



# REPORT OF THE HYBRID SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA PROJECT TERMINAL CONFERENCE



21-22 July 2017

African Royal Beach Hotel, Nungua, Ghana

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# Report of the Hybrid Security Governance in Africa Terminal Project Conference

## Overview

The terminal conference of the Hybrid Security Governance in Africa research project (HSG) was held in Accra, Ghana, from 21-22 July 2017. As with previous gatherings, it was organised by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) with support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).

Begun in early 2013, the HSG emerged from acknowledged tensions between SSR's preponderant focus on state mechanisms despite growing recognition of the involvement of non-state security actors and of reciprocal influences between both groups. The project thus set out, guided by the underlisted broad research questions, to research the 'complex amalgam of formal and informal, statutory and non-statutory actors and institutions' which together constitute what it terms 'hybrid security orders'.

1. How do informal norms, solidarities and networks become embedded in the official security, policing and justice institutions of African states? In what ways are they instrumentalised by elites? And in what ways does this influence their capacity to provide security and protect the rights of citizens?
2. What roles do 'non-state' or 'informal' actors and institutions play in security, policing and justice; and how do they interface with the formal security institutions of the state?
3. What is the impact of hybrid security orders on the security and entitlements of citizens in African states and in particular on vulnerable and excluded people and communities? In what ways if any do they foster more effective, equitable and accountable security provision? Or do they instead reinforce existing inequalities and local-level disempowerment?
4. How can effective, inclusive and accountable security, policing and justice be negotiated in contexts of hybridity and informality, and foster new forms of public authority better suited to African realities?

Insecurity in Mali and Sudan pared an original list of eight countries down to six: Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone (two papers), Somaliland, and South Africa. A detailed project description, periodic meeting reports (includes agendas and participant lists), and all knowledge products from the HSG can be accessed free online from the ASSN website

<http://africansecuritynetwork.org/assn/research/>

At this final convening in addition to regular project members, researchers and advisors, the team was pleased to welcome and engage with a multinational mix of activists, academics, and regional policymakers who contributed actively and critically to the enriching discussions. Following presentations and discussions of the various country case studies, participants focused on considerations of the implications for their respective work of the findings from the project. The central outcomes of this conversation are distilled on pages 26-30 and will continue to serve

as reflection for all participants, including the IDRC, represented by Programme Officer Ms. Ramata Thioune, who intimated that the research findings and conference outcomes would inform subsequent internal meetings at the IDRC.

The keen interest shown by HSG members as well as associates during its three and half years span indicate the salience of the notion of hybridity in security and, as was remarked continually, a need for further research in an even more diverse array of countries—perhaps not only in Africa.

### Session I: Opening Remarks

Two considered notions emerged from the welcome remarks by project leader, Professor Eboe Hutchful and Ramata Thioune, Canadian High Commissioner Heather Cameron being unavoidably absent. First, that hybridity in its many forms is intuitive to Africans, in equal part because of our cultural diversities and colonial experiences. Second, that the HSG project is part of a larger recent and ongoing intellectual rediscovery of hybridity that seeks to make sense of the crisis of/surrounding the Westphalian state in Africa. Both speakers enjoined the gathering to think about how the project's findings might impact their work, and also to consider whether the project succeeded in answering the four guiding questions with which it set out.

### PRESENTATIONS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

As previously, in the interests of space, what follows are synopses of individual research presentations and distillations of discussions of each case study among participants. All of the terminal research papers and some of the policy briefs which formed the bases of each presentation are accessible online at the ASSN website here: <http://africansecuritynetwork.org/assn/research/>

### Session II: Gender, Justice and Security Reform

**Chair:** Titilope Ajayi, University of Ghana

**Title:** Women's Access to Justice in Sierra Leone: Secret Societies and Bridging the Formal and Informal Divide

**Researcher/Author:** Fredline M'Cormack-Hale, Seton Hall University, US

This paper addresses hybridity within the framework of women's access to justice, particularly regarding sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), which is limited despite years of security sector reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone. The most cited informal sources of security and justice are those in which men dominate—like the paramount chieftaincy system, which has been criticized for reflecting patriarchal values and perpetuating the constraints women face in accessing justice in Sierra Leone. Secret societies are one of a few informal spaces dominated by women. Focusing on women secret societies, this paper deepens discourse on hybridity and bridging the gap between formal and informal sources of justice in SSR, asking:

- Can organisations that are primarily women based provide better alternatives for women to access justice?
- Are they perceived as more legitimate than security arrangements encapsulated by the State?
- Do they serve to strengthen national structures or undermine them?

- To what extent can these serve as a potential positive source for those that argue in favour of hybridity, and ultimately protect the welfare of citizens, especially women?

Research was conducted in short research trips over 2015-2016 in all four geographic regions in Sierra Leone, specifically Freetown (Western Area), Bo (south), Kambia and Makeni (north), and Kenema (east). Methods included semi-structured individual and group interviews (questions were tailored to the different interview participants) with police; lawyers; local and international civil society activists, including women's rights actors; key elites within the relevant line ministries of Justice and Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs; leaders and members of secret societies; women and men non-members of secret societies; businesswomen and men; teachers; nurses; Family Support Unit representatives of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), chiefs, and Muslim and Christian religious leaders. Data was also obtained through meetings on women's rights, justice and policing issues.

SSR in Sierra Leone has focused heavily on the state justice sector in response to identified weaknesses therein. However, reforms have been criticised for being elitist, perceivably foreign and hence lacking community ownership, state-centric, and non-responsive to women's security, particularly in peacetime. The government has made efforts in this regard to address, for example, female underrepresentation within the police through the review and revision of police policies on sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment in 2014. Yet women continue to face challenges in accessing justice across the security and justice sectors. Police family support units set up to handle SGBV among other matters are under-resourced and far outnumbered by the numbers of women who need their services. Women are made to pay for health care that is supposed to be free, and survivors of sexual assault can only get support at any of three Rainbo Centres in Freetown, Kono, and Kenema. Shortages of courts and other institutional obstacles pose further challenges.

Chiefs are primary and respected reference points, despite numerous documented abuses by them. Other non-state actors cited by respondents include family members and/or elders and civil society organisations. Some respondents mentioned secret societies but often as an afterthought or in response to probing. Known as *Bondo* in the North and in Freetown and *Sande* in the South, they are instrumental in teaching girls how to be good wives and mothers, of which the rite of passage of female genital cutting is central, thus conforming to traditional culturally prescribed gender norms. Secret societies also are widely revered and feared for their putative power to punish, both spiritually and physically, men who mistreat their wives or anyone who violates Bondo/Sande laws. Prominent politicians often have to belong to a society before they can be elected, and Bondo/Sande are seen as repositories for economic self-help. Some state rulings, like the continuing ban on FGM imposed during the Ebola crisis, have affected Bondo/Sande practices. But, unlike chiefs, there are few laws with direct implications on the practices of secret societies and they remain largely outside the domain of the state.

To what extent can the power of secret societies benefit women? Which women benefit? In practice, secret societies illustrate that institutional female representation is not a sufficient condition for transformation, and that cultural

contexts must also be taken into account. As customary institutions, Bondo/Sande serve as custodians of customs and traditions that ultimately privilege men and maintain the status quo. Internal relationships among women within the societies are hierarchical and characterised by power differentials, access to their power is restricted to members, and they can serve as sources of insecurity to non-members. In one example, in 2008, Manjia Balema Samba, a female journalist reporting for UN Radio, was stripped naked, beaten and paraded around town in Kenema District by Bondo Society members, following an interview that highlighted health and other concerns with FGM (despite police intervention, no arrests were ultimately made).

While the literature projects a very active secret society presence in security and justice, interviews reveal a more nuanced reality. First, in practice, it would appear that their role is limited by several factors, including laws mandating the referral of grievous cases to the state justice and security system, the costs of navigating that system, and families' unwillingness to see cases through to their rational end. Further, they seem to be more actively involved with smaller domestic disputes, especially child related ones, like underage pregnancy (where sex is consensual), disputes between mothers and children, and encouraging girl child education.

Overall, this research shows that formal and traditional sources of justice and security can reinforce each other. Socio-cultural factors that hinder justice in the formal sector are also present in the informal sector, with the consequence that women ultimately suffer in both. While secret societies can and do challenge male figures, and have been able to secure justice for women, including for example, ensuring that women have access to land, most rulings, including domestic abuse cases are guided by a cultural framework that continues to privilege men and advocates a circumscribed understanding of the role of women. In the same way that these power relations must be questioned in order for women to enjoy justice in the formal sector, the same must be done in the informal sector.

### COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANT, KATHRYN NWAJIAKU, OECD, FRANCE

Kathryn commended what she termed an approach to “security in the vernacular” of centring research on people on the receiving end of hybrid security in Sierra Leone and made a few further observations:

- Is it justifiable to use a secret society, especially one engaged in [female genital] cutting, as a prism to interrogate traditional structures? Are we wishing them into something they are not in order to make policy options more feasible?
- The paper could feature with greater clarity the perspectives of those on the receiving end, i.e. women, of secret societies' security interventions.
- Consider looking at Sierra Leone as an evolving space with many non-state actors, not just secret societies, and ask what's transpiring in those spaces that research needs to be more astute about?
- The theoretical link between security and justice, e.g. body violence as a major threat to women, could be stronger.

## **Title: Gender, Transitional Justice and Justice Sector Reform in Liberia**

**Researcher/Author: Freida M’Cormack, Institute for Development Studies, Sussex University, UK**

Two key questions guided this research:

- In a context where the formal security and justice systems are under-resourced and under-capacitated, what are the prospects for complementary rather than competitive dispute resolution systems that provide justice, particularly for women in rural areas who continue to be under-served by both customary and statutory systems?
- How are ongoing processes such as exploration of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms influencing women’s access to justice?

Access to justice for sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is a critical entry point into research on hybrid security for several reasons. A complex set of cultural, community, structural, and societal factors intersect in ways that produce narratives of masculinity anchored on male entitlement and aggression and dominance that are yielding high levels of SGBV in the country (an estimated 25 per cent of the prison population is for SGBV crimes). This matrix, combined with the limited reach of the formal justice and security system, is a significant hindrance to justice for affected women and girls—only four per cent of criminal cases and three per cent of civil cases make it to the formal courts.

The Ebola outbreak delayed research but afforded an extended literature review. Other methods consisted of process mapping, including of the progress of various draft legislations and mechanisms to develop ADR mechanisms; 168 structured and unstructured interviews in xxx counties with police, judiciary, government officials; traditional authorities, civil society groups, etc.; focus group discussions with male and female elders, traditional authorities and county ministry staff, and participant observation of the 2015-2020 UN Joint Programme on SGBV and security and community meetings.

Liberia operates a hybrid security system with four layers: a formal justice system, modelled on that of the US; a customary legal system mostly worked through Chiefs (or customary) courts, ‘created by regulation and statute’; a ‘traditional’ indigenous system, and an informal system of civil society, national, and international actors. A mapping of relations among these actors shows, among other things, seeming overlaps in, and confusion over, the relative roles and responsibilities of formal and informal sectors, without clear delineation or sufficient information about the limitations of each. Also, there are ample opportunities in both systems to compromise cases, resulting from women’s perceived inferior position in society and exacerbated by the perpetration of crimes by senior or prominent members in society. Further, while most respondents were aware of the formal system’s jurisdiction over rape and threat-to-life issues, this was not universal and other issues, such as domestic violence (and other domestic disputes, which communities linked to SGBV), were not considered relevant to the formal sector.

Analyses of formal and informal actors revealed inherent strengths and weaknesses as illustrated in the table below:



System	Strengths/Advances	Weaknesses
FORMAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existing (robust) legislation</li> <li>Justice sector reform</li> <li>Police reform</li> <li>Policy development and implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inadequate implementation of frameworks/reforms</li> <li>Structural constraints</li> <li>Corruption and impunity</li> <li>Lack of coordination/Government ownership</li> <li></li> </ul>
CUSTOMARY/TRADITIONAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More 'fair', less costly and more accessible - 'user-friendly'</li> <li>Dispute resolution based on widely accepted cultural paradigms: focus on restorative justice, social reconciliation, repairing damaged social relations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>State's co-option and corruption of informal justice processes</li> <li>lack of resources --&gt; greater susceptibility to bribery</li> <li>Formal restrictions eroding authority of traditional systems</li> <li>traditional structures and practices are perceived as enabling SGBV, e.g. genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C)</li> </ul>
OTHER INFORMAL ACTORS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UN-Government of Liberia Joint Programme for SGBV</li> <li>Peace huts</li> <li>National Palava Hut</li> <li>Strengthening Indigenous Conflict Management Capacity in Liberia' (Carter Center)</li> </ul>	

Recommendations will need to target individual sectors as well as the nexuses and relationships between different sectors. Within individual sectors, it is imperative to increase physical access and reduce structural barriers to the formal system, as well as address a lack of coordination and cooperation among formal government structures, particularly within the executive (ministries of justice, internal affairs, health, etc.). In the traditional sector, there is a need to raise greater awareness among traditional authorities of the legal system and their limitations within it. A further priority is the need to change social norms through whole-of-community efforts that engage women, men, boys and girls, and traditional authorities. Regarding relations among different sectors, it would be helpful to increase collaborations and dialogue between law enforcement officials and traditional authorities through purposeful interactions; train traditional women leaders in the referral pathway; engage civil society and foster national ownership of these processes; and actualise programming based on realistic assessments.

## COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANT, THOMAS JAYE, KOFI ANNAN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRE, GHANA

- The cultural diversity of even a single small state like Liberia must be acknowledged as cultural practices vary across the country.
- Though there is broad consensus that murder and rape are the state's prerogative, there are varying perceptions of what constitutes serious violence and who should handle it.
- Chiefs' own legitimacy is in question owing to changes in their selection process (they are now elected, unlike previously) and in the quality of candidates such that they are no longer taken seriously or respected and often lack the critical historical knowledge that undergirds the institution.
- On the question of alternative dispute resolution, how alternative is alternative? What is it alternative to? How can this be framed differently taking cognisance of practices that are organic to beneficiaries? Whose [development and peacebuilding] agenda is being advanced with the use of such terms?
- The approach of NGOs and other actors trying to 'do' human rights is inherently problematic and accounts for the persistence of social problems that they have been trying to solve for many years.
- Secret societies, as their name suggests, have long been and will remain inaccessible. They are also closely embedded in other entities, including formal/public sector and institutions.

### GENERAL DISCUSSIONS

- It would be helpful for researchers to offer some elucidation on their personal link(s) with their chosen subject(s). Subjectivity is important as not all concepts/constructs travel well across other contexts. (NB: this participant had never heard of a secret society and had trouble engaging the idea.)
- How can norms change? Which new norms should we establish? And what strategies can be used to measure social change(s)?
- The entire project may have been remiss in not looking at language and the implications of popular frames of accepted concepts like 'alternative' dispute resolution.
- The paper is rich but would benefit from a slight restructuring that asks and shows how useful secret societies are to the state and NGOs as well as to women. The power associated with secret societies also needs to be illustrated beyond anecdotes. For example, are they able to mitigate levels of say husband violence, given the dominance of traditional marriage cultures/norms within their main operative contexts? Do they have any say in regulating women's access to land?
- Though it is important to obtain empirical knowledge on the broad non-state security matrix in Sierra Leone, there is merit in focusing on a traditional women's organisation, particularly one that presents interesting dilemmas regarding the protection of women's rights by women's institutions and the potential difficulties of one that has historically performed genital cutting becoming an advocate for justice and security in cases of violence. It might be useful to historicise the secret society by observing how it has evolved

since its inception as traditional institutions are no less dynamic than formal ones.

- How holistic is the germaneness of hybridity to our make-up as Africans? What's the exact status of hybridity: is one way of life more dominant? Are both [formal and informal] parallel?
- A brief exchange between Freida and one participant uncovered the practice of rape in Liberia as an accepted preface to marriage in some contexts, raising the questions of harmful traditional practices that uphold violent constructions of masculinity, and the dilemma around the prospect of 'converting' into champions of justice and security the same systems that enable such violence. It was suggested that some social problems like child rape, which is endemic in Liberia, should be addressed not as resolvable problems but confronted with radical, aggressive approaches that can overturn harmful norms and end them abruptly.

### Session III: Securing Pride: Sexuality, Security, and the Post-Apartheid State

**Xavier Livermon, University of Texas in Austin, US**

In line with other studies on safety and security in South Africa, this paper was contextualised within a long history of insecurity caused by Apartheid and framed as a discussion of whose security needs the post-Apartheid state is serving. The term security is often used to suppress those at the margins of gender and sexual propriety. Against this background, in the global South, the humanitarian rescue doctrine is explored as a particular form of governmentality in contexts where examples abound throughout Africa of LGBT subjects as sites of moral panic. It is in this light that governments like South Africa's claim to protect LGBT populations against popular depictions of them as assaults on public morality. Yet the hybrid nature of security and governance creates split citizenship rights for black LGBT South Africans: their legally guaranteed state citizenship is queried by the cultural argument that homosexuality is 'un-African'.

Gender and sexuality emerged as key components of security within the framework of human security following critiques that the latter did not address questions of gender sufficiently. Subsequent critiques that Hudson's work reified and naturalised dominant/cis gender categories led to calls to denaturalise gender categories and gender binaries such that meanings traditionally associated with gender expanded to include social constructions of not just women but also men and LGBT persons. Though states are mobilised in explicitly heteropatriarchal and heteronormative terms, interrogating the security of LGBT subjects requires a radical rethinking of the state away from these terms.

Based on the framework by Jarvis and Lister (2013) that lists six aspects of vernacular security, physical survival (belonging, hospitality, equality, liberty, and the disputably negative curtailment of liberties to ensure safety), Soweto Pride, an annual LGBT event, is presented as a form of vernacular security that lays claim to a specific racialised and sexualised space and contributes to reframing everyday

forms of violence and invisibility. In 2016, the organisers of Soweto Pride were compelled to cancel the event in capitulation to imposed state conditions that were impossible to meet, like the demand that FEW charge an entrance fee as a means of crowd control and obtain a liquor license and sell alcohol at the venue, both of which the organisation pointed out is against its ethos of accessibility. The South African police service also raised the Soweto Pride risk category from low to medium without explanation, requiring the organisers to hire more police and security detail at costs prohibitive to them. Collectively, these actions amounted to state coercion to prevent Soweto Pride, raising questions about the extent to which LGBT spaces are subject(ed) to state management and control.

Jo'burg Pride contrasts with Soweto Pride as one of multiple white elite spaces that are often exclusionary. It appears to be more pliant to state demands, raising questions around which LGBT bodies the state finds more acceptable. Informal norms often govern questions of gender and sexual propriety and do become instituted in law by way of, for example, criminalising sex work and LGBT, and disparate ages of consent for male and female. However, in this form such norms are often unevenly enforced by state and non-state actors, including traditional and religious leaders, police/courts, and private security.

Some recommendations toward achieving an effective inclusive sexuality justice and security sector in South Africa include rethinking the limits of state recognition of the most vulnerable gender and sexuality non-conforming Africans as it may privilege or legitimise a particular kind of LGBT subjectivity while suppressing others. Another consideration should be the decarceration of the state through the adoption of non-carceral frameworks for punishment and restitution like restorative justice to address violence against LGBT persons. The implication for related research beyond South Africa is that scholars and advocates must rethink the assumptions that we make about which kinds of bodies are implicated in SSR in Africa; LGBT bodies possess an extra layer of vulnerability in addition to other intersectional vulnerabilities.

## COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANTS

### KATHRYN NWAJIAKU

- The paper is rich, written in vivid readable style, and discusses issues like belonging and invisibility that resonate across other contexts, even beyond Africa. It portrays how narratives differ from and contrast starkly with reality.
- Among the multiple issues that it foregrounds, the author might consider focusing on specific ideas. The link between carcerality and capital, for example, is left hanging, with no conclusive answer to the 'what then?' question in this discussion.
- By way of a recommendation, consider being more radical in addressing the dilemmas of identity regarding differing conceptions of citizenship before the law and culture.
- The Tajabon transgender tradition in Senegal may be a useful reference.

## EBOE HUTCHFUL

- Following general observations about the surprising homophobia in South Africa given its political history and contemporary societal openness and embrace of human rights, Eboe suggested that the role of popular culture in questioning homosexuality had perhaps gotten lost during writing and needs to be re-added as the paper progresses.

## GENERAL DISCUSSIONS

- Does more security necessarily equal more safety? Which should take priority?
- There was a brief discussion and agreement to discuss dissemination of this paper which has foregrounded different concerns, including artist and black lesbians as it has evolved, each of which is important and critical to further research.

## Session IV: Security in Côte d'Ivoire

**Title: Formal organisation and decision-making processes of Ivorian defence and security forces.**

**Researcher/Author: Moussa Fofana, University of Bouake, Cote d'Ivoire**

This study set out to interrogate the presence of unofficial recruits in the high echelons of the Ivoirian army and to explore the links between their trajectories and the problems of restructuring facing that institution today. That current recruitment modalities into Côte d'Ivoire's national defence force are unknown to former dissident fighters and regular soldiers alike is testament to the querulous state of things in the country's security sector. Efforts to integrate leaders of former belligerent groups into the army and pay off ex-soldiers are part of a larger project to restructure the defence and security sector after a decade of military and political crisis triggered by electoral tensions. But recurrent mutinies signal the ineffectiveness of these efforts in which the army has gradually become a major stakeholder in the process of embrittlement of the state. Further, these efforts create the impression that the army continues to be an instrument of the consolidation of power for the benefit of former regimes.

The army is underequipped—a legacy of the 1980s economic crisis and political transformations in the 1990s. It also remains divided, having been enmeshed in rivalries between past political leaders throughout the 2000s. In this time, the army lost control over its personnel and their training, and could no longer be said to represent a republican army. Successive changes of the name of the army during this period betray its weakness.

With scant empirical work on the Ivoirian army and a predominance of speculative anecdotal evidence, data was collected using informal interviews with former servicepersons and officers under conditions of anonymity. Other sources were the local media and the outcomes of interviews conducted during the researchers' doctoral fieldwork. Given the sensitive nature of the subject, the study did not obtain formal authorisation from state authorities.

The informalisation of the army has unfolded over three decades owing to prevailing sociopolitical contexts and specific logics that informed the absorption into the army of 4000 young patriots in 2002, 7000 former rebels in 2007, and 2600 more in 2011. This occurred alongside disruptions caused by incidents like the republican guard's refusal to demobilise in 1996, and the reinstatement of demobilised soldiers by Robert Guéï in 2000.

A mapping was produced of the informal trajectories of inclusion of recruits in the national army between 1990 and 2011 which shows that its constitution, this internal hybridisation, and the relations among its different parties are merely a reflection of the messy politics affecting the rest of the country. Political and ethnic identity continue to influence ongoings in the army, careers remain politically determined, and there is a palpable feeling that the institution, far from being united, is really two armies in one. The informalisation of the army masks the stringent efforts being made to modernise and train Côte d'Ivoire's defense forces.

Clearly, the problems facing the Ivorian army are unresolved, though pressing. As a matter of urgency, the army needs to be equipped with the means and skills to make it less dependent on the political sphere. More emphasis should be placed during training on the ethic of commitment within a republican army, and all members should have equal merit-based access to promotion. Civil-military relations need to be redefined on the basis of a real republican pact.

## **Title: The *Dozo* Brotherhood in Côte d'Ivoire: Socio-cultural and Security Implications**

**Researcher/Author: Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné**

Despite a questionable human rights record and consequent attempts to excise them from Côte d'Ivoire's security sector by the state and the United Nations, *dozos* continue to deliver security, particularly in local communities, and sometimes in association with state security operations. This study set out to answer three main research questions:

- Who are *dozos*?
- How did these 'traditional community hunters' come to play a role in the national security system?
- What are their links with the formal state security system?

Data sources consisted of secondary data obtained from documentary evidence and literature, and primary data from individual and group interviews with *dozo* leaders and ordinary members, ethnic group community members, soldiers and others. It took place in Abidjan (south), Bouaké (centre), Korogho (north), and Daloa and Duekoué (west).

To make meaning of the *dozo*, they must be situated within the particular historical and political experience of the Mandingo cultural universe that cuts across and united multiple populations in West Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone). The *dozo* worldview originates from a system of beliefs, a moral and ethical code that defines it and orders its relation with the external world. The

functioning and internal organisation of *dozo* associations are based on the principles of universality and equality on the one hand, fraternity, solidarity and loyalty on the other, and submission to the authority of the teachers (masters/elders). The *dozo* are organised into chapters that all belong to a national federation though the latter is undergoing leadership conflicts arising from differences over the benefits of their prominence and marketisation.

*Dozo* became involved in the security market in the early 1990s due to the failure of the Ivorian State to provide adequate security to all citizens, in a context of pauperisation and expansion of crimes in urban and rural areas. Since then, they have been invited to various regions of the country to assist national security forces to secure the country's populations and their successes have been publicised by the media. The demand for their services has escalated in tandem with the strong demand for private security by economic actors and individuals. It is fed, on one hand, by beliefs in their supposed magic powers and on the other hand, by the ethical and moral values of honesty, courage, and a sense of duty with which they are credited. A second factor in the popularisation of *dozo* is the violent crisis of Ivorian democracy in the mid-1990s that led to their instrumentalisation within the ethno-political struggle waged by political actors.

in some parts of the country, notably the forest areas (west and south), the political commitment of the *dozo* has eroded their positive image with local populations perceiving them as a militia for the government in power. They have been questioned in the abuses against the people of these regions who were close to the former regime, especially during the 2011 post-electoral violence, and during numerous land conflicts between these populations and migrants from the north of the country.

*Dozos*, like former fighters, have been recruited into the national army where some of them, like *dozo* leader Koné Zakaria, hold high positions. On the ground, although the authorities deny direct collaboration with the *Dozo* at the central level, there are many examples of cooperation between *dozos* and the police and gendarmerie at the community level.

In light of the failure of efforts to restrain *dozo* security activity, the state cannot continue to ignore the influences of these so-called informal actors on the national security system. Continuing and successful collaborations in communities with local *dozo* associations by local state actors could prevent the risks of potential human rights abuses by *dozo*. The state must work toward a more effective community security policy by initiating dialogue on the modalities of this collaboration, especially in areas where there is not enough state security coverage.

## COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANTS

### MPAKO FOALENG, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL (UNOWAS)

- The papers are very timely given that the UN operation in Côte d'Ivoire concluded its mandate on 30 June and the country file has moved from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to her office, the UN Office in West

Africa, with a focus on sustaining peace and maintaining benefits of peace process.

- There is a clear challenge and unanswered question regarding how to reconcile different groups under a single hierarchy in ways that ensure loyalty to the state and legitimately elected authorities.
- The paper tries to explain the concept of hybridity but there seems to be a tension between the researcher's understanding and the reality? On the ground. Are they two sides of one coin? The paper does not explain this relationship enough.
- How are you situating informality/hybridity/formality?
- Questions were posed but not answered about what the formal recruitment process is now and its status in relation to informal processes.
- The papers should be clearer and more forthcoming about key lessons and policy implications.
- The *dozo* paper is brilliant but the *dozo* role in communities is unclear. Beyond the intermittent discussion of human rights, there needs to be a stronger link with *dozo* accountability/norms systems. What sanctions exist where these are contravened?

#### MAXIME RICARD, UNIVERSITY OF MONTREAL

- This paper is valuable because it studies security actors for what they are vs. what they should be. It defeats the idea that order comes from a [state] monopoly of violence and historicises the army well.
- The author should strengthen his theoretical basis/es by looking at work on the critical anthropology of rebellion (Marielle de bos, Paul Richards, etc.). Try to understand the rationalities of the actors that disrupted the Ivorian army during the various mutinies.
- The *dozo* paper is a commendable update of 1990s research that shows how the institution has evolved over the last 20 years and sets out clearly the import of the country's contemporary army in its current state.

#### GENERAL COMMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Questions, some intended for later reflection, included:

- What insights exist into the practices of informal groups when they are absorbed into the army?
- With reference to the points in Jimam's paper on the pluralisation of law vs. the pluralisation of policy and practice, is Côte d'Ivoire heading toward hybridisation as law or will hybridity remain an on-the-ground reality?
- Who should and who has the interest to provide the means to depoliticise the army? What are the implications of the findings in terms of statebuilding and nation building in Côte d'Ivoire? What does/would it take to have an 'armée nation'?
- *Dozo* sanctions lie partly in transgenerational beliefs in the negative spiritual repercussions of bad behaviour/violation of *dozo* norms.
- The political economy of *dozo* presence in Abidjan is feeding the market for mystic powers that are being sought by children (known as microbes) and increasing their criminality.



- How does (in)formalisation play out from a community perspective?
- Are our methods perhaps just not adequate for attaining certain information?
- The researchers were referred to recent work by Scott Strauss on the making and unmaking of nations and his thesis that strong nationalistic army values are the reason why there has been no genocide in that country despite the abundance of conducive conditions.

## Session V: Somaliland and Sierra Leone (Civilian Defence Forces)

**Chair: Medhane Tadesse**

**Title: Hybrid Security Governance in Somaliland**

**Researcher/Author: Mohamed Abdi Omer, Academy for Peace and Development, Somaliland**

After giving an overview of key historical events in Somaliland, notably the 1981 formation of armed resistance movements and onset of civil conflict, and the 1990 Collapse of Somalia's central government, Mohamed stated the research questions as follows:

- What are the networks and processes that span the divide between formality and informality security governance in Somaliland?
- What are the roles of informal security institutions and what are the interactions and interface between them and the formal security institutions in Somaliland?
- How does hybridity impact on the security and entitlements of citizens, particularly in situations of vulnerability, exclusion and equity?

Methods were chiefly qualitative and consisted of focus group discussions, unstructured interviews, and key informant interviews. Research involved a limited quantitative survey of hybrid security governance in two locations: Hargeisa town (urban) and Dilla District (rural). Respondents in both settings included formal institutions – the district administration, the district police commission, local government authorities, the national police force, and the judiciary, and informal institutions: traditional elders, religious leaders, ad hoc religious courts, youth vigilante groups, neighborhood committees, and the committee for the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice.

The research findings indicate that Somaliland hybrid security order comprises informal and state security governance actors. In its current state, informality is deeply embedded in formal security and justice provision and informal institutions use their legitimacy to underpin the provision of security in the country. In the urban areas, informal institutions complement the formal in the provision of hybrid security and justice. In the rural areas, justice and security provision is the collective responsibility of formal and informal institutions. The public is the first to benefit from the hybrid security order for the fact that informal institutions augment the capacities of formal institutions with no or minimum cost. Because of the

inefficiency associated with the formal courts, many people resort to Sharia courts, creating a space where the latter competes with the formal justice institutions.

Informal institutions also benefit from the hybrid security order, given the fact that it boosts their legitimacy among the public. Minorities and women are losers in hybrid security governance because of its leniency to unequal power relationships and male-dominated culture. The reinforcement of working relationships within the security governance actors requires support from each system through tolerance, dependence, trust and reconciliation.

Recommendations include that community members should be involved and take ownership of their own security within their communities. The fragility of the hybrid security order should be carefully analyzed and its lack of sustainability should not be overlooked. Non-state security actors should be appreciated and legalised to perform in a well structured mechanism in recognition that state actors alone are not adequate in terms of security provision.

**Title: Civil Defence Forces and Chiefdom Security Committees in Sierra Leone.**

**Researcher/Author: Osman Gbla, Centre for Development and Security Analysis (CEDSA), Sierra Leone**

This presentation expounded the diverse networks and processes involved in formal and informal security, policing and justice provisioning in Sierra Leone using the Civil Defence Forces (CDFs), the Chiefs customary justice system and Ebola as case studies.

The research critically examines the manifestation of hybrid security governance in practice, its major constraints and its sustainability in post-conflict Sierra Leone. Specifically, it identifies and analyzes the diverse networks and processes of the formal and informal security, policing and justice institutions in order to generate an understanding of their interwoven nature.

The major research questions that the study addresses are: In what ways are the informal security, justice and governance structures embedded in the formal structures of Sierra Leone? What various roles do informal structures play in the security, justice and governance of Sierra Leone and do they work in cooperation or in conflict with the formal structures? What are the impacts of the interwoven roles of formal and informal structures on the entitlements and livelihoods of the citizens? How can accountable, effective and transparent hybridized roles be developed?

Some of the important findings of the paper are that: although hybrid security governance has over the years been dictated by varying historical contexts in Sierra Leone, its manifestations and relevance are clearly visible in the country's present-day realities; Sierra Leone's customary justice administered by chiefs is not static as one would want to imagine as it is evolving and responding to changing contexts; various efforts have over the years been made to build viable, transparent and efficient hybrid security governance but its operation in practice is fraught with a number of challenges.

## COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANTS

### SOMALILAND - DAOUUD ALWAN (IGAD)

As a reviewer of the report, my expectations were frustrated as neither the findings, nor the body of the text respond to the research questions brilliantly listed by the researcher as follows:

- Identifying networks and processes of formality and informality in urban setting like Hargeisa and in rural locality such as Dilla.
- Identifying the roles of informal security institutions and their interactions or interface with formal ones in the designated sites of the study.
- Finding out the sources of financing of these informal security institutions.
- Determining the way this hybrid security governance in Somaliland could be used as a source of inspiration elsewhere in Africa.

Though rich in detail on the political process that produced Somaliland, the narrative seems to focus more on the first stages of peacebuilding and state-consolidation in Somaliland and to the exclusion of the last and recent decade of political processes and dynamics. Clear lacuna are evident particularly in highlighting the current groups and factions and their rivalries and cooperation around some of the more intractable issues like the future of Somaliland polity within a radically transforming geopolitical environment marked by the frustration of the youth, the emergence of new lines of thinking concerning the roles of Islam in daily politics, the threat of terrorists operating cross-border with the rest of Somalia and their affiliated groups, the absence of clear prospects in solving the international legal stalemate with the parent state of Somalia which is still considered as the sole internationally recognised entity.

In the literature sources, pride of place seems to be given to the opinions and positions held by controversial colonial anthropologists like Ian Lewis, an author much acquainted with northern Somali clan politics who worked within the British colonial administration during the protectorate period in Somaliland. It is simplistic and misleading to characterising the political contest between the various political actors within the unitary state of Somalia from its inception in the 1960s up to its destruction in 1991 as a process exclusively monopolised by the competitions and hostilities between two Somali clans, namely the Darood and the Issaq. Without totally dismissing the importance of clan differentiation in Somalis politics, caution should be taken in light of the work of analyst and historian Sam Mealy who relevantly characterises the deficiencies of the Somali Polity during the emergence of the first Republican state in the following terms: 'Independent Somalia during the 1960's provides an historical illustration of Huntington's 'political gap' hypothesis: rapid social change and the consequent mobilisation of new groups into politics often outpaces the development of political institutions able to process their participation and demands. When political participation suddenly expands without corresponding increase in institutionalisation, instability and disorder results'.

Some suggestions for improvement:

- Add more background information for readers not acquainted with Horn of Africa and Somali politics. This should include some graphs showing the genealogical representations of various clans and sub-clans and also a map of the 'geopolitical' and clan territorial distribution of Somaliland.
- Shorten the report and make it more concise by concentrating on the last decade and, in particular, the dynamics of the house of elders with the various formal and informal sections of Somaliland politics and its broader polity.
- Hargeisa is a settlement of people from all over the country and should not be considered a representation of the country's true culture.
- Not enough is known about the real functioning of the Guurti. The paper would be ground breaking if it dedicated some analysis to this very important issue.

Further caution is required regarding the applicability of the concept of hybridity to the peculiarity that is Somaliland. Per the notion of the quasi-state advanced by scholars like Pal Kolsto (2006), there is debate among analysts about whether Somaliland possesses the full characteristics of a state, especially given its continued non-recognition by most members of the international system. The hybridity occurring in Somaliland is thus more complex than the traditional-formal binary.

#### DAVID LEONARD

The paper has improved considerably since the last workshop and is now a fitting update of I M Lewis' work on Somaliland in the 1960s. Final suggestions for revision more work on the relationship of sub-clan structures with habitation patterns in urban spaces, the need to reconcile with one voice and flow what was written by different people, and the impact of the social insurance that social groups when their members commit social vices.

#### SIERRA LEONE - ERNEST ANSAH LARTEY (KAIPTC)

The paper firmly establishes three key facts about hybrid security formations in Sierra Leone:

First, the security sector in the country is split between the formal and informal sectors, with the formal sector (i.e. military, police, intelligence, immigration etc.) operating as the mainstream rule of law bearers of security, whilst the informal sector (such as the Civil Defence Forces (CDFs), chiefs, customary justice system etc.) operate as the alternative security mechanism.

Second, with evidence from previous survey reports, the paper establishes that majority of the Sierra Leonean population prefer the informal security system to the formal security system. Therefore, in terms of preference and acceptance, this finding portrays a shift in the status quo wherein the informal security sector now occupies the mainstream sector, thus pushing the formal security sector to the

alternative. However, in spite of this fact, the narrative still maintains the old order that reinforces the status quo.

Third, in spite of the binary categorisation of the formal and informal security sectors, overlaps exist between the two categories. This is presented differently in the form of the CHISECs, DISECs and PROSECs. More so, the creation of bodies such as the Police Partnership Board (PPB), Area Police Partnership Committees and the Zonal Security Committees suggest a firm interface between the formal and informal security sectors. This interface produces a continuum- rather than a binary- of the security sector where authority, legitimacy, capacity, accountability and control are shared (in some different degree) between the formal and informal sectors.

The paper could consider the following questions:

1. Are the alternative security mechanisms the new normal in security sector transformation?
2. Is hybrid security concept an operational, policy or coordination tool for managing a security sector which is fragmented? How does it deal with issues of duplication of efforts and of turf battles amongst the various actors?
3. It seems that when we talk of hybridity, it is more expressed (or applicable) at the local level (i.e. micro-level security concept) than at the national level (macro-level security concept). This is because the inclusion of the chiefs in the security sector does not transcend to the national security level. What accounts for this?
4. Do we not risk politicising the chieftaincy institution by including it in security structures such as the DISECs and CHISECs which have top politicians represented? And apart from the chiefs, are there no other CSOs represented on the CHISECs?
5. Who is a chief, how does one become a chief and how do chiefs sustain themselves in Sierra Leone?

## GENERAL DISCUSSIONS

- Neither paper looks closely at public perceptions of security.
- Prolonged inconclusive debate about the meaning of hybridity in Somaliland reflected a strong divergence of opinion between at least two participants on what the project has acknowledged is a contested subject.
- Is Somaliland a hybrid political order or a new kind of state? Is the Somaliland model sustainable? What lessons does it hold for the rest of Africa?
- There was also some disagreement on the role and influence of religious actors, especially in light of the growing prominence of Wahhabism in Somaliland and its significance for the rights of women and other sex and gender groups. Though female Somalilanders appear to have some autonomy, polygamy is rife and their identities remain rooted in their affiliation to male family heads and male-headed clans.

## Session VI: Nigeria

**Chair: Thomas Jaye**

**Title: Hybridisation in the Organisation and Provision of Safety and Security in Poor Urban Nigeria**

**Researcher/Author: Oluwole S. Ojewale (CLEEN)**

Nigeria's state security actors have the core responsibility to provide security and to design and implement the country's security policies for the protection of the state and its citizens. However, the complexity and upsurge of violent conflicts and criminality in the country and the consequences of poor security provisioning, have created security gaps that individuals and communities struggle to fill in diverse ways. Non-state (informal) policing systems have played vital roles in addressing the safety and security needs of most underprivileged populations. The poor patronise such informal actors for multiple reasons: their intimate knowledge of the society, their grassroots outlook, their ability to prevent criminal attacks in neighbourhoods, and their prompt response to security threats. Given that their existence and operations have not only added to the plurality of security actors but also compounded the ambiguity of roles and relationships, this study explores Nigeria's widening hybrid security matrix against the hitherto exclusionary state posture.

In this wise, the study asked the following questions:

- Can patterns of embedding be identified between the State and non-state security organisations?
- What are the likely impacts of the processes of hybridisation on the current security order in Nigeria?
- How do these processes impact on vulnerable groups in society? What are the gender considerations in the processes of hybridisation of the current security order in Nigeria?

The study focused on the nature of the relationships between state and non-state security actors with specific reference to the O'dua Peoples' Congress (OPC), Bakassi Boys, Hisba (Muslim religious 'police'), the Civilian Joint Task Force, the Nigeria Police Force and the military. A mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods was employed to:

- identify and analyse the diverse complexities of the formal and informal security sectors.
- examine the similarities and differences between formal and informal security provisioning.
- review the management and accountability processes.
- deliberate on the perceived impact of the hybridisation of the formal and informal security systems on vulnerable citizens and communities.
- assess the gender roles in formal and informal security structures while promoting a hybrid security system in Nigeria.

Historical antecedents, identity politics and nationalism, an overly centralized national policing institution, and a crisis of confidence in the police are among the conditions that gave rise to informal security provisioning. Informal security actors are found to be interwoven with the State through complex relationships of cooperation and competition. Hence, they simultaneously strengthen and weaken different dimensions of statehood. The proliferation of informal security actors is viewed through the prisms of opposition (Bakassi Boys and OPC); incorporation (Civilian JTF); codification (State level legislative backing); and competition (Hisba). Contrary to the belief that these informal actors lack proper organisational structures, coordination and legality, most of them actors are well organised with functional organogrammes.

Informal mechanisms have become parallel strategies for protection for the majority of people excluded from mainstream security provisioning. Other findings include that formal-informal collaboration involves information sharing, training, and operational responsibilities, the result of which has somewhat improved intelligence gathering, leading to the effective identification of sect members and violent extremism. Also, traditional norms, values and practices continue to subordinate women and obstruct their progress in both private and public spheres, perpetuating unequal power relations.

This study recommends that policymakers and practitioners, inter alia:

- Recognise the role that informal systems play in security provisioning and, to that end, strengthen the links between formal and informal systems, including through community policing.
- Incorporate eligible members of Civilian Joint Task Force and other security provisioning outfits into the formal security sector.
- Prioritise women's role in security provisioning in the country.
- Address the legality of operations of informal actors.

**Title: Policing Actors, Plural Processes, and Hybridisation: Histories of Everyday Policing Practice in Central Nigeria.**

**Researcher/Author: Jimam Lar**

This study is an extension of the author's doctoral and other research on histories of plural policing in selected areas of Central Nigeria from the late colonial period to the present. A broad framing of policing as all organised activity and services provided by statutory and non-statutory institutions that seek to ensure and maintain law, order and security, renders visible the pluralities of actors and practice in various contexts around the world where the state does not police alone. Also flowing from this conceptualisation is that policing is a mode of statecraft, a means of governing, situated within a plural landscape, that is shaped by political, economic and social interest and not simply a technical function of state confined to the lens of the criminologist.

Beyond the quotidian forms of violence manifest in ethno-religious, identity-based conflicts that have preoccupied much analysis of violence, this research foregrounds violence as everyday policing practice. Literature that does study violence as

everyday policing explores with reluctance how such practices are embedded within policing practice in a field where state and non-state actors converge, interact and reproduce former, and sometimes new forms of policing practice. The paper further distinguishes subjective violence (disruptions to public order that we ‘identify and recognise as acts of crime, sectarian violence, and (physical violence)’ by ‘a clearly identified subject’) and objective violence (that which is ‘inherent to the normal state of things’). Subjective violence is more visible because objective violence ‘is invisibly perpetrated so that the established order continues uninterrupted’. While aspects of these violences are embedded in the formation of the creation and existence of the colonial state, and consequent agitations for liberation, they also find meaning in the policing activity of non-state actors. Against this background, the paper seeks to answer three questions:

- What are the historical and contemporary processes of socialising policing actors as it relates to violence and policing practice?
- How does this socialisation manifest in everyday hybrid/plural policing practice of state and non-state policing actors?
- What is the impact of this on citizens, particularly as it relates to structures of power and vulnerable groups?

The study deployed a historical approach embedded in qualitative methods to specifically account for the origins and changing forms of policing. To examine the contemporary manifestations, selected ethnographic methods are used to complement the historical methods of data collection. Extensive fieldwork was done over several months in urban and rural central Nigeria and the researcher gathered archival material in Jos, Kaduna, and London. He also recorded personal histories and accounts of individuals and groups including serving and retired police officers, retired Native Authority Police (NAPF) officers, local government officials, community leaders, women leaders, vigilante group leaders and members, traditional rulers, youth leaders, and former British colonial officers.

The paper examines processes of socialisation as an entry into understanding how policing actors learn and imbibe policing practice. It queries the influence on policing socialisation of cultures of ‘disciplinarity’ in the church and other spiritual entities and educational institutions (through corporal punishment). The socialisation of non-state police actors went from being superintended by community norms rooted in ancestral cult worship pre-colonialism, to state police during colonial rule, to ex-service personnel post-colonialism, and back to state police from the 1980s following security and other crises occasioned by the introduction of structural adjustment policies. ‘Vigilante policing’ was influenced by practices of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) as well as by military tactics owing to the NPF’s absorption from 1976 to 78 of some 10,000 demobilised soldiers. Shared modes of operation include checkpoints and patrols which vigilante police do, in the day and at night, in groups of eight to ten, sometimes accompanied by an armed NPF officer(s). Vigilante police also wear uniforms (albeit un-uniform ones), carry arms, keep audio, visual, and written records, and hold post-activity debriefings at local chiefs’ houses. They also, like state police, arrest, detain and interrogate suspects using methods that include varying forms of corporal punishment, not unlike those practised in Nigerian public schools, and the ‘dance of shame’ that involves the



public shaming of suspected criminals in popular spaces like market squares on busy market days with slight disparities between rural and urban vigilantes.

Beyond this socialisation, the relationship between state and vigilante police has two sides: direct and indirect vigilante cooperation with the police, and state police engagement in vigilante policing, police violence being considered, by some, a misnomer. Partly in a bid to regain social legitimacy, the state police, while perpetrating violence as part of policing practice, seems to also try to ensure that violence is controlled and as much as possible remains within the domain of policing. Seen from this angle, plurality is therefore operating within a dynamic that has structure and is organised. The study shows that policing practice transcends what obtains in legal frameworks and embraces equally the practices that individual actors engage with daily. Within a given social context, state-practice–policing practice—is conceived as a back-and-forth mediated negotiation.

### COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANTS, OKEY UZOECHINA (ECOWAS) & ALICE HILLS (DURHAM UNIVERSITY)

#### *Okey (ECOWAS)*

Nigeria presents an interesting case for the study of hybridity in the security sector. This is because the country has had enough historical antecedents, especially in the recent past where primary (formal) security sector and secondary (informal) security sector have interacted in adverse ways over, for example, the Bakasi, Niger Delta, and the Boko Haram crises. The paper is undoubtedly rich with many insightful examples of how the informal security sector in particular aids in the provision of safety and security in poor urban communities in Nigeria. However, the following key questions are worthy of note:

- Given the very busy- otherwise crowded nature- of the security sector in Nigeria, does hybridity promote effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of security and safety?
- How do hybrid security formations promote opportunities for gender mainstreaming?
- Noting the fact that decentralization has helped -in some limited ways-to restructure the security sector in Nigeria, does decentralization promote hybridity, especially at the state and local government levels as opposed to the federal level?

#### *Alice Hills*

The paper makes enjoyable reading and contains all the ingredients of a good research. Notably, it is commendable the way the author had managed to transform a PhD dissertation into a refined piece such as this article. As the author rightly notes, violence is an inherent element in policing practice. However, there are limits to the exercise of violence, particularly under rule of law and human rights governance.

- The paper should be clear about the research objective. Similarly, rather than basing the research objectives on historical episodes, it will be helpful to have the objectives set on scientific sources.
- The author can consider developing a roadmap of sequential arguments to enhance the internal logic of the paper.

- The section on “plurality, hybridity and violence” should tone down on the historical perspectives.

## GENERAL DISCUSSIONS

- How should the research reports get back to the research communities so that they don’t not only become subjects of information but also beneficiaries of research?
- The political economy of vigilantism rests on three questions: Who wins? Who loses? and Who gets access to resources? Vigilantes are resourced mainly by the goodwill of communities and occasionally by dedicated state government budgets. Vigilantism is also about economic survival and livelihood. Often, groups patrol more prosperous areas so that they can receive more benefits.
- Women have been mainstreamed into the CJTF to perform instrumental roles like searching for suicide bombers among Boko Haram women. To determine how they can be included more meaningfully beyond this requires further research of women’s diverse roles in the informal security sectors.
- How does the CJTF operate?
- How are vigilantes selected? Does anybody get excluded from the vigilante system? Is their recruitment driven solely by a volunteering ethic as pertains in jurisdictions like the US where volunteer fire servicepersons undergo thorough training and orientation that enhances their competence, credibility and public acceptance?
- Are there different policing approaches, such as nationalised police forces that are regime focused, and localised police forces that ensure that communities control routine local-level violences? What are the trade-offs between these two policing options?
- On the question of human rights abuses and the legitimacy of the CJTF: All policing approaches in Nigeria are influenced by past military experience. Vigilante practice is intended to enhance security for the poor, but they suffer the worst abuses.
- There is the need to have a conversation around the *Dozos*, and the vigilante groups in the HSG Nigerian research papers.
- Does the multiple role of policing impact on the studies? How do public, state, and local authorities interact with vigilante groups?

## Session VII: Comparing Research Findings on Hybrid Security Governance

**Chair: Mpako Foaleng**

### **KAIPTC Research Team**

State security establishments like the police and the law courts are often presumed to be the main channels of response to community concerns, especially on security matters. The KAIPTC conducted research in Liberia to verify this claim, premised on the fact that traditional authorities have a crucial role to play in politics, even if this role is often poorly understood. It proceeded on the understanding that the role of chiefs transcends peace, security, and justice.

In addition to broad communication and logistics constraints, research was hampered by the inaccessibility of some areas earmarked for fieldwork in Liberia, compounded by heavy rainfall during the rainy season.

Prior to the Barclay Plan in 1904, Liberia had a dual political administration: the Americo-Liberian rule amongst the settler communities in the Coastal areas, and the customary rule which was exercised by the traditional authorities in the hinterlands. Efforts at extending the settler rule to the hinterlands were resisted by the indigenes until the Barclay Plan succeeded in bringing Liberia under one political administration. To ensure effective administration in areas where there were no chiefs in the hinterlands, chiefs were appointed and commissioned by the president. However, this system was abolished because it permitted the latter excessive control over the chiefs who are now elected and subject to the people as opposed to the president. The civil war impacted negatively on traditional authorities: many chiefs were killed, creating a knowledge gap in terms of the preservation of traditional values in the communities. Yet chiefs remain relevant in the post-war era.

The research sought to define security from the perspective of the local people. This generated various responses from respondents. Issues such as lack of jobs, armed robbery, and the lack of education and food, among others, were identified as sources of insecurity. Respondents indicated that they prefer traditional authorities to respond to these security needs rather than the state administration and security agencies. However, it was noted that chiefs do not handle cases such as rape and murder which are handled by civil courts. However, in certain communities like Boje, courts are a last resort because this is a community in which the people see themselves as one extended family.

Contrary to the view that traditional authorities are not accountable, it was noted that accountability mechanisms exist in the traditional set-up. For instance, bodies such as councils of elders and secret societies are often consulted by chiefs before decisions are made. Similarly, there have been instances where unpopular decisions by chiefs have been overturned by councils of elders and secret societies. Given this strong foundation in the traditional system of governance, especially where majority of the people subscribe more to traditional authorities, many political analysts have questioned the basis of the state and statehood in Africa.

It was noted that women and youth are excluded from key decision-making processes. This is because they are thought of as people who cannot handle sensitive information. However, the research revealed that women and youth play indirect roles in decision making. For instance, whenever there is a deadlock over a decision, the men are often asked to go home and sleep over the matter. In the process of reflecting over the issue, the men consult their wives and children for insights that inform their decisions.

It was observed that the constitution of Liberia recognises both statutory and customary security arrangements. The traditional authority is as important as the secret society because most of the top-level government and public officials are members of secret societies. The decentralisation process has led to the election of chiefs at all levels.

### Discussions

- It is perceived that the prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM) in some of the communities is preventing the domestic violence bill from being passed.
- In order to avoid civil crimes in these communities, issues such as rape and murder are defined in ‘traditional’ terms.
- Is there any material difference between chiefs being appointed and elected?

The appointment of chiefs by the president was a way of compromising their role. For this reason, many chiefs did not enjoy support from their people who reposed greater trust in elders than chiefs. For being monetised and politicised, the new process of electing chiefs is weakening their claim to being custodians of traditional norms and values.

## Session VIII: Roundtable Implications of the Project Findings for Policy and Future Research

### Chair: Eboe Hutchful

Panellists were tasked to structure their contributions according to four questions:

- What is the current policy position (if any) of your organisation on the issue of *hybrid security* and *hybrid security governance*?
- Relatedly, what is the policy position on the role of non-state security and justice actors? To what extent is this in sync with regional and national realities?
- How are the research findings likely to influence your own thinking and work on SSR?
- We welcome any other thoughts or ideas that you think should inform this dialogue.

This section is structured accordingly.

### **Hamouda Kanu, African Union**

The ASSN did well to select unique examples that enabled the participation of national research institutions from countries like Somaliland. The hybrid roles of some non-state security actors (para-military militias) can sometimes be risky as it can lead to state regulation of these elements. Some states do this to accommodate/ integrate their loyal militias and mainstream them into state security apparatuses without considering issues of governance, the rule of law or any knowledge of national, regional or international legal frameworks. The example of the Janjaweed in Sudan who have evolved to become rapid deployment forces reporting directly to the national ministry of defence is a prime example.

Suggestions to the ASSN:

- Publish and disseminate the research papers to widen the benefit for those who are interested in such work.
- Expand this research initiative, including to new contexts and themes like the phenomenon of cattle rustling by the Dahalo groups in southern Madagascar. More generally, more research is needed to highlight the interconnections between human security and state security.
- Establish a standing research institution that can train, commission or encourage researchers to conduct this kind of research on the security sector on the continent.
- Researchers may need to substitute the term hybridity with complementarity which is more acceptable to states as the former raises concerns about recognition by formal state security actors.

### **Mpako Foaleng**

The crux of the UN and UNOWA's current work on peace and security centres on the sustaining peace approach which highlights the importance of violence prevention in UN actions. Context (crucial), flexibility and other principles. The main pillars and most recurrent questions in UNOWA's work on sustaining peace are SSR and reconciliation which are currently being piloting in West Africa in Burkina Faso and The Gambia through work on issues that can create conditions for peace.

The relevance of the HSG research is multiple. First, it enhances in-depth understanding of UNOWA's work contexts. Second, it enhances understanding about how to create the conditions for necessary but difficult discourses, such as the one impending in Côte d'Ivoire on the issues raised by the relevant papers.

By way of next steps, there is a need to build acknowledgement of the hybrid nature of security governance without necessarily undermining the rationale behind a state-centric approach and to table conversations like the one at hand in Burkina Faso about how it should handle its local equivalent of *dozos* whom the state sees as a threat but who are a safety source for local populations.

Overall, the HSG research will be very crucial to shaping narratives around security sector governance, and helps fill gaps in empirical knowledge about the prevalence of non-state security provisioning, especially at regional levels.

### **Daoud Alwan, IGAD**

IGAD is troubled by the continuous wave of instability on the continent, much of which is based on the erosion of traditional values through globalisation. In this 21<sup>st</sup> century, Africa, due to its unique and exceptional wealth in terms of natural and mineral resources and its inescapable geostrategic positioning is yet a pawn of external and rapacious international competitors.

Issues such as these and others emanating from the HSG research is what will inform both research and policies developed by IGAD now and in the near future.

### **Okey Uzoehina, ECOWAS**

ECOWAS has two key policy frameworks when it comes to security matters: the 2008 conflict prevention framework (ECPF) which is its primary reference document for security governance, and its 2016 policy framework for security reform and governance. Both contain many provisions on working with a range of NSAs in security governance. Article 73(c) of the ECPF which is more pointed than comparable UN and AU requirements) mandates ECOWAS to develop, adopt, and facilitate the implementation of a regulatory framework for non-state armed groups (vigilantes, militias, private security, community watch groups, etc.) with a sanctions regime. It is not clear how well positioned all stakeholders are for this undertaking and how member-state contexts might augur for the task. The ASSN and the HSG research can accompany a process of thinking about how ECOWAS can achieve this goal in ways that are acceptable to states and beneficial to all concerned. ECOWAS needs help to determine, among other things what form such a framework might take and what the interactions could be between national and regional levels within it.

### **Kathryn Nwajiaku, International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding, OECD**

The International Dialogue was set up in Ghana in 2008 with the aim of promoting effectiveness and national ownership in peacebuilding and statebuilding in countries affected by conflict and fragility (97 members from 20 countries).

The New Deal, supported by 50 countries and organisations across the world including some HSG case study contexts (examples; Sierra Leone and Liberia), contains three core pillars/suggested priorities:

- **Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs):** As foundation to MDGs, to identify priorities, guide funding decisions, and monitor progress.
- **FOCUS:** New terms of engagement to support country-owned and -led transitions out of fragility.
- **TRUST:** Commitments to provide aid and manage resources for better results in fragile states.

Human security is very central to the New Deal. It also forms part of the OECD's ongoing reflection and dialogue around what has gone wrong with SSR in its member countries. A big challenge is the incapacity of donor systems to address issues like NSAs as not just oversight but substantive actors in their own rights. While policy circles seem open to hybridity, conversations on it remain largely state centred to the exclusion of civil society. The HSG team needs to think about how to engage emerging opportunities at high policy levels to re-enact some of the discourses at the HSG meeting in ways that change practice. Coherence around questions like whose security is being served will be important to get people to listen with the intent of acting on what they hear about hybridity.

**Missak Kasongo, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)**

ECCAS is concerned with three big issues: firstly, what future roles do traditional authorities have given the increasing pace of globalisation? This question is pertinent because globalisation appears to be taking away identity, thereby questioning the influence of traditional authorities. Secondly, whereas CSOs are increasingly gaining recognition and authority in SSR processes, it appears the role of traditional authorities is being diminished in the formal SSR process. Thirdly, private security companies are spreading rapidly (especially in Angola) but state regulation is not at pace with this development.

**Alice Hills, Durham University**

There is no doubt that politics will continue to drive security discourses among the regional and national policy community. The role that CSOs play in this discourse, however peripheral in the past, is beginning to manifest in ways that CSOs such as the ASSN cannot be ignored. Empirical research such as this will certainly generate interest within the policy community. The next steps should focus on how to develop advocacy around the project's findings.

**Robin Luckham, Institute of Development Studies**

There is often a difficulty trying to determine specific outcomes of research of this nature where the objective seeks to more or less challenge the existing orthodoxy, and moreso in the security sector. Questions such as who exactly is doing this research and for what purpose and which audiences will always arise with this kind of endeavour. Is this effort geared toward producing a policy-based evidence and/or evidence-based policy research? Or is it about understanding the real security processes on the ground? Is this research aimed at providing analytical or methodological tool for understanding the security sector? Does it seek to contribute to the big debate on violence and power wherein we seek to interrogate the wider set of political and economic relations of security? Or is it about providing a voice to the poor and the vulnerable? There is the need to understand that the sources of transformation, change, dynamics and mutations of non-state actors often result from the ways states have responded to their own security threats. Such manifestations may present historical opportunities and breakpoints between state and non-state security actors.

## David Leonard, University of California, Berkeley

It seems old forms of authority which were entrenched, but had faced severe encroachment for the entry of colonisation have resurfaced in today's debate. Therefore, does the penetration of non-state actors represent a new construct of authority? Although they do not perform the same roles, the re-engagement of local structures of governance into operation may present a dynamic struggle and clash between compromised values and uncompromised values. Today, arguments about the importance of secret societies, especially in the matrices of traditional authorities in Liberia and Sierra Leone means a revival of an important aspect of traditional values that has been long overlooked. But in another vein, can one accept the trend of the 'new nationalism' as bringing back the debate about ethnicity?

### Session IX: Remarks on the African Societal Analysis (ASA): an offshoot of the HSG Project

#### Niagale Bagayoko, ASSN

##### Overview

With funding from the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), the ASSN set up the think tank African Societal Analysis/Analyse Sociétale Africaine (ASA) in October 2016 as a follow-on from the research programme *Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Implications for State Building* (HSG). The ASA is a response to the necessity highlighted by the HSG project for more nuanced understandings of socio-cultural dynamics that are specific to the African continent and how they underpin various social and political happenings. The ASA's key aim is to use key lessons from the HSG project to deepen and support security and development policy making and implementation by producing, on an ongoing basis, information and data designed to assist decision-makers to better grasp the sociological realities within which security and development governance in Africa are rooted. While there is no intuitive security link with some of the focal topics, the HSG findings show that the underlying dynamics make for a better appreciation of the environment and implementation of effective policies in Africa.

ASA's knowledge takes three main forms:

- institutional mappings of the relationships between the formal and informal security institutions (short analytical notes) in both textual and visual format (Prezi presentations) are published weekly in French and English by email and posted on social networks as well as on the ASSN web site, <http://africansecuritynetwork.org/assn/institutional-mapping/>. The first institutional mappings, including those deriving from the HSG project, were launched in October 2016 with support from the OIF.
- Tailored analyses (case studies) of the societal and cultural dynamics of today's Africa. In this wise, a study on 'The role of formal and informal institutions in resources critical to food security in the conflict region of Northern Mali' has been commissioned by CARE International under USAID funding.



- Training via distance learning (e-learning resources, video supports, tele-briefings via Visio conference or Skype, webinars) or/and on-site courses.

### *Objectives*

By introducing new sociological parameters and incorporating often neglected indicators, the ASA's objective is threefold:

- Reinforce oversight and early warning systems, crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and mediation processes that are more rooted in local and societal contexts.
- Support security and development policy formulation and implementation, based on a deeper understanding of local realities.
- Connect decision-makers with a new community of African experts.

### *Method and approach*

All of this is achieved by mobilising a network of locally based African experts on grassroots institutions and actors, with the objective of highlighting the role of non-state actors, local or transnational networks, and so-called informal standards and practices, in six thematic areas, namely:

- Traditional authorities, community membership and social solidarities/exclusion.
- Religions and religious networks.
- Gender.
- Informal security and justice.
- Social changes and emerging stakeholders.
- African and transnational networks.

HSG outputs and deliverables have so far been disseminated chiefly via the ASA (ASSN website, emails, Facebook, Twitter) in the form of policy briefs that highlight varied aspects of each case study and conform with both the IDRC and the ASA "institutional mapping" format. Five papers were published in English and French between December 2016 and April 2017 with three others scheduled for release in early 2018.

### *OIF collaboration*

The ASA took off with an initial grant from the OIF of €20,000 to support work on four countries identified by the Directorate of Political Affairs and Democratic Governance, namely the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire. For each of these countries, institutional maps have been produced on religions and religious networks; traditional authorities, community affiliation and solidarity/social exclusion; social change and emerging players; and informal security and justice. Examples of specific topics include Fulani communities and Islam in Mali; the *Moog Naaba* and the Church in Burkina Faso; the *Malinké* and *dozos* in Côte d'Ivoire; and chieftaincy and the *Zaraguinas* in the Central African Republic. Twelve further mappings will be delivered by mid-November 2017 under a new agreement signed with the OIF in June 2017. Topics will include migration among West African countries; rap groups as youth mobilisers in Senegal; and the roles of women in terror groups.

## *Challenges and opportunities*

Although some ASA maps were well received and re-broadcasted by certain personnel of the United Nations and the University of Montreal (UQAM) through its Bulletin FrancoPaix, the ASA is looking to expand its consumption beyond the 1500 contacts currently on its contact list. Part of this challenge is that for budgetary reasons, many ASA outputs are available only in French, despite a need to reach wider academic and policy audiences, particularly in the field of peacekeeping, security system reform promotion and the fight against terrorism in the the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, and the OECD. To these ends, the ASA desires to mobilise more of the OIF and the IDRC's dissemination networks.

The ASA needs core support to attain its objectives, specifically in the areas of:

- **Communication:** to broaden the reach of its institutional mappings.
- **Advocacy:** to promote its novel societal approach to the study of security and development.
- **Translation:** to facilitate wider access to all its knowledge products.
- **Fundraising:** to help identify other potentially interested funders (especially international foundations).
- **Financial support.**

## CONCLUSION AND CLOSING REMARKS

### Session IX: Entry point of hybridity in policy-

#### **Niagale Bagayoko, ASSN**

Linking the research themes and outputs to policy actions could follow certain key steps such as:

- *Assessment:* this entails a comprehensive mapping of the security sector.
- *Training:* focusing on peacekeeping missions.
- *Programming:* research, policy engagements, and networking.
- *Monitoring and evaluation:* how to take into account the role of informal actors, mobilise local expertise and local resources with an emphasis on deep knowledge vis-à-vis intelligible knowledge.
- *Communication:* adopting the use of local language to communicate research findings to target audiences.
- Need to deepen partnerships and create new projects on hybridity through South-South dialogue.

#### **Ramata Thioune, IDRC**

There is a great potential to support critical thinking and academic research that will contribute to better human security and development in Africa. This is why the IDRC took the initiative to collaborate with the ASSN in this endeavour. The research has revealed many interesting but very important perspectives that had long been ignored in the security sector discourse. Dissemination of the research publication should not only target policymakers but also technocrats. There are other thematic

areas that are being considered even though the HSG project has formally ended. Going forward, the IDRC will continue to seek avenues for developing analytical tools and concepts that will help improve human security and inclusivity. This will involve providing opportunities to build intellectual community and networking.

*Next steps: Outcomes and results*

- Though dissemination of the research findings remains crucial, more efforts should be made to engage policymakers.
- There is the need to aggregate the different case studies in this research to produce one coherent narrative that will be used to engage policymakers.
- There is the need to upscale this first stage of the research using more topical themes in the security sector.

*IDRC programming*

Currently, IDRC is realigning its programmatic areas with the view to focusing more on governance and justice. However, future themes will include:

- Empowering vulnerable groups and providing safer spaces to vulnerable groups to escape from violence and conflicts.
- Youth violence (youth involvement in violence), with sub-themes such as:
  - Radicalisation.
  - Access to land and forced migration, and
  - Sexual rights.

These are areas that can be explored by the ASSN for future collaboration.

## APPENDICES

### I. Agenda



#### International Conference on Hybrid Security Governance in Africa

African Royal Beach Hotel  
Accra, Ghana  
21 - 22 July, 2017

DAY I (21 July)		
8.30: 9:00	Registration	
9.00 - 9.30.	<b>Session 1:</b>  Welcome and Introduction to the Workshop	<b>Eboe Hutchful</b>  <i>Project Leader</i>  <b>H.E. Heather Cameron</b> <i>Canadian High Commissioner to Ghana</i>  <b>Ramata Thioune</b>  <i>IDRC Programme Manager</i>

<b>Sessions II-VII: Presentation of Research Findings</b>		
9:30-11:00	<p><b>Session II:</b></p> <p><i>Chair:</i> Titilope Ajayi</p> <p><b>Bondo society, gender and police reform in Sierra Leone.</b></p> <p><i>Discussant(s)</i></p> <p><b>Gender, transitional justice and justice sector reform in Liberia</b></p> <p><i>Discussant(s):</i></p>	<p><b>Fredline M’Cormack</b></p> <p><i>Kathryn Nwajiaku (OECD)</i></p> <p><b>Freida M’Cormack</b></p> <p>Thomas Jaye</p>
11 - 11:30	<b>Coffee Break</b>	
11:30-12:30	<p><b>Session III:</b></p> <p><i>Chair:</i> Robin Luckham</p> <p><b>Securing Pride: Sexuality, Security and the Post Apartheid State</b></p> <p><i>Discussant:</i></p>	<p><b>Xavier Livermon</b></p> <p><i>Kathryn Nwajiaku</i></p>
12.30 - 13.30	<b>Lunch</b>	
13.30 - 15.00	<p><b>Session IV:</b></p> <p><i>Chair:</i> Niagale Bagayoko</p> <p><b>Formal organisation and decision-making processes of Ivorian defence and security forces.</b></p> <p><b>Conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire</b></p> <p><i>Discussants:</i></p>	<p><b>Moussa Fofana</b></p> <p><b>Rodrigue Kone</b></p> <p><i>Mpako Foyaleng (UNOWA)</i></p> <p><i>Maxime Ricard (UQAM)</i></p>
15:00-15:30	<b>Coffee Break</b>	

15.30 - 17:00	<p><b>Session V:</b></p> <p><i>Chair:</i> Medhane Tadesse</p> <p><b>Thematic Area:</b> <b>Armed Conflict and Security in the Horn of Africa</b></p> <p><b>Topic:</b> <b>Armed Defence forces and Chiefdom security Committees in Sierra Leone.</b></p> <p><i>Discussants:</i></p>	<p><b>Mohamed Abdi Omer</b></p> <p><i>Daoud Alwan (IGAD)</i></p> <p><i>David Leonard</i></p> <p><b>Osman Gbla</b></p> <p><i>Ernest Larrey (KA IPTC)</i></p>
<b>DAY II (JUNE 22)</b>		
8:30-10:00	<p><b>Session VI:</b></p> <p><i>Chair:</i> Thomas Jaye</p> <p><b>Topic:</b> <b>Safety and security of poor urban communities in Nigeria.</b></p> <p><b>Topic:</b> <b>Policing Actors, Plural Processes and Hybridisation: Histories of Everyday Policing Practice in Central Nigeria-</b></p> <p><i>Discussants</i></p>	<p><b>Oluwole S Ojewale</b></p> <p><b>Jimam Lar</b></p> <p><i>Okey Uzoechina (ECOWAS)</i></p> <p><i>Alice Hills (Durham)</i></p>
10:00-11:00	<p><b>Session VII:</b></p> <p><i>Chair:</i> Mpako Foaleng</p> <p><b>Conclusion: Comparing Research Findings on Hybrid Security Governance</b></p>	<p><b>KA IPTC Research Team</b></p>
11:00-11:30	<b>Coffee Break</b>	

11:30-13:00	<p><b>Session VII1: Roundtable: Implications of the Project Findings for Policy and Future Research</b></p> <p><i>Chair: Eboe Hutchful</i></p> <p><b>Panellists:</b></p> <p>Hamouda Kanu, <i>African Union</i></p> <p>Mpako Foaleng, <i>UNOWA</i></p> <p>Kathryn Nwajiaku, <i>International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding. OECD</i></p> <p>Okey Uzoechina, <i>ECOWAS</i></p> <p>Missak Kasongo, <i>ECCAS</i></p> <p>Daoud Alwin, <i>IGAD</i></p> <p>Kwesi Aning, <i>KAIPTC</i></p> <p>Alice Hills, <i>Durham University</i></p> <p>Robin Luckham (IDS)</p>	
13:00-14:00	<b>Lunch</b>	
14:00-15:00	<p><b>Session VIII: Roundtable: Political and Policy Implications of the Research Findings (conclude):</b></p>	
15.00-15.30	<p><b>Session IX:</b></p> <p><b>Remarks on the African Societal Analysis (ASA): an off-shoot of the HSG Project</b></p>	<b>Niagale Bagayoko</b>
15:30-16:00	<p><b>Concluding Remarks and Way Forward</b></p> <p><b>ASSN Project Co-Lead</b></p> <p><b>IDRC Programme Manager</b></p>	<p><b>Niagale Bagayoko</b></p> <p><b>Ramata Thioune</b></p>
16:00	Conference closes	
Evening & Day 3	DEPARTURES	

## II. List of participants

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