectoral stovepipes, despite best efforts to establish an effective, efficient and accountable security sector. The most applicable frameworks facilitate cross-government reform and act as windows of opportunities as well as drivers for change.

Thirdly, the process of developing and establishing nationally applicable normative frameworks engenders, empowers and ensures **local ownership**. This is a key driver for the sustainability of a normative framework, and marks it apart from frameworks that have been brought in wholesale

from elsewhere. The Accra Agenda for Action<sup>6</sup> demands greater ownership, inclusive partnerships and measurable results. Frameworks can assist in producing locally developed indicators to measure for results, and the Busan New Deal<sup>7</sup> is a major step in setting the parameters for locally developed frameworks, whilst having a comparative value across fragile states.

Finally, normative frameworks contribute to addressing issues of **donor coherence and coordination** by giving a ready-made framework of goals and activities for donors to support. The increasing proliferation and adaption of normative frameworks in the implementation of security sector reform is testimony of their usefulness.

## International Organisations

International, regional and sub-regional organisations can provide guidance to member states, to ensure that good principles are incorporated into national, context-specific, approaches to SSR. An understanding as to the ambitions of an SSR process among the constituent members of international and regional organisations, as well as in these entities themselves, is the necessary starting point towards the evolution of a regional security policy upon which all national peace and security initiatives could be anchored. This also serves to strengthen national ownership and coordination among development partners. Mutually understood ambitions as to SSR processes that are adjustable to their respective, sometimes complex environments may provide consistency throughout the stabilisation-SSR continuum. It has already been noted that, for instance, the need for a sub-regional mechanism for addressing SSR becomes evident in the face of the benefits of an integrated approach to joint regional peace operations, such as is the case with the African Standby Force (ASF).<sup>8</sup>

### United Nations

At the Security Council's request, on 23 January 2008 the UN Secretary-General submitted a report, entitled "Securing Peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform", that would frame the UN's approach to security sector reform.<sup>9</sup> This report put SSR firmly on the global policy agenda. Supported by a growing body of evidence derived from the UN's experiences, the report outlines basic SSR principles and highlights the importance of partnerships with

regional organisations, in particular the African Union and the European Union (EU). Work is currently underway to undertake a Comprehensive Review of how the recommendations put forward in the 2008 Report have been implemented over the last five years.



Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon addresses the Security Council on the issue of SSR.  
Source: UN Photo/Jenny Rockett

<sup>6</sup> For the Accra Agenda for Action, see: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1217425866038/AAA-4-SEPTEMBER-FINAL-16h00.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> For the Busan New Deal, see: <http://www.newdeal4peace.org/about-the-new-deal/>

<sup>8</sup> Ebo, Adedji, *Towards a Common ECOWAS Agenda on Security Sector Reform*, 2007, DCAF Occasional Policy Paper Nr. 23, p. 10.

<sup>9</sup> For the 2008 Secretary-General's Report, see: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/216/06/PDF/N0821606.pdf?OpenElement>.

In support of the effort to provide UN member states with a coordinated UN response, an Inter-Agency SSR Task Force was set up comprised of 13 UN departments, programs and agencies.<sup>10</sup> This Task Force has been responsible for developing UN guidance, standards and practices in a number of areas of SSR (including the development of Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on SSR)<sup>11</sup>; undertaking consultations with regional organisations; managing a roster of SSR experts and delivering training to UN personnel, external partners, and Member States. It currently supports 14 peacekeeping operations, peace-building support offices and special political missions engaging in SSR assistance.

### *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) has played a pivotal role in conceptualizing the field of SSR or Security System Reform. Through its working group for Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC), the DAC has done much work in defining the key principles of SSR in accordance with the "Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice" guidelines<sup>12</sup> adopted by the DAC Member States in 2004. These guidelines formed the basis of the DAC's seminal work on SSR, the "Handbook on Security and Justice Reform: Supporting Security and Justice", containing concrete recommendations.<sup>13</sup>

Importantly, the OECD framework has set reform obligations for both partner countries and donors. The latter are supposed to create a clear institutional framework and to adopt whole-of-government approach in order to ensure coherence of activities among different actors and institutions. The objective is to ensure a coherent and coordinated approach, establishing synergies between projects that would otherwise be stove-piped. The OECD's guidance on the development of the peace building and state building goals (PSGs) as well as the FOCUS<sup>14</sup> engagement of the Busan New Deal<sup>15</sup> has been instrumental. Moreover, work is currently underway to unpack and rethink donor approaches to identify innovative and feasible options for improving the quality of international support to security and justice programming.

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<sup>10</sup> For the Inter-Agency SSR Task Force, see: <http://unssr.unlb.org/Actors/UNInterAgencySSRTaskForce.aspx>.

<sup>11</sup> For the Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, see: <http://unssr.unlb.org/Portals/UNSSR/UN%20Integrated%20Technical%20Guidance%20Notes%20on%20SSR.PDF>

<sup>12</sup> For the Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice guidelines, see: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/31642508.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> For the 2007 OECD DAC Handbook, see: <http://www.oecd.org/development/conflictandfragility/38406485.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> **FOCUS** = **F**ragility assessment conducted nationally; **O**ne vision, one plan; **C**ompact with stakeholders and the public; **U**se PSGs to monitor; **S**upport political dialogue and leadership.

<sup>15</sup> For more information on the Busan New Deal, see: <http://www.oecd.org/international%20dialogue/aneuadealforengagementinfragilestates.htm>.

## Regional Organisations

### European Union

The European Security Strategy<sup>16</sup> adopted by the European Council in 2003 advocates enhancing the EU's role in security sector reform. In November 2005 The European Union Concept for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) support to SSR was adopted.<sup>17</sup> The EU's focus was directed towards the reform of various sectors (defence, police, justice and the rule of law, parliamentary cooperation, border and customs reinforcement) as well as the implementation of the principles of democratic governance, including with regard to financial matters. In 2006, the European Commission defined SSR one of its priorities for the Community's external relations, as underlined in its Communication entitled "A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform".<sup>18</sup> These two concept papers were brought together under the EU Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform in June 2006.

Several ESDP/CSDP missions have been conducted or are under way with a view to supporting the reform of the police and justice institutions (EUPOL RD Congo<sup>19</sup>, EUPOL Afghanistan<sup>20</sup>, EULEX Kosovo<sup>21</sup> and EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories<sup>22</sup>) and the armed forces (EUSEC RD Congo)<sup>23</sup>. Furthermore, the European Union has also deployed an integrated SSR mission to Guinea-Bissau (police, justice, armed forces, customs and general administration), which finished in 2010.<sup>24</sup>

### African Union

In January 2008 the Assembly of the African Union Heads of State and Government encouraged the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform. Ultimately, such a Policy Framework is envisioned to develop a more tailored approach to SSR on the African continent that would enhance country ownership and ensure greater effectiveness of SSR processes.

In the wake of these calls, the AU launched a substantial consultative process with key stakeholders – including the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), civil society, SSR practitioners, and AU

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<sup>16</sup> For the 2003 European Security Strategy, see: <http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/european-security-strategy.aspx?lang=fr> .

<sup>17</sup> ESDP has been enamed since the 2007 Lisbon Treaty to Common Security and Defence Policy. For the EU Concept on Support to SSR, see: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st12/st12566-re04.en05.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup> For the 2006 EC Concept, see: [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006\\_0253en01.pdf](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0253en01.pdf).

<sup>19</sup> For EUPOL RD Congo, see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eupol-rd-congo?lang=en>.

<sup>20</sup> For EUPOL Afghanistan, see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eupol-afghanistan?lang=en>.

<sup>21</sup> For EULEX Kosovo, see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eulex-kosovo?lang=en>.

<sup>22</sup> For EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories, see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eupol-copps?lang=en>.

<sup>23</sup> For EUSEC RD Congo, see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eusec-rd-congo?lang=en>.

<sup>24</sup> For the EU's integrated mission to Guinea-Bissau, see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eu-ssr-guinea-bissau?lang=en>.

Member States – to draft and to review the AU Policy Framework for SSR. The Framework, adopted by member states in January 2013, draws from the experience that the AU has gained across many different contexts, including Burundi, Somalia and South Sudan amongst others. Throughout, the AU received substantial support and assistance from the United Nations and other partners.

Importantly, the SSR Policy Framework encourages RECs and national governments to develop their own specific frameworks and instruments. At the country-level, member States are encouraged to develop SSR reviews, needs assessments as well as national security strategies. Institutional, legal and security policy frameworks are to be built up and democratic control and oversight mechanisms are to be enhanced and made functional. In line with these provisions, the AU has, for example, supported the 2010 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-led Security Sector Assessment process in Guinea-Conakry and the subsequent March 2011 National Seminar. The Assessment process was in itself informed by broad public consultations engaging government actors as well as civil society groups.

### *The Regional Economic Communities*

The aforementioned AU's SSR Policy Framework foresees that RECs will become the primary organisations, alongside the AU Member States and the African Union, for implementing the Policy Framework and taking a prominent role in ensuring a coordinated approach to SSR.

A common regional approach is especially important given the political and economic impacts of conflicts on the region as a whole and the need to ensure internal member-state coordination, as well as donor alignment. As such, the RECs are expected to play a prominent role in ensuring peace and stability within their respective regions.

In line with this, ECOWAS has developed its Security Sector Governance Concept and Action Plan, derived from the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which was adopted by the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council in 2008.<sup>25</sup> Concurrently, ECOWAS has been actively supporting SSR processes in its member states. In 2010, ECOWAS led the development of the SSR Roadmap for Guinea-Bissau, building on the 2006 National Strategy for Modernisation of the Defence and Security Forces. The roadmap is now seen as a key framework that provides a clear vision, defines SSR priorities and serves as a guiding mechanism to streamline international SSR cooperation in Guinea Bissau.

At the regional level, much work remains. RECs are still in the process of developing sufficient institutional capacity to implement, coordinate and monitor ongoing SSR programming in their respective regions. This may lead each REC to develop its own respective SSR framework, which will define responsibilities and outline the modalities of how such REC's will engage in SSR. Entry points are already in place to enact such policies: apart from ECOWAS, both the East African Community (EAC) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) explicitly acknowledge the link between security and development in various policy documents, a core aim of SSR, and have dedicated themselves to the promotion of peace and security. The diversity of needs and priorities in SSR across Africa inherently means that regional frameworks will need to be comprehensive to

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<sup>25</sup> For the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, see:  
[http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/framework/ECPF\\_final.pdf](http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/framework/ECPF_final.pdf).

accommodate the various opportunities and challenges of SSR in the region – ranging from basic train and equip activities in Somalia to more development SSR engagements in Kenya.

### *National Case Studies*

At the country level, states can resort to an array of instruments to ensure a clearly conceptualized and nationally owned framework to which donors should harmonise and align their support. Simultaneously, the process of developing frameworks may act as sources of empowerment for previously marginalised groups. For example, in South Africa, public consultations were held in support of the 1994-1996 Defence White Paper Process that included substantive input from women's rights groups. In Burundi, during the final stages of preparation for the Poverty Reduction Strategy formulation process in 2006, the World Bank in close collaboration with the UN system brought together focal points from the PRS team, government and civil society. Working groups on various themes (human rights, governance, land reform, justice, etc.) were formed following a two-day workshop. This created a neutral space for actors engaged in the security sector to discuss these issues in the context of formulating Burundi's national development framework, while laying the groundwork for some of the country's SSR activities and empowering various groups across society.

### **South Sudan**

In **South Sudan** the lion's share of SSR attention has been focused on the defence sector. Already before independence, the 2008 Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Defence White Paper (which is being revised in line with South Sudan's new sovereignty) and the SPLA Act of 2009 have been key strategic documents for outlining the path for reform. The real challenge for those involved is implementing the policies and strategies that have been developed. The task ahead is to maintain and improve the progress made so far, and translate this throughout South Sudan's ten states and across the entire security sector, especially into the areas of justice and police. Further use of normative frameworks that include these areas may help lead the way.

### **Somalia**

Following two security sector assessments in **Somalia** and a consultative process that included all major stakeholders a National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) was drafted in 2011. Despite the successful ending of the transitional period and the establishment of a new constitution, Somalia's specific environment and the limited capacity of the existing government has made it particularly challenging for the implementation of wide-ranging SSR in line with the NSSP. Government security forces still face the prospect of battling an elusive enemy while attempting to undertake reforms.

### **Burundi**

In **Burundi**, the Arusha Peace Agreement provided the framework for SSR aspects intrinsic to the peace process. The Agreement highlighted the need for the defence and security forces to be politically neutral, united and representative of the entire population. All subsequent ceasefire or power-sharing agreements, the Constitution, the country's poverty reduction strategy, the sectoral policies of the Ministries of Defence and Public Security, the strategic plans of the Force de Défense Nationale (FDN) and the (Police Nationale de Burundi) PNB are grounded in the spirit and letter of the Arusha Agreement. Several matters remain on the reform's agenda, namely: public perception of the police and the military, corruption, improving access to justice, and strengthening oversight.



From a political perspective, the instability in neighbouring Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) presents a potential risk to the reform process.

## 6. Partnerships

Clearly recognised as being essential for effective SSR initiatives, partnerships have grown in recent years. There are now several positive and helpful examples of how partnering between organisations, institutions, or countries, can make the difference between success and failure in SSR processes. Appreciating the long-term nature of SSR programmes, the interests and commitment of partners must match the long-term aspirations and needs of the countries being assisted. This is often challenging and yet it is this type of commitment from partners that can help a host nation develop effective security and justice systems.

Strong strategic partnerships now exist between the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), Regional Economic Communities (REC), and other regional organisations. Indeed, these partnerships were highlighted and reinforced during the HLP. The Assistant Secretary-General for the Rule of Law and Security Institutions shared the recent developments in the UN's partnership with regional bodies within Africa, underlining that it is only through these partnerships that the support from the UN and other international bodies can be legitimate and sustainable.

### African Union – United Nations

The African Union and the UN formally created a strategic partnership in 2009. The UN's commitment to partnership building was evident before this however: it is stressed as being an essential element of effective SSR in the UN 2008 SRSR report on SSR.

For the AU this partnership is realised through its SSR team based in the Defence and Security Division of the AU Commission Peace and Security Department. For the UN it is implemented through the UN SSR Unit based in New York, which falls under the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) under DPKO. The Unit currently supports approximately ten UN missions operating on the African Continent. The UN also directly supports the AU Commission in Addis Ababa through the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU), established in July 2010. This office facilitates proximate technical advice and support in the area of peacekeeping and includes a dedicated officer for SSR. Such support was set up before the AU Commission had the capacity it now has with its own SSR team. Now, as this SSR team develops, the two organisations are able to complement each other as the partnership grows.

### African Union – African Security Sector Network

Another critical partnership for the AU is with the African Security Sector Network (ASSN).<sup>26</sup> This partnership was created in 2009, and allows the ASSN to second SSR experts and administrative staff to the AU. The ASSN was established in 2003 out of recognition of the need to harmonise and facilitate the SSR activities of the different African organisations working in the sector. Hence, partnerships are one of its core elements. The ASSN's central activities include critical collaboration with the AU, the RECs and national governments to promote national ownership of SSR; and engaging with external partners interested in supporting SSR initiatives in Africa. As such the ASSN's

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<sup>26</sup> For more information on the African Security Sector Network, see: <http://www.africansecuritynetwork.org/site/>.

work is an important means to build partnerships at all levels and across institutions, organisations and countries.

## African Union - European Union

The European Union together with the AU and regional African organisations has an Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security. The main instrument for implementing this partnership is through the African Peace Facility (APF).<sup>27</sup> This mechanism was established in 2004 based on the recognition that peace and security are necessary preconditions for sustainable development. The AFP activities are in three areas: financial support to African-led Peace Support Operations; the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); and strengthening the political dialogue on peace and security challenges.<sup>28</sup>

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan 2011-2013 highlights the commitments made and the expected results.<sup>29</sup> These include many of the aspects that are increasingly being appreciated as essential elements of effective SSR: local ownership, through basing initiatives on the African security agenda; strengthening cooperation, coordination, and dialogue within the security-development nexus; a focus on protection of civilians, including special attention on children and women (in line with the respective UN Security Council Resolutions 1894<sup>30</sup>, 1325<sup>31</sup> and 1820<sup>32</sup>). The partnership is set up to be able to meet some of the funding challenges for SSR-related work: there is a dual approach combining short-term funding of crisis response with longer-term support for institutional capacity building.

The overall effort towards strategic partnership is articulated in the overall objectives of the Action Plan: *“As part of African and European regional organisations' contributions to effective multilateralism, the AU and EU will work with the UN to address global threats to peace and security as well as the financial and operational capacity of the AU and regional mechanisms to plan and conduct peace support operations.”*

## National SSR Actors – Donors

On the ground in countries that are undergoing security and justice reforms partnerships are seen increasingly amongst bilateral donors providing assistance. The efforts towards developing meaningful coordination and cooperation by those implementing the donor programmes at the operational level are enhanced by the partnerships at the strategic level. When this approach is led by the national security leaders SSR processes are most likely to succeed and be sustainable.

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<sup>27</sup> For the African Peace Facility, see: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index_en.htm).

<sup>28</sup> For the African Peace and Security Architecture, see: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/capacity\\_building/apsa\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/capacity_building/apsa_en.htm).

<sup>29</sup> For the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan, see: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009\\_2014/documents/dpap/dv/jeas\\_action\\_plan/jeas\\_action\\_plan\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dpap/dv/jeas_action_plan/jeas_action_plan_en.pdf).

<sup>30</sup> For UN Security Council Resolution 1894, see: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20SRES1894.pdf>.

<sup>31</sup> For UN Security Council Resolution 1325, see: [http://www.un.org/events/res\\_1325e.pdf](http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf).

<sup>32</sup> For UN Security Council Resolution 1820, see: <http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/BasicWPSDocs/scr1820english.pdf>.

Examples of working in this way can be seen in South Sudan: The Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) recently convened a meeting for all the donors supporting defence sector reform in order for them to present their respective programmes and to identify how best to work together in partnership with the MoDVA and with each other. This meeting heralds the start of a new way of working for the SSR actors in South Sudan and has been possible in part due to the regular coordination efforts within the international community working on SSR.

### South-South, North-South Partnerships

In recent years there has been an increasing recognition of the value of strengthening South-South and North-South partnerships. Organisations and initiatives such as the G7+ and the ASSN place great emphasis on these partnerships with regard to supporting peace and security in the countries of the South.<sup>33</sup> In Africa specifically, it is important to highlight such initiatives as the AU's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), set up in 2003.<sup>34</sup> This is an African self-monitoring mechanism, designed and implemented by Africans for Africa. The APRM exists for a broad set of themes and sectors. However, such mechanisms present an opportunity for increased South-South cooperation specifically on SSR.

Fragile and conflict-affected countries, through the work of the G7+, now have a new model of partnership amongst themselves as well as with their development partners. The New Deal on Engagement in Fragile States (commonly referred to simply as the New Deal) gives the framework for a genuine and substantive engagement by those countries most affected by insecurity. From a SSR perspective, this increases the likelihood of sustainable reforms.

There has been a positive level of support for the New Deal, chiefly from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OECD INCAF), the Secretariat of which supports the High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness<sup>35</sup>.

The High Level Panel on SSR was a concrete example of global North-South partnerships being enhanced. The diverse group of participants from countries from the global South and North engaged in a dialogue where they grappled with the SSR challenges and identified possible ways forward.

There are many other examples of initiatives developed to foster South-South and North-South partnerships. However, to achieve a good balance of participation, responsibility, accountability and capacity to implement SSR processes remains an on-going challenge.

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<sup>33</sup> For more information on the G7+, see: <http://www.g7plus.org/>.

<sup>34</sup> For more information on the Africa Peer Review Mechanism, see: <http://aprm-au.org/>.

<sup>35</sup> The New deal arose from the 2011 Forum in Busan.

## 7. Support to SSR

International partners now have a series of agreements or guidance to inform their engagement, including the Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action<sup>36</sup>, Busan New Deal<sup>37</sup>, as well as the likes of the OECD Handbook on SSR. However, there is still a lack of evidence that the good practise contained in these documents is being implemented on the ground, and there is a strong need for better and more systematic support by the International Community to regional and bilateral efforts: greater synergies, integrated efforts and the streamlined use of resources to deliver as one.

### **Support by the Netherlands to the SSR process in Burundi**

The Dutch and Burundi Government entered an eight-year MoU. This longer-term framework has allowed the support to be developed gradually, allowing the programme to factor in ongoing developments and varying rates of progress in the different areas.

However, even with this type of commitment, and the financial assistance that comes with it, the Burundian authorities are still facing shortfalls in the resources required to implement the different SSR projects they have started (not just with the support of the Netherlands).

There are a number of potential challenges to improving the way in which support is provided, including:

- The international community is reluctant to give the flexibility required and invest in relationships without a clear idea of where they will go;
- New actors still need to be brought into the dialogue; several African countries are providing SSR support, but their examples are not being fed into current thinking on how to best engage;
- The donor community has shown reluctance to think differently about how it operates, for example, being unwilling to move away from rigid formats such as log frames and moving towards using a process approach in supporting SSR.

There are many examples of good practice covered under the sections above regarding the way that donors and multilateral organisations support SSR, along with suggestions of what should be taken into account. Programmes should be based on national priorities and uphold principles of national ownership. The politics of change must be addressed when undertaking any reform process – but this is especially important when tackling security and justice issues. SSR is not an isolated sector, but rather one that impacts and is impacted by many other areas; donors and multilaterals therefore need to situate their support within national development frameworks and link in to concurrent processes, such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Normative frameworks help to guide interventions, and partnerships bring knowledge and experience from different backgrounds

<sup>36</sup> For the Accra Agenda for Action, see: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1217425866038/AAA-4-SEPTEMBER-FINAL-16h00.pdf>

<sup>37</sup> For the Busan New Deal, see: <http://www.newdeal4peace.org/about-the-new-deal/>

and skill sets. However, beyond these overall observations, there are a few specific aspects that came out strongly in the HLP that have not been captured above. These are covered below.

### **Support by the UK to the SSR process in Sierra Leone**

Support by the UK to the SSR process in Sierra Leone was initially through a ten-year MoU, which provided both the budget and the framework for engagement. This approach, combined with the fact that there was a single lead donor, managed to circumvent some of the challenges encountered when multiple international actors act on the same short-term issues, competing for space (as was seen to an extent in Guinea Bissau). However, when applying the latest thinking in good practice on the incremental support, a better approach could have been to phase the support and look to bring in additional donors to tackle clearly defined areas.

### **Engaging for the long-term, but not forgetting short-term perspectives**

Long-term engagements completely change the dynamics of SSR support. They reduce the pressure to achieve results within unrealistic timeframes. Moreover, they allow time within a programme to build up the capacities required (in both nationals and donors) to best support the SSR process. A vision is key to designing the right support to SSR. If already in place, this should stem from national development strategies, PRSPs or national security strategies. If not, donors should consider supporting national processes to develop overarching strategies.

However, when undertaking studies to determine what sort of support can be provided by the International Community, there is a tendency for assessment teams to focus solely on the institutional gaps. However, whilst support for longer-term institutional capacity building is vital for authorities to meet their service delivery responsibilities, citizens rarely feel the benefits of this in the short-term, especially in the case of the most vulnerable groups. Efforts should be made to reinforce strategic assistance with suitable assistance programmes that also address immediate security and justice concerns on the ground.

### **Thinking beyond hard security; beyond only training & equipping**

Whilst more traditional types of assistance to security providers remain valid ways of supporting host nations to develop their capabilities, such as providing skills training to the military, it should be remembered that SSR involves addressing both effectiveness and accountability aspects. This does not mean that every activity or project has to address both areas, but rather the overall support provided (whether by a single or multiple donors) is balanced in its approach.

### **Getting the right capacity**

Individual skills, approaches and capacities can make a significant contribution to the success or failure of a support programme. The need to deploy the right people is not new (for example, this

was the subject of the 2011 High Level Panel discussion<sup>38</sup> in Brussels), but examples still abound of experts and advisors who:

- View everything as a technical exercise and fail to recognise or take into account the politics,
- Fail to understand the importance of process and step in and do the job themselves, because they see this as easier and quicker, and/or
- Do not take the local context into account.

This issue can in part be addressed through specific training (for example, SSR training on “Being an Effective Advisor”), and greater use of South-South partnerships and networks with particular experience, such as the ASSN. A further possibility is to provide additional support to technical experts. This approach was used by the Netherlands in their support programme in Burundi, which involved the deployment of two strategic advisors to assist the Burundian Ministries of Defence and Interior. Whilst the international advisors had high levels of technical knowledge, they reinforced their understanding of working in a developmental context by bringing in additional expertise to help them translate their skills.

### **Having realistic ambitions and choosing when to engage**

Although international standards should form the backbone of any SSR process, there is a need for support to be based on realistic assumptions of what can be achieved. Goals for support programmes should be modest and reflect on the reality of the challenges that even well-developed democracies countries face in their security and justice sectors, such as transparency and miscarriages of justice. SSR often means that sensitive areas need to be tackled, such as the abuse of power by high-ranking officials. It may not be possible to address such issues at the beginning of an SSR process; however, it may be an option later on once some progress has been achieved. As part of their monitoring strategy programme managers should re-examine the scope of their engagement to see if any new, more sensitive areas could be added without compromising the support currently provided. This could include efforts to tackle corruption.

### **Recognising and working with complexity and unpredictability**

The complexity, risk, and unpredictability of SSR, make donors wary of engaging in such processes. Many post-conflict and fragile societies are characterised by political instability and uncertainty, thereby rendering it difficult, and at times impossible, to achieve the planned results of a reform process. In Guinea Bissau, for example, power has changed hands more times by military coup than through democratic elections. Assassinations and political violence are a common feature in the political landscape of the country. The task of engaging in long-term reform processes in these conditions, while having to regularly report on progress to higher authorities, is not merely challenging but also pushes donors to shift their focus towards the less essential and less complex aspects, while neglecting the larger, more complex issues that require attention.

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<sup>38</sup> For the 2011 Brussels High-Level Panel Report, see:

<http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/3408/28773/file/ISSAT%20High%20Level%20Panel%20Report%202011.pdf>.

## Reconciling value for money and sustainability

Two concepts frequently highlighted as requirements for SSR support are value for money and sustainability. Donors are beholden to their taxpayers and need to show that the money they are spending is being used to produce 'tangible results'. However, this produces a risk that programmes focus too much on immediate, easy-to-achieve results that ignore the political complexity of the environment in which many SSR programmes take place. This in turn can undermine long-term sustainability. This is because SSR requires an approach more akin to organisational and cultural change, assisting institutions to work through a process to determine how they can best provide services to meet the security and justice needs of both the people and the state. Programmes therefore need space to be able to take stock of progress and changes in the environment and reorient accordingly. This should involve moving away from the rigid straightjacket provided by log frames.

## ANNEX – Country Background Notes

### Burundi



**Capital:** Bujumbura.

**Total area:** 27,830 km<sup>2</sup>.

**Population:** estimated 10'557'259 (July 2012).

**Administrative divisions:** 17 provinces; Bubanza, Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Bururi, Cankuzo, Cibitoke, Gitega, Karuzi, Kayanza, Kirundo, Makamba, Muramvya, Musinga, Mwaro, Ngozi, Rutana, Ruyigi.<sup>39</sup>

Following its independence in 1962, Burundi experienced cycles of violence in the 1960s, in 1972, 1988 and during the period 1993-2006. Whilst partially the manifestations of a struggle for power between the Tutsi ethnic minority and the Hutu ethnic majority, the recurring conflict was also rooted in complex dynamics that ran along religious, sub-regional and socio-economic lines. The defence and security forces played an active part in the conflict.

In 1993, the population voted in a Hutu President and a Hutu dominated parliament in the country's first democratic elections. In October 1993, President Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated by elements of the Tutsi-led military. Some members of his party massacred a number of Tutsi in revenge, provoking an army-led crackdown on the Hutu population, which turned into a civil war.

Even though the war would not effectively end before 2008, the Arusha agreement for peace and reconciliation signed in August 2000 has underpinned the Burundian peace process.

### Introduction

The Arusha Agreement provided the framework for SSR aspects intrinsic to the peace process. The Agreement highlights the need for the defence and security forces to be politically neutral, united and representative of the entire population (ethnic composition), to "be an instrument for the protection of all people" (as opposed to ensuring regime security) as "prerequisites for the establishment and maintenance of peace and security"<sup>40</sup>. Protocol III, Chapter II focuses exclusively on the defence and security forces and reinforces these points, stressing that "the maintenance of national security and of national defence shall be subject to Government authority and parliamentary oversight." The Chapter further spells out the desired end-state of the transformation of the Burundian defence and security system, detailing the principles of organisation (in particular subordination to civilian authority under the Constitution and in accordance with the rule of law),

<sup>39</sup> Map and information taken from the CIA World Factbook, see:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html> (updated 15 August 2012).

<sup>40</sup> Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi – 28 August 2000, Protocol III, Chapter 1, Article 1.



their missions, structure, composition<sup>41</sup>, size (to be determined by the threats each institution has to address, and taking budgetary constraints into account), and recruitment (transparent, based on age, physical and intellectual aptitude, level of training).

The transformation of the defence and security forces was thus closely linked to political power sharing arrangements. Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs)<sup>42</sup> were required to release their combatants and disarm before they could register as political parties.

All subsequent ceasefire or power-sharing agreement, the Constitution, the country's poverty reduction strategy, the sectoral policies of the Ministries of Defence and Public Security, the strategic plans of the FDN and the PNB were all grounded in the spirit and letter of the Arusha Agreement.

### *Overview of Security Sector Reform in Burundi*

#### **Police Reform**

The new Burundian National Police (known under its French acronym PNB) was established in 2004 in a delicate political and security context. In accordance with the Arusha Agreement, the Airport and Border Police, the Public Security Police and the Criminal Investigations Department were merged to form the PNB. The personnel of the new institution were drawn from these police services, but also from the former Burundian Armed Forces (FAB), the gendarmerie and former APPMs. The size of the police thus expanded almost overnight from approximately 2,000 officers to over 18,000.

The diversity of backgrounds of PNB personnel continues to pose legitimacy, management and discipline challenges, particularly as no vetting<sup>43</sup> took place when the PNB was created. Since 2005, training initiatives have been developed through bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Most of them place particular emphasis on literacy, respect for human rights, international humanitarian law, gender-based violence and the ethics of policing, including within the context of elections. Further training continues to be required for the PNB's to enhance its operational capacity.

To support the professionalisation of the PNB, an institutional audit was conducted in 2008 and a census that permitted the establishment of a personnel database as well as the issuance of ID badges for all service members was carried out in 2009. This was followed in 2010 by the formulation of a policy document spelling out PNB reform priorities, which was complemented by a gender strategy the following year.

The PNB is only eight years old and is still developing its management systems and procedures, its oversight mechanisms and its capacity.

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<sup>41</sup> Article 14 introduces ethnic quotas "for a period to be determined by the Senate" to "achieve ethnic balance and to prevent acts of genocide and *coups d'état*", and stipulates that individuals "found guilty of "acts of genocide, *coups d'états*, violation of the Constitution and human rights and wars crimes" should not be accepted in the National Defence Force, be they the former members of the Burundian Armed Forces or of the Armed Political Parties and Movements.

<sup>42</sup> Expression chosen during the peace process to refer to the armed opposition to the Government instead of "rebel groups".

<sup>43</sup> The Arusha agreement called for the conduct of such vetting.

## Defence Reform

The reform of the military also began in 2004 with the integration into the National Defence Force (known under its French acronym FDN)<sup>44</sup> of FAB and APPM personnel, in accordance with the terms of the Arusha Agreement, and after the “Etat-major Général Intégré”<sup>45</sup> reached agreement on rank harmonization following lengthy negotiations. The process of integration also sought to ensure that the ethnic quotas stipulated in the Agreement were respected.

The Ministry of Defence and FDN leadership initially focused on harmonisation training with a view to facilitating the smooth integration of former foes at a time when armed conflict continued with the last rebel group that remained out of the peace process. Minimal infrastructure required to house and train the FDN were put in place to further these efforts. With the support of the international community, barracks and training facilities were rehabilitated or built, which also resulted in more effective control of government issued weapons. At the request of the Ministry of Defense, international assistance also focused on training activities - particularly on ethics and conduct, and gender-based violence - as well as on efforts to improve management and oversight, and military justice.

In 2010, the national authorities initiated an extensive, consultative review process that aims to ensure that the FDN develops into a defence force truly at the service of the Burundian population.

For the past four years, the FDN has participated in the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Despite reports of PNB involvement in pre-election intimidation in 2010, and FDN involvement in violent incidents targeting political activists in 2011, a recent comprehensive and independent

### DDR in support of early SSR efforts

A programme supporting the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the members of former combatants that would not be integrated in the new defence and security institutions facilitated the creation of the PNB and the FDN.

DDR activities initially focused on members of the former APPMs. They then facilitated adjustments in the strength of the FDN from approximately 45,000 to 30,000 and of the PNB from over 18,000 to 15,000.

The national DDR programme was supported by a regional, multi-donor initiative, the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP).

Through the programme, 23,022 adults were demobilised. The MDRP also support the release of 3,261 children form armed groups.

<sup>44</sup> The *Forces Armées Burundaises* were renamed *Forces de Défense Nationale* (FDN) in the law promulgated on 31 December 2004 that further clarified the institution’s composition and missions.

<sup>45</sup> The “Etat-major Général Intégré” was a committee composed of senior officers from the FAB and the APPMs responsible for the implementation of the clauses of the Arusha Agreement relative to the establishment of the FDN.

survey shows that during the last 12 months the perception of the police and the army by the population has clearly improved<sup>46</sup>.

### **Justice Reform**

The justice sector suffers from a number of challenges that limit its efficiency. It enjoys limited confidence by the population<sup>47</sup> that also complains about the absence of an overall framework governing legal aid and difficulties in accessing justice services. The independence, oversight mechanisms, objectivity and impartiality of the justice sector are in need of improvement. At the operational level, the sector requires increased human capacity, budgets and infrastructure. These challenges are interlinked and would need an overall strategic reform framework rather than the fragmented initiatives undertaken to date.

A number of factors limit access to formal justice services. These include high costs, the remoteness of courts, the absence of appropriate information on how the system functions, and the fact that most legal texts are in French, a language that only a minority speaks and reads. A pilot project is being implemented in three communities to investigate the feasibility of legal aid clinics managed by the municipality, while efforts have been made to translate the Penal Code into Kirundi to remedy the language issue.

In terms of capacity development, actors in the justice system have benefited from several national and international, government and NGO-led training programs since 1993. However, a clear strategic vision and greater coordination between these initiatives would yield greater results and help avoid overlaps. The Ministry of Justice is therefore developing a strategic training plan for judges and justice sector personnel, in line with its policy goals.

### **Transitional Justice**

After a number of years of inaction, transitional justice is now on the national agenda. The Arusha Agreement provided for the establishment of an International Judicial Commission of inquiry on genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as, a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Arusha also stipulated that the government would request the establishment of an international criminal tribunal by the UN Security Council “should the findings of the commission point to the existence of acts of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity”<sup>48</sup>.

Although President Buyoya addressed a letter to the UN Secretary-General requesting the establishment of an international judicial commission of inquiry for Burundi on 24 July 2002, the transitional justice agenda was then put on the back burner for years. In 2011, the national authorities announced the creation of the TRC. However, the respective roles and responsibilities of the International Judicial Commission and the TRC have yet to be clarified, as do the rules and regulation for their functioning and for the protection of the prosecutors and victims<sup>49</sup>.

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<sup>46</sup> Survey conducted by CENAP and CREDESS - April 2012.

<sup>47</sup> According to a survey carried out by the Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale, CIGI, Security Sector Monitor, Burundi, November 2009.

<sup>48</sup> *Transitional Justice for Burundi: A Long and Winding Road Study*, Workshop Report, Crisis Management Initiative, Nuremberg 25-27 June, 2007, pp 12-14.

<sup>49</sup> *Le processus de justice de transition au Burundi : Défis et Perspectives*, ICTJ, Programme Afrique, 18 April, 2011.

## **Oversight and Governance**

State and non-state governance and management mechanisms are in need of stronger capacity, skills, tools and knowledge about their role as regards the security sector. The sector's legal framework also requires review, while the role of internal, external and parliament oversight bodies with responsibilities over the security services needs to be reinforced. Some encouraging developments have occurred in the past years with the Senate Commission calling Ministries to account on budget transparency. In 2012, a National Security Council Permanent Secretary was appointed and tasked with overseeing the preparation of a national security plan, which was completed by the end of 2012.

Civil society played an active role in the peace process. A small number of national NGOs have monitored closely the transformation of the security sector and the performance of state security providers from the outset, reporting on human rights abuses as they occur. Although civil society organisations and the media have been able to operate relatively freely during and after the conflict, they now have more limited room for manoeuvre as a result of the tensions linked to the 2010 elections that still affect the political process.

### ***Lessons, Challenges and Opportunities***

- Burundi has succeeded in breaking the cycles of large-scale armed violence and in establishing security institutions more representative of the population.
- As security institutions stabilized, space gradually opened for broader debate on JSSR. The authorities moved gradually beyond emergency measures to structural reforms.
- A commission tasked with developing a national security policy was established during the course of 2012.
- However, improving access to justice, strengthening oversight and tackling corruption remain priorities.

From a regional perspective, the instability in neighbouring Eastern DRC presents a potential risk to the reform process.

## The Federal Republic of Somalia



**Capital:** Mogadishu.

**Total area:** 637'657 km<sup>2</sup>.

**Population:** estimated 10'085'638 (July 2012).

**Administrative divisions:** officially 18 regions; *de facto* semi-autonomous State of Puntland in the North-East, State of Galmudug in the Centre, and self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the North-West (not recognised internationally).<sup>50</sup>

### Introduction

In Somalia, years of fighting and political instability have undermined prospects for economic development and the country has consistently scored low in various human development indicators. After President Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991 by opposing clans, the country was plunged into lawlessness and warfare. The collapse of viable state structures and a worsening security situation have led to multiple humanitarian emergencies including several famines, forced displacement and the death of up to one million people. Symptomatic of the lack of state structures and economic opportunities, and of the destruction of livelihoods through conflict and natural disaster, piracy has become a major issue across Somalia.<sup>51</sup> With multiple attempts at peace processes, local and international efforts aimed at building a stable government have been unsuccessful for many years. With more viable transitional institutions now in place, the year 2012 finally marks the end of transition and seems to deliver what will hopefully be an effective functioning central government.

Since 1991, the regions of Somalia have evolved differently and have faced disparate levels of stability, development and governance. State structures collapsed in the south-central region, while the north-western part of Somalia unilaterally declared itself the independent Republic of Somaliland. In 1998, Puntland declared itself an autonomous state. Somaliland and Puntland have gradually been able to re-establish relative peace and stability in their areas of control and have operated autonomously from the federal government.

In 2009, a United Nations (UN) brokered peace process led to the establishment of Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), with a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and a Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). The TFG was an entity which the international community had been supporting as a way to re-establish a central state. The years 2011 and 2012 mark important steps in the process of ending Somalia's transition period. Several major documents have been adopted, building on the Transitional Federal Charter of 2004, the Djibouti Agreement of 2008, and the Kampala Accord of June 2011. In September 2011, a detailed Roadmap for ending the transition was adopted, with the

<sup>50</sup> Map and information taken from the CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html> (updated August 15th 2012).

<sup>51</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary General, S/2010/394*, 2010, p.8.

participation of the TFI, the Puntland and Galmudug States of Somalia, and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a.<sup>52</sup> In August 2012, the Provisional Constitution was adopted by the National Constituent Assembly,<sup>53</sup> while the first session of the new Somali Parliament was held the same month.<sup>54</sup>

While the overall security situation has improved enough in Mogadishu to allow the Somali authorities to be based there and several international actors, including the UN, to re-establish a presence, security and access to justice do remain serious issues. In the rest of south-central Somalia, the security situation is highly volatile and unpredictable as military operations continue. Fighting between the Somali forces supported by AMISOM and allied forces on the one hand, and armed opposition groups on the other hand including insurgents such as Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, continues. Al Shaabab attacks are also destabilising parts of Puntland where the insurgents are trying to build alliances with militia groups.

### *Overview of Security Sector Reform in Somalia*

#### **Policy Framework**

A number of instruments have laid the foundations for the development of security and justice institutions. In 2008, the Djibouti Agreement envisaged the creation of a Joint Security Committee (JSC) to act as a coordination mechanism to harmonise the efforts of international partners and local stakeholders for the implementation of national security arrangements.<sup>55</sup> The Provisional Constitution, adopted in 2012, contains provisions regarding the development of security forces. It provides for the development of federal armed forces, an intelligence service, police and prison forces, as well as the development of a police force for each Federal Member State. The Constitution moreover provides general principles that all security forces must abide by, including respect for the rule of law, democratic governance, and fundamental rights, as well as transparency and accountability. As for the judicial system, the Provisional Constitution guarantees an independent judiciary, access to courts for all and protects the fundamental right to legal aid. Reflecting the federal nature of the country, the Provisional Constitution provides for three different levels of courts, at the Federal Government and Federal Member States levels, as well as a Constitutional Court. The Provisional Constitution does also envisage potential complaints of human rights abuses committed by the security forces and foresees the judiciary mechanisms to address them.<sup>56</sup>

Following two security sector assessments and a consultative process, which included *inter alia* representatives from the then TFG and TFP, civil society, the Puntland and Galmudug States, ASWJ, as well as representatives from international and regional organisations,<sup>57</sup> a National Security and Stabilisation Plan (NSSP) was drafted in 2011. It was adopted by the TFG through a Presidential

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<sup>52</sup> Galmudug, in the central region of Somalia, considers itself as a federal division within the Federal Republic of Somalia, see: <http://www.galmudug.com/>. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a is a Somali paramilitary group.

<sup>53</sup> On August 1<sup>st</sup> 2012, see UNPOS, *Bi-Weekly Update on Key Developments in Somalia*, 1 to 15 August 2012, p. 1.

<sup>54</sup> On August 20<sup>th</sup> 2012, see *Baby Steps*, in *The Economist*, August 25<sup>th</sup> 2012.

<sup>55</sup> *Agreement between the Transitional Federal government of Somalia and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (Djibouti Agreement)*, June 11<sup>th</sup> 2008, art.8.

<sup>56</sup> References to Draft Provisional Constitution, art. 126, 127, 106, 34, and 108 found in UNPOS, *Guidebook to the Somali Draft Provisional Constitution*, July 25<sup>th</sup> 2012, p.27.

<sup>57</sup> Somalia Transitional Federal Government, *National Security and Stabilization Plan 2011-2014*, 2011, p.1,3.

Decree on 8<sup>th</sup> of August 2012.<sup>58</sup> The NSSP forms an ambitious and comprehensive plan, with the development of "affordable, accountable and professional defence/army, security and justice agencies and institutions" as one of its main strategic objectives.<sup>59</sup> The NSSP provides for strengthening security and justice policy, strategy development and coordination mechanisms for better service delivery. The NSSP therefore provides for rebuilding *inter alia* defence, army, security, intelligence, justice and corrections agencies and institutions. It also provides for civilian democratic oversight and accountability institutions. It also contains a detailed implementation action plan summarising objectives, priority actions, available financial and technical capacity, and responsibilities for the development of the National Security Force (NSF), the Somali Police Force (SPF), the National Security Agency, a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme, and other security and justice institutions.<sup>60</sup>

Complementing these national policy instruments, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and its Security Sector Development Office (SSDO) have drafted a Strategy to Support the development of the security sector through the period 2011 to 2013.<sup>61</sup> This Strategy seeks to implement objectives related to the military, police, justice and corrections institutions, as well as support to Somalia's DDR programme.

### Security Sector Development

The Joint Security Committee composed of representatives from the Somali authorities and international partners (including the UN, AU, AMISOM, and IGAD) meets regularly to monitor the security situation and coordinate international support to the development of Somalia's security and



Somali Police training in Djibouti. Source: Gihan Eltahir (UN)

justice institutions, both of which vary greatly across the country. International support to the development of security and justice institutions has been directed mainly at Mogadishu and south-central Somalia. With extended support from the UN and AMISOM, following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2036, logistical support, equipment and infrastructure for the military have been enhanced, especially around Mogadishu<sup>62</sup> and Somali forces figure prominently in the expanded AMISOM operations.<sup>63</sup> With the support of the European Union Training Mission (EUTM), AMISOM and other bilateral partners, training for hundreds of troops has taken place.<sup>64</sup> The development of the police force has also achieved some progress, with

<sup>58</sup> UNPOS, *Bi-Weekly Update on Key Developments in Somalia*, August 1<sup>st</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> 2012, p.3.

<sup>59</sup> Somalia Transitional Federal Government, *National Security and Stabilization Plan 2011-2014*, 2011, p.11.

<sup>60</sup> Somalia Transitional Federal Government, *National Security and Stabilization Plan 2011-2014*, 2011, Annex I, p.43-67.

<sup>61</sup> UNPOS, *Mission Strategy in Support of Security Sector Development in Somalia*, 2011-2013.

<sup>62</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia*, S/2012/283, May 1<sup>st</sup> 2012, p.5-7.

<sup>63</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia*, S/2012/283, May 1<sup>st</sup> 2012, p.8.

<sup>64</sup> For more information on EUTM Somalia, see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eu-somalia-training-mission>

AMISOM building the capacity of the SPF<sup>65</sup> and other international partners covering arrears in police stipends.<sup>66</sup> Capacity building has also included significant infrastructure projects as well as funding and issuing of critical equipment. In the field of justice and corrections, progress has been made with the rehabilitation of courts, judicial training and an assessment of the corrections system conducted.<sup>67</sup>

In summary, substantive progress has been made in rebuilding the Somali security and justice sector institutions through the work of the JSC. For example, the JSC continue to meet bi-monthly in Mogadishu, under the co-chairmanship of the Somalia authorities, the UN (UNPOS), the AU (AMISOM) and IGAD (facilitator), with multilateral and bilateral partners represented, such as the European Union, the United States (US), and the United Kingdom. Its main responsibilities have included, provision of strategic guidance, tracking and monitoring progress and addressing outstanding issues in the implementation of the Roadmap's security benchmarks and the NSSP. Representatives of regional entities such as Puntland, Galmudug, and ASWJ have also been participating in JSC meetings since its inauguration in Mogadishu in October 2011.

The JSC Technical Working Groups (Police, Military, Justice and Corrections and DDR/Disengaged former combatants) also now meet on a regular basis. The Military Technical Working Group (MTWG) has made significant progress in coordinating support to the NSF and in the delivery of capability. Under the auspices of the Military Technical Working Group (MTWG), a Training Sub-Committee has been established, through which immediate training requirements have been identified and delivered; a broad training strategy for the coming 12 months has also been developed. The recruitment of young Somalis into the NSF continues with well-developed and effective recruiting and screening systems in place and with UN oversight. The UN (UNPOS/UNSOA) in partnerships with the AU (AMISOM), have helped to develop a detailed and comprehensive requirements list for critical combat supplies for Somali security and allied militia forces. This continues to be presented to potential donors to support and fund. Furthermore, initial restructuring to reflect revised transitional structures has taken place including the issue of US-funded equipment. Work on rehabilitating the Ministry of Defence and NSF Headquarters buildings is nearing completion. The JSC MTWG is proving a useful mechanism to ensure both Somali ownership and better coordination of international assistance to meet the needs of the Somali NSF and allied militias.

The JSC Police Technical Working Group (PTWG) has also made promising progress securing the engagement and coordination of international assistance in the delivery of coherent capability to the SPF. The delivery of significant quantities of vehicles, logistics and communications equipment was completed recently followed by the development of a mechanism for effective use and up-keep of these assets by the SPF. Regularly stipends are being provided. A project to rehabilitate existing Police stations in Mogadishu and in recovered areas is also underway. The biometric registration of SPF personnel for improving transparency and accountability in the payroll system is progressing well and more than 70% of personnel have been registered so far. There have been significant pledges to assist in or to fund the training of the Somali police (including from Egypt and Angola)

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<sup>65</sup> For more information on AMISOM's activities in police reform, see: <http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/amisom-police/>.

<sup>66</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2012/283*, May 1<sup>st</sup> 2012, p. 9.

<sup>67</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2012/283*, May 1<sup>st</sup> 2012, p. 9.



especially in the areas of management and crime scene processing. Plans for the training and deployment of police to areas recovered from the insurgents are also being drawn up but need to be set within the context of wider work on the establishment of Regional and District Security Committees which is on-going.

In a similar manner, “Somaliland” has been able to build its own security and justice institutions, and a comprehensive National Development Plan (NDP) was recently drafted for the period 2012 to 2016. Considered as a medium-term framework that should enable long-term development,<sup>68</sup> the NDP provides details for the support of several pillars. Under the Governance pillar, the reform of state institutions is to be pursued and reinforced, including the judicial system, police and courts, the penitentiary system, and other peace and security institutions.<sup>69</sup> The United Nations has supported the development of regional and district courts, as well as corrections services,<sup>70</sup> while UNDP has specifically helped reform legal frameworks and build up police institutions.<sup>71</sup>

In Puntland, the security and justice sectors comprise the armed forces of the autonomous Puntland region, as well as an independent military judiciary. A Puntland Maritime Police Force has recently been formed.<sup>72</sup> International support to the development of Puntland's security and justice institutions has also taken place. As is the case in Somaliland, UNDP has been active in building the capacity of police and in supporting justice sector development.<sup>73</sup> The United Nations has also sponsored legal and human rights training for judges in Puntland.<sup>74</sup>

### **Challenges and Opportunities to Security Sector Development**

While the national policy frameworks and necessary international support for the development of the Somali security and justice sector institutions now exist, the country is going through a critical phase, moving from the end of a political transition to stabilisation and transformation phases. The adoption of the NSSP and a Provisional Constitution, coupled with the end of the transition period, and the nomination of a Parliament and a new President, represent positive signs and the opportunity for further development of security and justice institutions. Yet there are a number of challenges which may have strong implications for security and justice sector development. Tensions between Somaliland, Puntland, and the new Somali authorities are expected to persist, at least for the foreseeable future.<sup>75</sup> While Al-Shabaab has been losing ground in south-central Somalia, it is still a strong force in the country and the Somali authorities, the NSF and their allies being supported by AMISOM, do not control the entire territory.<sup>76</sup> Piracy and terrorism also remain significant security issues, as well as other transnational organised crime activities. Currently supported by the international community, the financial cost and expenditure of the Somali security, justice and corrections institutions will not be sustainable unless viable solutions are found. In the long run, new Somali institutions will have to prove how they are representative of the people, and avoid

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<sup>68</sup> Somalia Transitional Federal Government, *National Security and Stabilization Plan 2011-2014*, 2011, p.9.

<sup>69</sup> Somalia Transitional Federal Government, *National Security and Stabilization Plan 2011-2014*, 2011, p.14-15.

<sup>70</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2012/283*, May 1<sup>st</sup> 2012, p. 9.

<sup>71</sup> Eavis, Paul, et al., *Evaluation of ROLS III Programme*, November 15<sup>th</sup> 2011, p. 10.

<sup>72</sup> For more information on the Puntland Marine Police Force, see: <http://pmpf.net/>

<sup>73</sup> Eavis, Paul, et al., *Evaluation of ROLS III Programme*, November 15<sup>th</sup> 2011, p. 56.

<sup>74</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2012/283*, May 1<sup>st</sup> 2012, p. 9.

<sup>75</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2012/283*, May 1<sup>st</sup> 2012, p. 1

<sup>76</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2012/283*, May 1<sup>st</sup> 2012, p. 6.

corruption which could damage their foundations. With a wide array of international actors engaging in the development of Somalia's security and justice institutions, the coordination of international assistance will be a critical issue. Ultimately, the delivery of security and justice as public goods will only be sustained if the international community supports the new Somali institutions to build relevant, effective, sustainable, and accountable security and justice institutions, as necessary conditions for ensuring the safety and security of Somali citizens, as well as their opportunities for economic development. In the medium to long-term, the delivery of improved security and access to justice by Somalis is vital for any AMISOM exit strategy.

## The Republic of South Sudan



**Capital:** Juba.

**Total area:** 644'329 km<sup>2</sup>.

**Population:** estimated 10'625'176 (July 2012).

**Administrative divisions:** 10 states; Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Unity, Upper Nile, Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Western Equatoria.<sup>77</sup>

### Introduction

After 50 years of conflict, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 between the Government in Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) paved the way for a referendum in January 2011, which brought independence to the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) on 9 July 2011.<sup>78</sup> As a new nation state, South Sudan is faced with numerous security challenges, as well as with the significant task of building institutional capacity for SSR at the national and state level. Part of these challenges is in its emergence from what had become a deeply militarised society.

### Overview of Security Sector Reform in South Sudan

#### Security Management and Oversight Bodies

Preparation has been ongoing since the CPA to foster understanding of SSR in South Sudan and to build indigenous capacity for it. The Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS)<sup>79</sup> adopted its South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013<sup>80</sup> in August 2011, in which its fourth pillar on Conflict Prevention and Security plays an integral role. The Ministry of National Security (MoNS)<sup>81</sup> has been established, along with an executive secretariat for the National Security Council. The MoNS is currently developing a national security architecture, including a national security policy, strategy and development plan that takes on board the issues and needs at the central, state, and local levels. In 2012 the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA) started its first review of the

<sup>77</sup> Map and information taken from the CIA World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html> (updated August 15th 2012).

<sup>78</sup> For the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, see: <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf>.

<sup>79</sup> For more information on the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, see: <http://www.goss-online.org/>

<sup>80</sup> For the South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013, see: <http://www.jdt-juba.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/South-Sudan-Development-Plan-2011-13.pdf>

<sup>81</sup> For the Ministry of National Security, see: <http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/ministries/National-Security.html>

defence budget, which to date has taken up 40% of the national budget<sup>82</sup>. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) is instrumental in supporting this process.

Parliamentary and civil society oversight of the security sector is slowly gaining traction. Within the Legislative Assembly, the Specialised Standing Committee for Defence, Security and Public Order has been established and several civil society organisations (CSOs) both at capital and state level have been active in providing checks and balances to the SSR process. The Community Empowerment for Progress Organisation (CEPO) is one CSO of notable input at the national level, while at the state level some CSOs are providing valuable services to vulnerable groups in their areas.

### **Defence Transformation**

The lion's share of SSR attention has been focused on the defence sector. Already before independence the 2008 SPLA Defence White Paper (which is being revised<sup>83</sup>) and the SPLA Act of 2009<sup>84</sup> have been key strategic documents for outlining the path of reform. The former sets out a process for the development of a professional defence sector including how it should operate and how it should be structured and managed, with the aim of making its activities effective, efficient, accountable and transparent. The latter addresses issues related to the then Southern Sudanese security environment, the mission and roles of the SPLA, policies for its operating in a framework of democratic governance and oversight, as well as its development into a force which is appropriately sized, affordable and effective. South Sudan's strategic transformation plan for its military, Objective Force 2017, looks at the development of the army over a five year period (2012-2017) and works off the premise that the total force strength shall not exceed 119,000<sup>85</sup> (current estimates suggest a parade strength of 200,000).

In the face of renewed conflict in recent months in some border areas with Sudan, the GRSS Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission<sup>86</sup> (RSSDDRC) is moving cautiously forward with Phase 2<sup>87</sup> of its DDR programme envisaged for 150,000 ex-combatants: 80,000 from the SPLA and 70,000 from other national organised forces<sup>2</sup> (police, prison, wildlife services, fire brigade). The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration Commission has now formally communicated that the first pilot phase of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme at Mapel will commence on 15 April 2013. A reintegration plan has been developed as part of the first pilot phase of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme in Mapel.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> See: <http://www.irinnews.org/report/94858/SOUTH-SUDAN-Briefing-life-without-oil>

<sup>83</sup> World Bank Workshop on SSR "Building Citizen-Centered Security Institutions- Reflections from the South Sudan Development Plan Process", July 11<sup>th</sup> 2011

<sup>84</sup> For the SPLA Act of 2009, see: <http://67.227.214.116/publication/spla-act-2009>.

<sup>85</sup> See: <http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/Independant-Commissions-and-Chambers/Demobilization--Disarmament-and-Reintegration.html> as of August 29<sup>th</sup> 2012.

<sup>86</sup> For the GRSS Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission, see: <http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/Independant-Commissions-and-Chambers/Demobilization--Disarmament-and-Reintegration.html>

<sup>87</sup> Phase 1 (2009-2011) demobilised 12,525 ex-combatants. See: <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3475&language=en-US>

<sup>88</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan*, S/2013/140, March 8<sup>th</sup> 2013, p. 13.

### **Police Reform**

Police reform remains far behind that of defence reform, and legislation of police activity is lacking. The GRSS Ministry of Interior (MOI) adopted a police reform plan<sup>89</sup> in 2011 to increase and develop its capacities (notably size) and broaden its area of activities across South Sudan, and following on from this, the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) General Inspector is now developing a strategic action plan for reform. The number of police in the SSNPS has increased in recent years with many redeployed former SPLA, and yet, paradoxically, at the local level there is a shortage of police personnel on the ground. The police force is working to improve its overall capacity, with a focus on training and on improving literacy rates<sup>90</sup>.

### **Justice Reform**

The South Sudan judicial system is suffering from a profound lack of physical, institutional and human capacities. The Transitional Constitution<sup>91</sup> includes an extensive Bill of Rights and various provisions establishing an independent judiciary, but for most, the judicial system currently in place still relies heavily on traditional courts and on customary laws. The transition to the level and breadth of human rights stipulated in the Transitional Constitution will take time. Judicial structures are underdeveloped with access to justice and law enforcement limited. To cope with the backlog of cases, Special Courts<sup>92</sup> have been established in some locations, but for these to function effectively, further logistical and security considerations would have to be taken on board. In addition, concerns remain about the independence of the judiciary and access of women to justice services nationwide.

### **Prison Reform**

The penitentiary system faces many difficulties. Existing prisons in South Sudan (particularly outside of the capital) are in very bad condition, and therefore require major maintenance and overhaul, including lighting, health care, transport and communications, recreational facilities, as well as provision and access to clean drinking water and sanitation. In some cases prison populations mix convicted offenders with pre-trial detainees, as well as juveniles with adult population<sup>93</sup>. Prison officers are currently inadequately trained.

### **Donors Support and Coordination**

International donor support to SSR in South Sudan has been significant, both before and after independence. UK and US support has laid emphasis on the defence sector, while UNDP support has concentrated on rule of law and crisis prevention (including the reintegration element of DDR). UNMISS includes an SSR section, supplementing its more established work on police reform, rule of law, and DDR. The previous UN peacekeeping mission, UNMIS, also gave support to prison reform and more broadly to security sector capacity building in the south.

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<sup>89</sup> See: [http://www.nsi-ins.ca/images/documents/police\\_reform\\_independent\\_south\\_sudan\\_final.pdf](http://www.nsi-ins.ca/images/documents/police_reform_independent_south_sudan_final.pdf)

<sup>90</sup> Functional illiteracy in the police is as high as 80%. See: [http://www.nsi-ins.ca/images/documents/police\\_reform\\_independent\\_south\\_sudan\\_final.pdf](http://www.nsi-ins.ca/images/documents/police_reform_independent_south_sudan_final.pdf)

<sup>91</sup> For the Transitional Constitution, see: <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=11412>

<sup>92</sup> ISSAT interview with South Sudan Governor, May 2011.

<sup>93</sup> See Human Rights Watch, *Prison is not for me*, June 2012: <http://www.hrw.org/node/107794/section/4> and the US Human Right Report for South Sudan, 2011: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187907.pdf>


Coordination at the technical and programmatic level has improved over the last two years. Monthly meetings to share information and plan ways of enhancing overall support have been held for the last year between the international actors working in the defence sector. Furthermore, the MoDVA has included in its transformation plan the inclusion of a Directorate for International Cooperation, with the purpose of leading the coordination of all international support to defence. Donor support to the broader development sector has to a large extent been coordinated by the Joint Donor Office.<sup>94</sup>

### **Conclusion**

SSR challenges for Africa's newest independent nation state are comprehensive, and the country is making significant inroads into setting up the framework for reform. The real challenge for those involved is the implementation of the policies and strategies that are developed. A renewal in violence in some areas bordering Sudan has hampered progress in recent months, as has the associated economic situation. The task ahead is to maintain and build upon the progress made so far and translate this throughout South Sudan's ten states and across the entire security sector, especially into the areas of justice and police.

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<sup>94</sup> This incorporates six donor countries: UK, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Canada.



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